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In the first essay, I study job-education mismatch and estimate its impact on the 
earnings of recent immigrants to Canada. Previous related studies have largely ignored 
cross-country differences in schooling quality. This essay presents a novel idea to 
account for cross-country differences in the quality of education, using Card and 
Krueger’s (1992) two-step approach. The earning impact of job-education mismatch is 
estimated using an Over-Required-Under Education technique. Data from the 
Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada is used, and both cross sectional and panel 
data estimation methods are used to estimate the earning equations. Results show that 
recent immigrants to Canada have a persistent high incidence and intensity of over-
education with substantial negative impact on their earnings. Most importantly is that not 
accounting for differences in educational quality across source countries leads to: 1) 
Overstating (understating) the incidence of over-education (under-education). 2) 
Understating (overstating) the return to over-education (under-education) for immigrants 
from countries with low quality of schooling. 3) Overstating (understating) the return to 




In the second essay, I quality-adjust human capital acquired from different source 
countries. This is achieved by explicitly deriving quality-adjustment indices, using data 
on adult males from the 2001 Canadian census. The derived indices are then used to 
examine the role of schooling quality in explaining the differential returns to schooling 
and over-education rates by nativity. I also use these indices to identify important inputs 
in the production technology of schooling quality. The key finding of this study is that 
accounting for schooling quality virtually eliminates the native-immigrant gaps in the 
returns to schooling and in the incidence of over-education. Results show wide variations 
in the return to schooling across countries. These variations are significantly explained by 
cross-country differences in educational resources, particularly government educational 
expenditure and the length of the school term. 
The third essay studies the effect of graphic cigarette warning labels on smoking 
prevalence and quit attempts. The Generalized Estimating Equation model is used to 
estimate the population-averaged (marginal) effects of tobacco graphic warnings on 
smoking prevalence and quit attempts. It is found that graphic warnings had a statistically 
significant effect on smoking prevalence and quit attempts. In particular, the warnings 
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The labor market performance of immigrants compared to native-born Canadians has 
been the subject of intensive research (e.g. Galarneau and Morissette, 2004; Li et al., 
2006; Green et al., 2007; Wald and Fang, 2008). Both earnings and occupational 
placement have been commonly used to assess the degree of economic integration of 
immigrants. A key factor directly related to this integration process is the quality of 
foreign-acquired human capital brought into the host country (Friedberg, 2000; Chiswick 
and Miller, 2009).  
A growing body of research has examined job-education mismatch among 
immigrants and its impact on earnings (e.g. Galarneau and Morissette, 2004; Li et al., 
2006; Green et al., 2007; Wald and Fang, 2008). The general finding is that immigrants 
have a substantial earnings disadvantage and a higher incidence of over-education 
relative to the native-born.  
The adverse effects of over-education are well established. It has been shown that 
over-education is associated with high job dissatisfaction, high absenteeism, low 
productivity, poor health, job instability and lower wages (Tsang, 1987; Tsang et al., 
1991). In addition, long term over-education may have negative impact on an individual’s 
technical ability, especially if skills are not updated. Moreover, over-education may be 
costly for the economy because human capital resources are potentially inefficiently 
allocated, leading to lower economic growth (Barrett et al. 2006). 
Accounting for cross-countries’ schooling quality differences has been largely 
ignored in previous studies. Immigrants come from different source countries whose 
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educational systems are of different quality. It is well documented in the literature that 
the national origin of immigrant’ education significantly affects its return in the host 
country’s labor market. The first essay of this thesis explicitly accounted for differences 
in the quality of education by adjusting immigrants’ “nominal” years of schooling from 
different source countries to reflect their “real” value using Card and Krueger’s (1992) 
two-step framework. In particular, the first essay attempted to answer the following 
questions: First, does schooling quality matter for the incidence of job-education 
mismatch? Second, how do the incidence and intensity of job-education mismatch evolve 
over time? Third, what is the impact of job-education mismatch on earnings? Data from 
the longitudinal survey of immigrants to Canada was used to achieve the objective of this 
study, and data about schooling quality was obtained from Hanushek and Kimko (2000).  
Two empirical regularities have emerged in the economic assimilation literature. 
First, foreign-obtained schooling is discounted in the destination country’s labor market, 
as reflected by lower return toan immigrant’s education compared to the native-born (e.g. 
Chiswick, 1978; Baker and Benjamin, 1994; Friedberg, 2000; Alboim et al., 2005; 
Chiswick and Miller, 2008). Second, the prevalence of over-education is on average 
higher among immigrants than the native-born (e.g. Li et al., 2006; Kler, 2007; Green et 
al., 2007; Wald and Fang, 2008; Galarneau and Morissette, 2008; Nielsen, 2011). Given 
that schooling quality is not directly observed, previous studies on the economic 
integration of immigrants have largely ignored the quality dimension of immigrants’ 
human capital, and focused only on quantity measures, such as years of schooling. 
However, recent empirical evidence has shown that the quality of human capital is as 
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important as its quantity (e.g. Hanushek and Kimko, 2000; Sweetman, 2004; Chiswick 
and Miller, 2010; Schoellman, 2011).  
The second essay adds to existing literature on cross-country differences in education 
quality by incorporating the idea that the labor market performance of foreign educated 
immigrants in the same labor market can be used to measure the average quality of 
schooling of their home countries. In particular, the returns to foreign-obtained schooling 
of immigrants in the Canadian labor market were used to measure the average quality of 
schooling for a wide set of countries. The estimated returns to schooling were used to 
identify important inputs in the production technology of schooling quality, adjusting 
immigrants’ years of schooling for cross-county quality differences and revisiting 
evidence on the differential schooling returns and over-education rates by nativity.  
The third essay of this thesis uses longitudinal Canadian data to examine the effect of 
graphic warnings labels on smoking prevalence and quit attempts. The adverse effects of 
tobacco use are well documented. Smoking is the leading preventable cause of premature 
death in the world and is a risk factor for many diseases (e.g. strokes, cardiovascular 
disease and cancer). According to the World Health Organization (WHO), smoking is 
responsible for 6 million deaths and by the year 2030; this figure is expected to reach 8 
million (WHO, 2011). The average life span of a smoker is reduced by 6 to 10 years. In 
Canada, smoking is the leading cause of premature and preventable mortality. It is 
responsible for more than 45,000 deaths and a total economic burden of $15 billion per 
year. 
To address the rising smoking epidemic, the WHO Framework Convention on 
Tobacco Control (FCTC), requires member countries to implement measures aimed at 
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reducing the demand for tobacco products (WHO, 2008). Article 11 of the FCTC 
provides guidelines for warning messages on cigarette packages. It recommends the use 
of rotating, large, clear, and visible graphic warning messages and it should cover 50% or 
more of the principal display areas of the package (WHO, 2008). In line with the global 
effort to curb the rising smoking epidemic, the Government of Canada implemented 
several measures to discourage smoking. In January 2001, Canada became the first 
country in the world to enforce graphic health warning labels on cigarette packages. The 
warnings occupied 50% of the principal display area and appeared in English and French 
on both sides of the package. Since then, graphic warnings have been the subject of 
intensive research to determine their effectiveness as an antismoking measure. 
Several studies have assessed the effectiveness of graphic warnings in discouraging 
smoking (For a recent review of the literature see Hammond, 2011), with the general 
finding that graphic warnings were more effective than text only messages (e.g. 
Hammond et al.,2006; Givel 2007; Borland et al., 2009; Hammond, 2011). Though there 
is a substantial literature that examines the effectiveness of graphic warnings as a key 
tobacco control measure, evidence based on actual smoking behavior has been limited. 
Previous studies relied on respondents’ answers to questions about the graphic warnings 
to determine their effectiveness. The questions covered the desire to quit, increased health 
knowledge of tobacco risks, ability to recall the messages, and self-reported 
effectiveness. The problem with these types of questions is that individuals tend to 
provide logical responses to questions which involve an appeal to fear. These answers 
may not reflect actual behavior, and hence may not provide an objective assessment of 
the effect of graphic warnings (Hastings et al., 2004; Ruiter and Kok, 2005). 
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Accordingly, this study takes a different approach by using survey data that has smoking 
related information without any health warning questions. In particular, the effectiveness 
of graphic cigarette warning labels was assessed based on their effect on smoking 
prevalence and quit attempts. Longitudinal data from the Canadian National Population 
Health Survey (1998-2008) is used to conduct the multivariate regression analyses.  
Three approaches are used to capture the effect of graphic warnings. In the first 
approach, the graphic warning is considered to be in effect starting from July, 2001. In 
the second approach, the warning is considered to be in effect from December, 2001. 
However, in the third approach, a scaled variable that takes the value of zero for up to the 
first six months in 2001, then increases gradually to one from December, 2001 is used. 
Given the longitudinal structure of the Canadian National Population Health Survey and 
to account for the within individuals dependency, a Generalized estimating equation 
(GEE) model is used to examine the population-averaged (marginal) effects of tobacco 
graphic warnings on smoking prevalence and quit attempts. The merit of this model is 
that it accounts for correlated responses in longitudinal data, and gives consistent 
estimates of the regression parameters and of their variances under weak assumptions 
about the joint distribution. Three different working correlation structures; exchangeable, 
autoregressive and unstructured, are used to check if the main results are sensitive to the 
structure of covariance matrix.  
There are several policy implications from the findings of this thesis, especially, for 
the Canadian immigration policy, as well as policies designed to help immigrants to 
assimilate in the labor market. In particular, the findings of the first two essays help to 
identify which groups of immigrants are genuinely more over-educated, which is of 
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interest to policies concerned with immigrants’ assimilation. In addition, the Canadian 
immigration point system could take into account the quality of schooling when assigning 
points for education. The third essay of this thesis provides longitudinal evidence that 
graphic tobacco warnings have a statistically significant impact on smoking prevalence 
and quit attempts. This supports the current call for countries that are not yet 





Job-Education Mismatch and its Impact on Earnings among 
Recent Immigrants to Canada: Does Schooling Quality Matters?  
 
-Abstract- 
There is a large literature documenting a high incidence of job-education mismatch 
among immigrants. When education is measured by the years of schooling alone - as is 
standard in previous studies - some of this apparent mismatch arises due to differences in 
schooling quality between the host and source countries. This paper presents a novel idea 
to account for cross-country differences in the quality of education, using Card and 
Krueger’s (1992) two-step approach. The earning impact of job-education mismatch is 
estimated using an Over-Required-Under Education technique. Data from the 
Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada is used, and both cross sectional and panel 
data estimation methods are used to estimate the earning equations. Results show that 
recent immigrants to Canada have a persistent high incidence and intensity of over-
education with substantial negative impact on their earnings, though some sort of 
assimilation has taken place with time spent in Canada. I also find strong evidence that 
source countries’ schooling quality, as measured by international test scores, affect the 
returns to education for immigrants in the Canadian labor market. Results also show that 
not accounting for differences in educational quality across source countries leads to: 1) 
Overstating (understating) the incidence of over-education (under-education). 2) 
Understating (overstating) the return to over-education (under-education) for immigrants 
from countries with low quality of schooling. 3) Overstating (understating) the return to 
over-education (under-education) for immigrants from countries with high quality of 
schooling. 
 




1. Introduction  
The contribution of immigrants to host country’s economic welfare largely 
depends on the degree by which their foreign-obtained educational qualifications 
translate into useable skills in the labor market. An empirical regularity in the 
immigrants’ assimilation literature is the imperfect transferability of immigrants’ human 
capital across countries (Friedberg, 2000; Green et al., 2007; Chiswick and Miller, 2009). 
Newly arrived immigrants usually face a set of barriers when searching for jobs that 
match their qualifications.1 These barriers either prevent or delay their integration into the 
host country’s labor market. Immigrants who find a job upon arrival to host country 
usually work in jobs that require a level of education less than what they actually possess. 
This form of job-education mismatch is known in the literature as over-education.2 If a 
worker is employed in a job requiring more years of schooling than what he/she actually 
has, he/she is considered to be under-educated. Most of the job-education mismatch 
literature has focused on studying the phenomenon of over-education due to its high 
incidence and significant adverse effects. 
Though there is a large body of literature that studied job-education mismatch 
among immigrants and its impact on earnings (e.g. Reitz, 2001; Green et al., 2007; Wald 
and Fang, 2008; Chiswick and Miller, 2009), previous studies have largely ignored the 
effect of cross-country differences in schooling quality. To measure the incidence of job-
education mismatch, actual years of schooling of the workers are compared to required 
                                                 
1 The common problems that immigrants encounter include non-recognition of foreign 
credentials and experience, lack of work experience, language barriers, lack of contacts in the job 
market, costly and long accreditation process for regulated occupations (see Table 1 in the 
appendix for details). 
 




years of schooling in each occupation. A common practice in the literature is that studies 
implicitly or explicitly assume that nominally equal years of schooling of individuals 
from different source countries are of equal quality. This treatment may not be accurate 
given the substantial evidence on the existence of wide variation in schooling quality 
across countries, and that the return and degree of transferability of human capital 
depends on its national origin (Friedberg, 2000; Hanushek and Kimko, 2000; Bratsberg 
and Terrell, 2002; Sweetman, 2004; Chiswick and Miller, 2010). 
This paper adds to the job-education mismatch literature by presenting a novel 
idea to control for cross-country differences in schooling quality. In particular, this paper 
aims to answer the following questions: First, does schooling quality matter for the 
incidence of job-education mismatch and its earnings impact? Second, how do the 
incidence and intensity of job-education mismatch evolve over time?3 Third, what is the 
impact of job-education mismatch on earnings?  
In this paper, I extend Card and Krueger’s (1992) two-step approach to account 
for the difference in schooling quality across source countries.4 The impact of job-
education mismatch on earnings is estimated using an ORU model which is attributable 
to Duncan and Hoffman (1981).5  
                                                 
3 Studying the pattern of over-education overtime helps to understand the assimilation behavior of 
immigrants in the labor market.  
 
4The methodology used here is an application of the idea developed by Card and Krueger (1992) 
who related cross-state returns to schooling of migrants to the schooling quality of states. 
 
5 ORU stands for over-education, required-education and under-education. Under this model, 
total years of schooling is decomposed into three components; years required by the job, years of 




The main data source of this study is the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to 
Canada, hereinafter LSIC. Data about source country schooling quality is obtained from 
Hanushek and Kimko (2000).  
The results of this study provide strong evidence that source country’s schooling 
quality matters for the incidence of job-education mismatch and its effect on earnings. In 
particular, I found that not controlling for source countries’ schooling quality differences 
leads to overstating (understating) the incidence of over-education (under-education). 
Analogously, not controlling for source countries’ schooling quality differences leads to 
understating (overstating) the return to over-education (under-education) for immigrants 
from countries with low quality of schooling. The converse is true for immigrants with 
high quality of education.  
The paper proceeds as follow. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 presents 
the empirical methodology. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 presents and discusses 
the results. Section 6 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Background and Literature 
Immigrants represent a considerable fraction of the population, and a major 
source of labor force growth in many host countries such as Canada, US, Australia.6 As a 
result, the labor market outcome of immigrants has been subject to intensive research 
among academics. Along this dimension, several studies, within the assimilation 
literature, have examined the occupational outcome of immigrants relative to their 
educational attainment (e.g. Galarneau and Morissette, 2004; Li et al., 2006; Green et al., 
                                                 




2007; Wald and Fang, 2008). The general finding in the literature is that there is 
substantial earning disadvantage and high incidence of over-education among immigrants 
(see Figures 1 and 2). For example, Li et al. (2006) found that during the 1993-2001 
period 52% of recent immigrants to Canada were over-educated. In another study, Wald 
and Fang (2008) found that half of the immigrants in Canada who arrived between 1989 
and 1997 were over-educated.  
The adverse effects of over-education are well established. It has been shown that 
over-education is associated with high job dissatisfaction, high absenteeism, low 
productivity, poor health, job instability and lower wages (Tsang, 1987; Tsang et al., 
1991). In addition, long term over-education may have negative impact on an individual’s 
technical ability, especially if skills are not updated. Moreover, over-education may be 
costly for the economy because human capital resources are potentially inefficiently 
allocated, leading to lower economic growth (Barrett et al. 2006).7 For example, the 
Conference Board of Canada (2001) estimated that the Canadian economy loses up to 5 
billion Canadian dollars annually because of over-education. 
The standard practice in the literature on job-education mismatch is to measure 
education by the years of schooling alone without controlling for schooling quality. As a 
result, some of the apparent job-education mismatch arises due to cross-country 
differences in schooling quality. Equal nominal years of schooling from different origin 
countries have different real value in the labor market, and so it is important to control for 
quality differences when studying job-education mismatch. 
                                                 
7 Job -educational mismatch does not necessarily imply inefficient use of human resources. 
Education is only one element of the stock of human capital. Other elements include experience, 
training, ability. Efficiency must be judged on whether the total amount of worker’s human 
capital is fully utilized or not (Sicherman, 1991). 
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Studies have shown that the observed foreign/native born earnings gap is 
primarily due to the national origin of the human capital (Friedberg, 2000; Alboim et al., 
2005). For example, Friedberg (2000) found that the source of human capital 
significantly accounts for the residual earnings disadvantage of immigrants to Israel. 
Immigrants come from countries with educational systems of different qualities. It has 
been shown that immigrants from countries with a  high quality educational system have 
better labor market outcomes than those from countries with low a quality educational 
system (Sweetman, 2004; Chiswick and Miller, 2010).8 In a study of the occupational 
attainment of immigrants in the US labor market, Mattoo et al. (2008) found that 
immigrants from Asian and industrial countries are less likely to end up working in 
unskilled jobs than immigrants from Latin America and Eastern Europe. The authors 
found a strong relationship between these differences in occupational attainment and the 
characteristics of the source country that influence the quality of human capital.  
In a related study, Bratsberg and Terrell (2002) found that the return to education 
of immigrants to the United States is affected by measures of source country educational 
inputs, a commonly used proxy for schooling quality. As well difference in the 
characteristics of educational systems account for most of the variation in rates of return 
to education earned by immigrants. In a Canadian study, Sweetman (2004) found that the 
returns to schooling are greatest for those educated in Canada, and smallest for those 
educated abroad. He found a strong correlation between source country schooling quality 
and the return to schooling, and that moving up from the 25th to the 75th percentile of the 
                                                 
8 Two main methods are used to measure education quality. The first uses education outcomes 
such as scores on internationally standardized tests like the Programme for International Student 
Assessment (PISA) as a proxy for schooling quality. The second approach involves estimating an 
education quality production function and relating educational inputs, such as pupils-teacher 
ratio, expenditures per pupil to the quality of the educational system. 
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schooling quality index (which was derived by Hanushek and Kimko (2000)) is 
associated with a 10 % increase in annual earnings. He also found that the earnings of 
immigrants who come to Canada at young ages are not a function of their source country 
school quality because they got most of their education in Canada. In another study, 
Chiswick and Miller (2010) found a strong positive relationship between the payoffs to 
schooling for immigrants in the US labor market and their source country schooling 
quality as measured by the PISA9 reading, mathematics and science literacy scores. Using 
Israeli Census data, Friedberg (2000) showed that the most important factor determining 
the earning gap between immigrants and natives is the source of human capital, and that 
this factor fully explains the residual earnings disadvantage of immigrants to Israel. She 
showed that accounting for this factor will eliminate or even reverse the gap in the 
residual earnings of Israeli immigrants and natives.  
In Canada, empirical evidence suggests that an  immigrant’s foreign education 
and work experience are significantly discounted in the Canadian labor market, and that 
the extent of this discounting varies by source country. For example, Alboim et al. (2005) 
found that the return to a year of foreign education is about 70 percent of the return to a 
year of Canadian education.  
Two main approaches are used in the literature to account for the impact of 
schooling quality on earnings. The first approach involves adding a school quality 
measures in a standard earning equation, either as a separate explanatory variable, or 
interactively with years of schooling or both. This approach was used by Sweetman 
(2004) to study the impact of school quality differences on earning of immigrants to 
                                                 
9 PISA refers to the Programme for International Student Assessment. It is an international 
evaluation of 15-year-old school pupils' scholastic performance conducted every three years by 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 
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Canada. The second approach which is attributable to Card and Krueger (1992) entails a 
two-step estimation process. In the first step, country-specific returns to total schooling is 
estimated from a standard earnings equation which are then regressed on the school 
quality measure in a second step. The current study develops a methodology, based on 
Card and Krueger’s (1992) two-step approach, to account for the effect of source 
country’s schooling quality differences.  
 
3. Methodology 
The first step of the analysis is to measure the prevalence and intensity of job-
education mismatch, and estimate its impact on earnings, using quality-unadjusted years 
of schooling.10 The second step is to construct a quality adjustment index for each source 
country to control for cross-country differences in schooling quality.11 The quality-
adjusted years of schooling will then be used to revisit the evidence found in the first 
step. These steps are explained in detail in the following subsections.  
 
3.1. Measuring job-education mismatch  
 
As standard in the literature, job-education mismatch is measured by the following 
equation. 
	 =  -            (1); 
where   represents total years of schooling completed by worker  working in job 	, and 
	represents years of schooling required by job 	. If   >, the worker is considered to 
                                                 
10 Intensity of job-education mismatch refers to years of surplus or deficit schooling beyond what 
is required by the job. 




be over-educated. Conversely, if   <  , the worker is under-educated, while if   =, 
the worker is just-educated. 
In this study, required schooling for each occupation was determined using the 
realized match method. Under this method, years of required education in each 
occupation are determined by the modal (i.e. most frequent) or mean years of schooling 
of the workers working in that particular occupation.12 An empirical regularity in the job-
education mismatch literature is that the fundamental findings are robust to the method of 
measuring required education (Hartog, 2000).  
 
3.2. The impact of source counties’ schooling quality on returns to education  
Before adjusting years of schooling to quality differences across source countries, 
it is useful to examine whether schooling quality, as measured by international test 
scores, affects the return to schooling. The methodology used here is an application of the 
idea developed by Card and Krueger (1992) who related cross-state returns to schooling 
of migrants to the schooling quality of states. The idea was also applied to international 
immigrants by Chiswick and Miller (2010). 13 
The first step involves estimating an ORU earning equation, with total years of 
schooling decomposed into three components; years required by the job, years of surplus 
schooling above what is required by the job and years of deficit schooling.14 In the 
                                                 
12 This study used the modal rather than the mean years of schooling because it is less sensitive to 
outliers.  
 
13 Chiswick and Miller (2010) extended Card and Krueger’s (1992) two-step approach to study 
the impact of source countries’ schooling quality on the returns to immigrants’ education in the 
US labor market. 
 
14 This model is attributable to Duncan and Hoffman (1981), and is an extension of the standard 
Mincerian earning function. 
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second step of Card and Krueger’s approach, the country-specific returns to required 
education, over-education and under-education obtained from the first step are regressed 
on the schooling quality index derived by Hanushek and Kimko (2000). This model can 
be presented as follow: 
lnW = β	X + ∑ β	I + ∑ β	I ∗ 	S  + ∑ β 	I ∗ 	S	!  + ∑ β"	(	I ∗ 	S$ ) + u 
                  (2) 
β =	α( +	α	schooling	quality + μ		      (3) 
β  =	δ( +	δ	schooling	quality + ϵ		      (4) 
β" =	θ( +	θ	schooling	quality + φ																																										    (5); 
where , 		9:;	< index for individual, source country and time period. 
 I = Set of country indicators 
β = country	specifc	intercept 
β = country	specific	return	to	required	education 
β  = country	specific	return	to	overeducation 
β" = country	specific	return	to	undereducation 
u = time	variant	residual 
Specifying the earning function as in equation 2 allows each country of origin to 
have its own intercept and return to Over-Required-Under Education which is central to 
the current study. Equation 2 shows that the logarithm of the weekly wage of individual  
from country 	 is determined by a country-specific fixed effect	β, years of Over S	! -
Required S	 -Under S	D  schooling, a set of common observed covariates X and a 
stochastic error termu. The control variables included in X are a quadratic in potential 
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experience, measured by age minus years of schooling minus 6 years, age and its square, 
two indicators for marital status, ten indicators for field of study, five indicators for 
immigration category, five indicators for provincial fixed effects, an indicator for gender, 
two indicators for language proficiency and an indicator for visible minority status. 
 
3.3. Adjusting years of schooling to quality differences  
 
To derive a quality adjustment index for each source country, the country-specific 
return to required-education(β), obtained from the first step of Card and Krueger’s 
model, is expressed as the multiplicative of two components; a return E common to 
immigrants from all countries and an index that captures the relative quality of 
schooling	q (Behrman and Birdsall,1983; Bratsberg and Terrell,2002). Formally, this can 
be written as follows:  
β = β q          (6); 
where:  
β = return to required education, which is country invariant 
q =	F GHIJJK	LDMKN	OPQR	JS		HJDON		GHIJJK	LDMKN	OPQR	JS	TMOPM" ."V	WXY = country-specific quality adjustment index  
For simplicity, expressing equations 6 in logarithmic form yields 




where j captures unobserved country-specific factors. The derived country-specific 
quality adjustment indices q are used to convert the “nominal” years of schooling of 
immigrants from different source countries into Canadian terms. 15  
This is calculated as  
 Si,jlm =	qj ∗ 	Si,jl	         (8) 
The quality-adjusted years of schooling Sn,olm are then used to re-measure the 
incidence of over-education and it’s earning impact as will be shown in the next 
subsection.16 
3.4. The impact of job-education mismatch on earnings 
 
In this section I estimate the impact of job-education mismatch on earnings using 
the ORU model. It has been shown that the ORU model is superior to the conventional 
Mincerian earnings function that uses total schooling as an explanatory variable.17  
The ORU model can be presented as follows:18  
                                                 
15 I assumed that the quality adjustment factor applied to years of required schooling is the same 
as that applied to surplus and deficit schooling. The rationale behind this is that years of surplus 
schooling and deficit schooling are determined in the first place before quality adjusting years of 
schooling. 
 
16 In another specification, a separate quality adjustment index was derived for required 
education, under-education and over-education. Then the adjusted total schooling was measured 
by the following equation 	Sn,olm =	q ∗ 	 +qJ ∗	^ − qD ∗	a. Results using this 
specification were very close to that of using only the adjusting factor derived from the return to 
required-education.  
 
17 The standard earning function may give misleading results because the return to surplus 
schooling - beyond what is required by the job - is likely to be lower than the return to required 
schooling. 
 
18  It should be noted that SJ and SD are mutually exclusive, where for each individual one of 
them or both must be zero. 
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 Sbq  =Sb  + SbJ  - SbD          (9) 
Ln	wb = β( + β	Xb + βSb + βSbJ + β SbD + ub    (10) 
 
Where , 		9:;	< index for individual, occupation and time period. S denotes required 
years of schooling by the job, SJ denotes years of over-education and a denotes years of 
under-education. t is a vector of other control variables including age, gender, field of 
study, marital status, immigration class, work experience, language proficiency, 
provincial dummies and visible minority status. ub is the standard time variant residual 
term. 
Under the ORU model, over-educated and under-educated workers are compared to co-
workers (workers with the same required schooling who are just-educated).19 
Accordingly, the coefficients in the ORU model are interpreted as follows: 
β = 	return	to	an	additional	year	of	required	schooling 
β = 	return	to	an	additional	year	of	surplus	schooling	relative	to	coworkers 
β = wage	loss	to	an	additional	year	of	deficit	schooling	relative	to	coworkers 
β − β =	Return to an additional year of surplus schooling relative to workers with same 
total schooling that is adequately used. 
 
 
Several findings concerning the earnings impact of job–education mismatch are 
documented in the literature.20 First, the return to over-education is positive (β > 0 ) but 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
19 The ORU model is reduced to the standard Mincerian earning equation if β	=β = xβ x. 
However, if this does not hold, the ORU model will give higher R and the return to required 




smaller than required education (β < β), while the return to under-education is 
negative(β < 0). Second, over-educated workers earn less than workers with the same 
education attainment in jobs which require that level of schooling(β − β) < 0. 
However, under-educated workers earn more than workers with the same educational 
level working in jobs requiring the level of education that they have, and earn less than 
coworkers possessing the required level of education.  
 
As a baseline model, I estimate equation 10 by a pooled cross-sectional method, 
ordinary least square (OLS), with the standard errors corrected for clustering at the 
individual level. This is done by pooling all observations in the three waves of the 
LSIC.21 To benefit from the longitudinal structure of the LSIC in accounting for 
unobserved individual-level heterogeneity, I also estimate equation 10 using panel data 
estimation methods, both between effect (BE) and random effect (RE) models.22 
Accordingly Equation 10 can be rewritten as: 
Ln	wb = β( + β	Xb + βSb + βSbJ + β SbD + {| + }|~   (11) 
 
Here, the error term	ub, from Equation 10 became {| + }|~, where {| represents 
time invariant individual-specific effects and }|~ is the standard residual term. In the RE 
                                                                                                                                                 
20 See for example Sicherman(1991); Kiker et.al (1997); Hartog (2000); Groot and Maassen van 
den Brink (2000). 
 
21 Pooled OLS produce consistent estimators if the error term in the ORU model is uncorrelated 
with all the explanatory variables in the model. However, if unobserved individual charactaristics 
are cruicial for determing the earnings, then the error term will be correlated with other 
explanatory variable, and hence it it better to use panel data estimation methods to have consistent 
estimates.  
 
22 The between effect is obtained when OLS is performed on the average over time for each 
individual in Equation 10. The fixed effect model was also estimated but is not reported because 




model, {| is assumed to be uncorrelated with other covariates in the model (Wooldridge, 
2002). Stata 11 software package is used to conduct the multivariate analyses, and all the 
estimations are weighted using the LSIC sampling weights. 
4. Data and sample characteristics  
 
The main data source for this study is the LSIC. The survey was conducted by 
Statistics Canada and Citizenship and Immigration Canada using a sample from the 
164,200 immigrants who immigrated to Canada between October 2000 and September 
2001. The survey consists of three waves of interviews. In the first wave, 12,000 
immigrants aged 15 years and above were interviewed between April 2001 and May 
2002, six months after becoming permanent residents in Canada. In the second wave, 
9,300 of the same immigrants were interviewed in 2003, two years after landing. In 2005, 
about 7,700 of the same immigrants were re-interviewed, four years after their arrival. 
The LSIC contains comprehensive information on all standard labor market and socio-
demographic variables.23  
To achieve the objectives of the current study, data from the three waves of the 
LSIC survey were used. Data about source countries’ schooling quality was obtained 
from Hanushek and Kimko (2000). The Hanushek and Kimko measure of schooling 
quality is based on six sets of tests in mathematics and science conducted between 1965 
and 1991 by the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement 
(IEA) and the International Assessment of Educational Progress (IAEP).24 
                                                 
23 For more information about the LSIC see (Statistics Canada, 2005). 
24 For more information on how country-specific scores are constructed see Hanushek and Kimko 
(2000) pp 1186-1187. 
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A potential concern with using the school quality measure from Hanushek and 
Kimko (2000) is that it applies to all students from a certain country. However, 
immigrants are a selected sample, and hence using this measure may bias my results. To 
avoid this selection problem, the assumption in this paper is that selection of  immigrants 
based on unobserved characteristics affects only the intercept not the slope of the 
earnings function. In other words, the effects of selection are captured by the country-of- 
origin fixed effects, which I discard, while the return to schooling is not affected 
(Schoellman, 2011). 
Data from the confidential 2001 Canadian census of population was used to 
derive the required years of schooling based on 508 occupations. The required years of 
schooling in each occupation is determined by the modal (most frequent) years of 
schooling of Canadian-born workers in that particular occupation. 
Due to data limitations, the analysis was confined to 24 source countries with 
significant percentage of immigrants accounting for about 72% of individuals covered by 
the LSIC.25 Some major source countries were excluded because the school quality index 
derived by Hanushek and Kimko (2000) was not available.26 In this study, the analysis 
was restricted to paid workers, aged 19-64 with a resulting sample of 5307 immigrants. 
The multivariate analyses included a number of economic and socio-demographic 
variables commonly used in the literature. Age was represented in continuous form. 
Gender was captured by two dummy variables. Marital status was represented by two 
dummy variables; married, separated/single (reference group). An individual’s 
                                                 
25 In this paper source country refers to country where the highest level of education was obtained 
and not to the country of birth. 
26 These include Pakistan, Bangladesh, Morocco, Senegal, Lebanon, Romania, Czech Republic 
and Slovakia. The schooling quality indices for the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia were 
given to now independent countries that were forming these countries. 
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educational attainment was captured by the total years of schooling. Work experience in 
the Canadian labor market was captured by the number of weeks that the immigrant has 
worked in Canada. Foreign work experience was captured by two specifications. In the 
first specification, a dummy variable was used to indicate whether the immigrant had a 
full time foreign work experience before immigration. In the second specification, 
potential work experience (age-years of schooling-6) was used. Immigration class was 
captured by four categories; family class, skilled workers, business class (reference 
group), and refugees. Immigrants’ source country of education was represented by twenty 
four indicator variables, with Canada as the reference group. Provincial or regional fixed 
effects were represented in five categories; Ontario, Quebec, British Colombia (reference 
group), Atlantic provinces (comprising New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, Nova 
Scotia and Newfoundland and Labrador) and Western provinces (Alberta, Saskatchewan 
and Manitoba). Immigrants’ fields of study were represented by seven categories: 
educational; fine arts, humanities and social sciences; engineering; health professions; 
commerce (reference group); agriculture and mathematics; and no specialization. 
Language proficiency was captured by an indicator variable: English/French is the 
mother tongue and English/French is not the mother tongue (reference group). 
Experience recognition was captured by an indicator variable with foreign experience not 
recognized in the Canadian labor market as the reference group. Working status (full 
time=1, part time=0) was controlled for in the analysis. The analysis also included a 
dichotomous variable indicating whether an individual belongs to a visible minority 
group as defined by Statistics Canada. 
<Insert Table 2 here> 
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Table 2 reports the summary statistics of the variables included in the analysis. 
Half of the immigrants were males, 80 % were married, 60% had at least a bachelor 
degree, and 61.3 % were skilled workers. For the field of study, 17.3% had engineering 
background, 19% were in commerce and management related fields. 9.5% of the 
immigrants reported English or French as their mother tongue. 48% were residing in 
Ontario. The average age of individuals in the sample was 35 years. 40% of the 
immigrants had their highest level of education in three main countries: China (17.95%), 
India (14.30) and the Philippines (7.34).  
Data on schooling quality, as proxied by Hanushek and Kimko (2000) indices shows 
significant difference across-countries. The Hanushek and Kimko indices for the included 
countries ranged from 18.26 (Iran) to 65.5 (Japan). 
 
5. Empirical findings  
5.1. The impact of source countries’ schooling quality on the returns to education 
The first step of Card and Krueger’s (1992) two-step model was estimated using 
Ordinary Least Squares with a country-specific intercept.27 Pooled OLS produces 
consistent estimators only if the error term in the ORU model is uncorrelated with all the 
explanatory variables in the model. However, if unobserved individual characteristics are 
crucial in determining the earnings of immigrants, then the error term will be correlated 
with other explanatory variable. To this end, I applied panel data estimation methods 
such as between effect and random effects models. The results were robust to alternative 
model specifications, and hence only the baseline OLS results are presented here. 
                                                 
27 As a robustness check, another version of the first step was estimated without including the 
countries’ specific intercepts and the results were very close to the baseline model.  
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Table 3 presents results for the second step of Card and Krueger’s (1992) model, 
where source countries’ returns to years of required education, over-education and under-
education are related to schooling quality measure. 
< Insert Table 3 here> 
 
To account for the relative sample size of source countries which affects the 
precision of the estimated return to education, weighted least squares was used to 
estimate the second-step equations. The total number of workers from each source 
country in the first-step regression was used as a weight for Equation 3, whereas the 
numbers of over-educated and under-educated workers were used as a weight for 
Equations 4 and 5 respectively.28 This means that source countries with a significant 
percentage of immigrants like China, India and Philippine were given more weight than 
source countries with fewer immigrants.29 
 
Results showed that the returns to required-education and over-education were 
significantly affected by source-country schooling quality. An increase in the schooling 
quality index by 10 points increases the return to required education by 0.74 percentage 
points and the return to over-education by 0.4 percentage points. The negative sign of 
schooling quality coefficient for the under-education equation indicates that an under-
educated worker earns a lower wage than a coworker working in the same occupation 
                                                 
28 Another set of weights which were used is the inverse of the variances of the estimated country 
specific returns to education in the first step. This gives more weight to country specific returns 
that are precisely estimated and less weight to country returns that are estimated less precisely. 
 
29 In a different specification for the second step, source countries’ per capita real GDP were 
included as an additional explanatory variable. The obtained results were very similar to the 
baseline model. For simplicity, only the parsimonious version without including source countries’ 
per capita real GDP and using the number of workers from each country in the first step as a 




with the required level of education. The wage penalty to under-educated workers was 
not significantly affected by the quality of the source countries’ schooling. That is, 
workers who were under-educated had the same wage penalty relative to coworkers 
regardless of their source of education.30 
 
5.2. Adjusting years of schooling to quality differences across source countries 
 
The weighted least square results from estimating Equation 7 are reported in 
Table 4.  
< Insert Table 4 here> 
 
A quality adjustment index q =	F [\]^^_	`a_bc	defg	^h		\^adbc		[\]^^_	`a_bc	defg	^h	ide" ."V	W(.Vwas derived for 
each source country. As shown in Figure 3, the quality adjustment index ranges from 
0.74 for Iran to 1.05 for Japan. A quality adjustment index of value 0.74 means that 10 
years of schooling from this source country worth 7.4 years when expressed in Canadian 
terms. Five countries in the sample had a test score higher than that of Canada, and hence 
their quality adjustment index is greater than unity.31  
<Insert Figure 3 here> 
The derived quality adjustment indices were used to adjust years of schooling for quality 
differences across source countries. The same exercise of measuring the incidence and 
intensity of job-education mismatch, and the estimation of its earning impact, was 
repeated using the quality-adjusted years of schooling. 
                                                 
30 Chiswick and Miller (2010) found similar results when they studied the impact of source 
countries schooling quality on the returns to immigrants’ education in the US labor market. 
 




5.3. The incidence and intensity of job-education mismatch  
The longitudinal feature of the LSIC facilitated the study of how the incidence 
and intensity of over-education evolved over time. The incidence of job-education 
mismatch at each wave of the LSIC is reported in Table 5. The results indicated a high 
incidence of over-education among recent immigrants to Canada even after controlling 
for cross-country differences in schooling quality. Based on the quality-unadjusted years 
of schooling, 76.27% of the immigrant males and 71.76% of the females were over-
educated at the first wave of the LSIC (6 month after becoming permanent residents). 
These figures did not improve so much after four years from arrival, where 70.35% of the 
males and 64.6% of the females were over-educated.32 However, based on the quality-
adjusted years of schooling, 66.27% (62.6%) of the males and 64.21 %( 58.76%) of the 
females were over-educated after 6 month (4 years) from arrival to Canada. The results 
also indicated that 15.71% of the immigrant males and 16.55% of the females were 
under-educated after 6 month from arrival to Canada based on the unadjusted years of 
schooling. While, using the quality adjusted years of schooling, 33.31% of the immigrant 
males and 35.36% of the females were under-educated after 6 month from arrival to 
Canada. 
< Insert Table 5 here> 
 
These results confirm that when job-education mismatch is measured by the 
quality-unadjusted years of schooling, as is standard in the literature, some of this 
apparent mismatch arises due to differences in schooling quality between the host and 
home countries. In particular, Results showed that not controlling for source countries’ 
                                                 
32 As a benchmark, the incidence of over-education among Canadian-born is estimated at 43.85 
percent using data from the 2001 Canadian census. 
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schooling quality differences leads to overstating the incidence of over-education by 7.7 
to 10 percentage points for males and by 5.8 to 7.5 percentage points for females. 
Analogously, under-education is understated by 16.4 to 17.6 percentage points for males 
and 18 percentage points for females. These results indicate that the incidence of under-
education among immigrants is considerably larger than what the quality-unadjusted data 
reveals. In other words, a considerable fraction of the apparently overeducated 
immigrants were in fact not over-educated.  
 
The persistent high incidence of over-education among the recent immigrants is in 
line with the findings of several previous studies who examined earlier cohorts of 
immigrants to Canada (e.g. Galarneau and Morissette, 2004; Li et al., 2006; Wald and 
Fang, 2008). The duration of over-education and the associated low schooling return, at 
least for some groups of immigrants, could partly explain why it takes long for 
immigrants to achieve earning parity with natives, and it also implies that the difficulties 
facing recent immigrants in the labor market are not necessarily transient. 
 
The high incidence of over-education among recent immigrants to Canada could 
be explained by several reasons that are widely discussed in the literature. Immigrants are 
forced, at least during early period of entering host country’s labor market, to accept jobs 
with less educational requirement due to lack of host country-specific human capital 
(e.g. job experience, contacts in labor market, and language skills).33 After four years 
from arrival to Canada, lack of Canadian work experience was mentioned to be the main 
difficulty (49.8%), followed by lack of contacts in the job market (37.1%), non 
recognition of foreign experience (37%) and foreign qualification (35.4%). About one-
                                                 




third of job seekers who experienced difficulties stated language barriers as a problem. 
Entering the labor market during periods of recession could be a possible reason for the 
high incidence of over-education (Picot and Hou, 2003). It is evident that the LSIC 
participants have arrived to Canada during a period of recession. As a result, immigrants 
are left with no option other than survival jobs. About one-third of the job seekers who 
experienced difficulties reported lack of employment opportunities as a problem.  
Costly accreditation and licensing requirements by professional associations in 
many regulated occupations also constitute an entry barrier in many occupations. The 
OECD (2006) reported that non-recognition of immigrants’ foreign credentials is the 
biggest learning recognition problem in Canada, and that a considerable part of the funds 
spent by Canadian government on educating and retraining immigrants was unnecessary 
or redundant. 
Poor source countries’ schooling quality is another reason for the high incidence 
of over-education among the recent immigrants. Recent data showed that there has been a 
shift from countries with high quality educational system to countries with low quality 
educational system. According to the 2006 Canadian census of population, 58.3% of 
recent immigrants came from Asia (including middle east) compared to 12.1% in 1977, 
while those who came from Europe were 16.1% compared with 61.6% in 1977. Picot and 
Hou (2003) found that Canadian employers have no reliable information about the real 
occupational skills and education quality of graduates from Asian universities. Another 
challenge is that recent immigrants have less command of official languages. For 
example, only 9.5% of the immigrants in the LSIC reported English or French as their 
mother tongue. Another reason is that there could be some sort of discrimination in the 
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labor market toward visible minorities.34 About 15% of the immigrants covered by the 
LSIC reported discrimination to be the main difficulty in finding a suitable job. This is 
supported by several studies which argued that immigrants are subject to discrimination 
in the Canadian labor market (see Galarneau and Morissette, 2004; Wald and Fang, 2008; 
Oreopoulos, 2009). For example, Oreopoulos (2009) conducted a study using thousands 
of resumes sent in response to online job postings for occupations in Toronto. The author 
found considerable employer discrimination against applicants with ethnic names on the 
resume in terms of lower callback rates and interview requests compared to those with 
English-sounding names. 
The wide range of variables in the LSIC enables measuring the incidence of job-
education mismatch among different subgroups of immigrants. Accordingly, the sample 
was stratified by gender, marital status, age, and level of education. 
<Insert Table 6 here> 
Table 6 shows considerable differences in the incidence of over-education among 
different subgroups of immigrants. Based on the LSIC data, the incidence of over-
education was higher among recent immigrant males than among females, and was also 
higher among married than singles. The incidence of over-education decreased with age. 
This is consistent with the job search behavior of young workers and the fact that young 
workers lack enough job experience or training relative to older workers.  
Not surprisingly, the incidence of over-education increased with educational 
attainment. The results show that immigrants with high educational level face substantial 
difficulties in transferring their qualifications to the Canadian labor market than the less 
                                                 
34 Labor market discrimination is a situation in which workers who are equally productive are 
treated unequally in a way related to observable characteristics like race, ethnicity or gender. 
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educated immigrants. For example, 90 percent of recent immigrants with a bachelor 
degree, and 94 percent with a master degree are over-educated. Immigrants with a degree 
in regulated occupations such as dentistry, medicine, veterinary medicine, optometry and 
law have the highest incidence of over-education (96 percent). These findings were 
consistent across the three waves of the LSIC and are in line with the findings of several 
previous studies (e.g. Li et al., 2006; Wald and Fang, 2008).  
A complete understanding of the phenomena of over-education and under-
education requires studying not only its incidence but also its intensity, and how both 
evolve over time. Studying how the job-education mismatch intensity evolves over time 
helps in understanding the dynamics of the assimilation process, where a reduction in the 
intensity of job-education mismatch could be an indicator of job match improvement and 
assimilation. The general finding from this analysis is that the incidence and intensity of 
over-education decreased with the length of stay in Canada (see Table 7). 
< Insert Table 7 here> 
 
< Insert Figure 4 here> 
 
< Insert Figure 5 here> 
 
< Insert Figure 6 here> 
 
The distribution of job-education mismatch intensity for the quality adjusted and 
unadjusted years of schooling, and its evolution by the length of stay in Canada are 
shown in Figures 4, 5 and 6. The quality adjusted distribution is more symmetric with a 
smaller kurtosis and skewness than the quality unadjusted distribution. Unlike the quality 
adjusted distribution, the quality unadjusted distribution is negatively skewed (skewed to 
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the left) which means that the left tail is longer, with few negative values (under-
educated), while the mass of the distribution is concentrated on the right(over-educated).  
 
5.4. The earning impact of job-education mismatch  
Results from estimating the ORU earning equation are reported in Table 8 for the 
whole population. In addition, the results for males and females are reported in Tables 9 
and 10.  
< Insert table 8 here > 
< Insert table 9 here > 
< Insert table 10 here > 
Consistent with previous findings, the return to over-education is positive but 
smaller than the returns to required education for both males and females, while the 
return to under-education is negative. These findings are robust to changing the model 
specification, estimation method, and to whether years of schooling are adjusted for 
cross- countries’ schooling quality differences.35 In the quality unadjusted version of the 
ORU model in Tables 9 and10, the return to over-education is 36.8% of the returns to 
required education for females, while for males, the return to over-education is 13.2% of 
the returns to required education. Over-educated males (females) earned 8.7% (7.6%) less 
than workers with the same education attainment in jobs which require that level of 
schooling.36 This means that for females there was no wage loss to an additional year of 
deficit schooling relative to coworkers. However under-educated males lost 3.25% for an 
                                                 
35 Given that the results of the three estimation methods, pooled OLS, Random effects and 
between effects were very similar, I used result obtained from the pooled OLS model in my 
interpretations. 
36 Although the return to under-education is not statistically significant for females, the effect of 
under-education has almost the same magnitude as for over-education. 
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additional year of deficit schooling relative to coworkers. The effects of the other 
explanatory variables were consistent with the priori expectations. Earnings increased for 
immigrants with English or French as a mother tongue, and having full time foreign 
experience which is recognized in the Canadian labor market. Working in a part time job 
reduced earnings. Immigrants’ earning also increased with age and with having a 
Canadian work experience. 
Results for the quality-adjusted version of the ORU model show that the return to 
over-education is 24% of the returns to required education for females, while for males 
the return to over-education is 13.3% of the returns to required education. Over-educated 
males (females) earned 8.5% (8.12%) less than workers with the same education 
attainment in jobs which require that level of schooling. Similar to the unadjusted 
estimation, the return to under-education was not statistically significant for females. 
However under-educated males lost 1.92% for an additional year of deficit schooling 
relative to coworkers.  
A key observation from Tables 8, 9 and 10 is that the returns to over-education 
and under-education based on the quality unadjusted years of schooling were less than 
the returns from the quality adjusted years of schooling. This implies that not controlling 
for schooling quality differences leads to understating the return to surplus and deficit 
schooling. This finding was robust to changing the estimation method. A deeper analysis 
and explanation for this finding is done in the next subsection, where the analysis is 




5.5. The earning impact of job-education mismatch by source country 
 
The previous section presented the population average impact of job-education mismatch 
on earnings; however, this impact may differ by source countries. Accordingly, the 
analysis is stratified by splitting the sample into two subgroups of source countries; 
countries with quality adjustment index greater than unity, referred to as high schooling 
quality countries, and the low schooling quality group (adjustment index is less than 
unity). 
< Insert table 11 here > 
< Insert table 12 here > 
< Insert table 13 here > 
< Insert table 14 here > 
< Insert table 15 here > 
< Insert table 16 here > 
Results for the high schooling quality group are presented in Tables 11 to 13 for the 
whole population as well as for males and females. Similarly, results for the low 
schooling quality group are presented in Tables 14 to 16.  
The main conclusion from stratifying the analyses by source-country schooling 
quality was that, not controlling for source countries’ schooling quality difference leads 
to overstating (understating) the return to over-education (under-education) for 
immigrants from countries with high quality of schooling. For example, for male 
immigrants from source countries with high schooling quality, the return to a year of 
surplus (deficit) schooling was 1.27% (4.49%) using the quality-unadjusted schooling 
data. However, using the quality-adjusted years of schooling, the return to a year of 
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surplus (deficit) schooling was 0.98% (5.58%). Conversely, for male immigrants from 
countries with low quality of education, not controlling for source countries’ schooling 
quality difference leads to understating (overstating) the return to over-education (under-
education). For example, for immigrants from source countries with low schooling 
quality, the return to a year of surplus (deficit) schooling was 2.71% (1.87%) using the 
unadjusted schooling data. However, using the quality-adjusted years of schooling, the 
return to a year of surplus (deficit) schooling was 3.02% (1.46%). These findings were 
robust to different model specifications and the estimation method. The effects of the 
other explanatory variables were in general similar to the whole population results. 
 
6. Conclusion 
A growing body of research has examined job-education mismatch among 
immigrants and its impact on earnings. However, accounting for cross-countries’ 
schooling quality differences has been largely ignored in previous studies. Immigrants 
come from different source countries whose educational systems are of different quality. 
This paper explicitly account for differences in the quality of education by adjusting 
immigrants’ “nominal” years of schooling from different source countries to reflect their 
“real” value using Card and Krueger’s (1992) two-step framework. 
This paper attempt to provide an answer to the following questions: First, does 
schooling quality matter for the incidence of job-education mismatch? Second, how do 
the incidence and intensity of job-education mismatch evolve over time? Third, what is 
the impact of job-education mismatch on earnings?  
Results show that the incidence of over-education is significantly high and 
prevalent among recent immigrants to Canada, though some sign of assimilation has 
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occurred by the length of time spent in Canada. Results provide strong evidence that 
source countries’ schooling quality affect the returns to education for immigrants in the 
Canadian labor market. Results from Card and Krueger’s (1992) two-step model show a 
statistically significant positive association between the returns to required education and 
over-education and schooling quality of the source-countries. Results also show that 
failure to account for differences in schooling quality across source countries leads to 
wrong estimates of the incidence of job-education mismatch and its impact on earnings. 
For the earnings impact of job-education mismatch, consistent with previous 
findings in the literature, I find that the return to surplus schooling is positive but smaller 
than the returns to required schooling even after controlling for differences in the quality 
of schooling. Results from the ORU model indicated that not controlling for source 
countries’ schooling quality differences understated (overstated) the return to over-
education (under-education) for immigrants from countries with low quality of schooling. 
Conversely, for immigrants from countries with high quality of education, not controlling 
for source countries’ schooling quality differences overstated (understated) the return to 
over-education (under-education). 
One limitation of the current study is that the analyses are restricted to only 24 
source countries. This calls for further research using a wider set of source countries to 
reach generalized findings at the population level. Second, the schooling quality index of 
Hanushek and Kimko (2000) may not be an accurate measure of the cross-countries 
schooling quality difference. These measures apply to all students in the source country, 
however, immigrants are a selected sample, and hence estimates based on these measures 
may be subject to selectivity bias. Accordingly, in the next chapter of this thesis I will 
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derive a measure of schooling quality using the immigrants’ return to schooling in the 






Difficulties facing immigrants aged 25-44 when searching for a relevant job 
Numbers are % of respondents answering positively 
Source: Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada, 2005 
  
 Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 
Not enough Canadian job experience 62.6 62.4 49.8 
No connections in the job market 33.1 37.1 37.1 
Foreign experience not accepted 42.6 37.9 36.6 
Foreign qualifications not accepted 39.2 38.0 35.4 
Lack of employment opportunities 29.1 42.7 32.4 
Not enough Canadian job references 33.2 34.8 32.1 
Language problems 38.2 34.6 31.9 
Not able to find a job in my field 14.9 34.8 29.8 
Not knowing enough people working 15.5 20.1 20.4 
Not having family or friends who could help 9.8 13.4 15.4 
Discrimination 7.6 13.2 14.6 
Not knowing how to find a job 9.7 10.1 10.4 
Childcare constraints n.a. 3.3 4.6 
Transportation constraints 8.7 6.4 3.9 
Not knowing the city 6.3 5.5 3.5 






Age (years) 35.3 
Male ( 1 if yes, zero if no ) 49.38 
Female ( 1 if yes, zero if no ) 50.62 
Married ( 1 if yes, zero if no ) 80.02 
Highest level of educational attainment  
Less than high school ( 1 if yes, zero if no ) 12.9 
High school ( 1 if yes, zero if no ) 11.9 
Some college ( 1 if yes, zero if no ) 5.4 
College ( 1 if yes, zero if no )  10.1 
Bachelor degree ( 1 if yes, zero if no ) 41 
Graduate degree  ( 1 if yes, zero if no ) 17.5 
Degree in dentistry, medicine, veterinary medicine, optometry, law or 
theology  ( 1 if yes, zero if no ) 1.2 
English or French is the mother tongue ( 1 if yes, zero if no ) 9.49 
Visible minority ( 1 if yes, zero if no ) 83.4 
Field of study  
Educational, recreational and counseling  services 6.3 
Fine and applied arts 2.07 
Humanities and related fields 5.4 
Social sciences and related fields 7.4 
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Commerce, management and business administration 19.4 
Agricultural and biological sciences and  technologies 2.3 
Engineering and applied sciences 17.3 
Health professions, sciences and technologies 3 
Mathematics and physical sciences 5.4 
Immigration category   
Family class ( 1 if yes, zero if no ) 26.90 
Skilled workers ( 1 if yes, zero if no ) 61.29 
Business class ( 1 if yes, zero if no ) 5.8 
Refugees ( 1 if yes, zero if no ) 4.58 
Provincial nominees ( 1 if yes, zero if no ) 0.88 
Province of residence  
Quebec 15.24 
Ontario 48.07 
Western provinces 14.91 
Atlantic provinces 1.21 
British Columbia 20.57 
Host country human capital   
Post immigration education or training in Canada ( 1 if yes, zero if no ) 58.9 
Has Canadian work experience ( 1 if yes, zero if no ) 69.4 
Working Part Time ( 1 if yes, zero if no ) 17.3 
Source  country human capital   
 
Has full time Foreign work experience ( 1 if yes, zero if no ) 74.8 
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Foreign experience recognized ( 1 if yes, zero if no ) 18.7 
has credentials 78 
Number of credentials 1.19 
Source: Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada. Statistics are weighted using 
LSIC sampling weight. These summary statistics are calculated using the balanced 




Descriptive statistics continued 
country Hanushek and Kimko  







Iran 18.26 0.749 2.44 
India 20.8 0.775 14.30 
Ghana 25.58 0.819 0.30 
Iraq 27.5 0.835 1.10 
Algeria 28.06 0.839 1.65 
Kenya 29.73 0.852 0.33 
Philippines 33.54 0.879 7.34 
Brazil 36.6 0.900 0.33 
Mexico 37.24 0.904 0.40 
Turkey 39.72 0.919 0.35 
Srilanka 42.57 0.936 2.05 
Indonesia 42.99 0.939 0.39 
Trinidad and Tobago  46.43 0.958 0.29 
United states 46.77 0.960 2.66 
Germany 48.68 0.970 0.65 
South Africa 51.3 0.983 1.06 
Guyana 51.49 0.984 0.61 
Yugoslavia 53.97 0.997 1.87 
Canada 54.58 1 0.26 
Soviet union 54.65 1 4.24 
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Fiji 58.1 1.016 0.30 
South Korea 58.55 1.018 3.71 
United kingdom  62.52 1.036 2.33 
China 64.42 1.044 17.95 
Japan 65.5 1.049 0.58 







The impact of source country’s schooling quality on the return to required 
education, over-education and under-education  
 
 Required education Under-education  Over-education 
Schooling quality 0.0737*** -0.0644 0.0399* 
 (0.0182) (0.0716) (0.0230) 
Constant 6.772*** 0.240 0.404 
 (0.850) (3.282) (1.086) 
Observations 24 24 24 






Estimation results for Equation 7. 
Variables 	ln		β 










The incidence of over-education among recent immigrants to Canada 
  Males Females 












Over-educated Quality unadjusted 76.27 72.51 70.35 71.76 68.89 64.61 
Quality adjusted 65.87 64.40 62.58 64.13 62.16 58.76 
Just-educated Quality unadjusted 8.02 9.18 9.65 11.69 11.79 12.97 
Quality  adjusted 0.42 0.51 0.54 0.43 0.43 0.59 
Under-educated Quality unadjusted 15.71 18.31 20 16.55 19.32 22.42 
Quality adjusted 33.71 35.09 36.88 35.44 37.41 40.65 
Source: Author’s calculation using data from LSIC. All statistics are population weighted 





The incidence of over-education among different groups of immigrants (% of 
each relevant group that is over-educated) 














Male 76.27 66.27 72.51 64.79 70.35 62.66 
Female 71.76 64.21 68.89 62.31 64.61 58.76 
Marital status 
married 77.31 68.15 75.89 68.17 72.20 64.84 
Not married 59.35 51.31 49.40 44.25 48.04 43.26 
Age 
25-34 82.25 73.36 81.39 73.80 75.01 66.75 
35-44 81.77 76.06 79.57 75.31 76.34 71.94 
45-54 62.05 55.93 60.67 55.55 64.36 61.50 
55-64 41.24 31.24 47.05 35.49 48.21 39.96 
highest level of education  
Some elementary 
or elementary  
2.51 2.51 1.48 1.48 1.79 1.79 
Some high 
school 
7.01 4.3 3.73 3.75 2.81 3.71 
High school 
graduation 
20.97 25.43 19.66 26.02 16.80 25.13 
Some trade or 
apprenticeship 
training 
56.08 45.63 52.24 49.52 51.38 53.54 
Trade certificate  60.87 42.99 54.73 39.91 58.47 45.64 
Some college  66.22 32.38 67.77 37.53 61.68 34.52 
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College/CEGEP  76.56 65.56 77.09 68.61 75.25 66.57 
Some university 85.53 57.11 83.03 58.05 79.95 60 
Bachelor's degree 90.92 78.38 89.62 78.06 82.67 71.25 
Master's degree 94.35 91.91 92.90 90.87 87.09 84.25 
Degree in 
medicine, or  law  
95.72 92.91 96.60 94.15 89.52 85.37 
Doctorate 87.30 87.18 90.71 90.92 86.86 89.04 
Source: Author’s compilation using data from LSIC. All statistics are population 





Distribution of the job-education mismatch intensity for quality adjusted and 
unadjusted years of schooling 
 quality unadjusted  quality adjusted  
intensity wave 1  wave 2 wave 3 wave 1  wave 2 wave 3 
>=9 2.36 1.9 1.69 1.43 1.14 1.01 
8 2.03 2.11 1.74 1.364 1.461 1.108 
7 2.21 2.208 1.72 3.522 3.159 3.379 
6 7.7 6.86 6.282 4.493 4.568 4.105 
5 8.952 8.63 7.506 8.519 8.732 10.11 
4 16.51 15.77 16.66 9.402 9.054 9.05 
3 16.92 15.9 14.43 10.21 9.678 8.305 
2 10.86 10.64 10.02 12.71 11.87 11.18 
1 6.85 6.85 7.781 13.05 13.14 13.13 
0 9.55 10.37 11.11 0.42 0.47 0.56 
-1 5.96 6.88 7.803 10.93 10.8 11 
-2 5.24 5.6 6.353 7.673 7.7 8.118 
-3 2.093 2.674 3 6.474 6.66 7.058 
-4 0.975 1.345 1.445 3.642 4.404 4.345 
-5 0.607 0.6922 0.82 3.183 3.329 3.771 
-6 0.3 0.458 0.67 1.06 1.602 1.54 
-7 0.38 0.53 0.35 0.6863 0.7423 0.9466 
-8 0.38 0.33 0.25 0.1383 0.174 0.2218 
>=-9 0.13 0.25 0.35 0.15 0.27 0.34 




Table 8  
The earning impact of job education mismatch- whole population- 
  OLS RE BE 
 Unadjusted  Adjusted  Unadjusted  Adjusted  Unadjusted  Adjusted  
Years of required 
education 
0.108*** 0.102*** 0.105*** 0.100*** 0.115*** 0.111*** 
 (0.00746) (0.00759) (0.00609) (0.00593) (0.00752) (0.00748) 
Years of over-
education 
0.0264*** 0.0187*** 0.0241*** 0.0186*** 0.0223*** 0.0203*** 
 (0.00525) (0.00469) (0.00536) (0.00506) (0.00585) (0.00558) 
Years of under- 
education 
-0.0214*** -0.0145** -0.0206** -0.0167** -0.0192** -0.0119 
 (0.00789) (0.00694) (0.00808) (0.00691) (0.00859) (0.00757) 
Age  0.0384*** 0.0397*** 0.0429*** 0.0434*** 0.0348*** 0.0350*** 
 (0.00872) (0.00868) (0.00729) (0.00731) (0.00802) (0.00805) 
Age square  -0.000489*** -0.000507*** -0.000521*** -0.000530*** -0.000438*** -0.000445*** 
 (0.000115) (0.000114) (9.04e-05) (9.07e-05) (9.94e-05) (9.98e-05) 
Visible minority -0.0658*** -0.0519** -0.0561** -0.0400 -0.0416 -0.0271 
 (0.0251) (0.0260) (0.0272) (0.0277) (0.0280) (0.0285) 
English/ French is 
mother tongue 
0.170*** 0.172*** 0.176*** 0.176*** 0.174*** 0.173*** 
 (0.0370) (0.0372) (0.0362) (0.0364) (0.0382) (0.0384) 
Full time foreign 
experience 
0.0280 0.0175 0.00462 -0.00575 0.0301 0.0222 
 (0.0267) (0.0267) (0.0310) (0.0312) (0.0321) (0.0323) 
Foreign exp is 
recognized 
0.279*** 0.283*** 0.292*** 0.296*** 0.283*** 0.286*** 
 (0.0239) (0.0241) (0.0263) (0.0264) (0.0281) (0.0282) 
Married  0.0252 0.0278 0.0213 0.0250 0.0467 0.0508 
 (0.0298) (0.0300) (0.0303) (0.0304) (0.0317) (0.0319) 
Part time -0.978*** -0.986*** -0.975*** -0.979*** -0.995*** -1.000*** 
 (0.0292) (0.0294) (0.0210) (0.0211) (0.0313) (0.0314) 
Experience in 
Canada 
0.00375*** 0.00380*** 0.00367*** 0.00370*** 0.00431*** 0.00449*** 
 (0.000241) (0.000243) (0.000201) (0.000202) (0.000493) (0.000495) 
Education and 
recreational 
-0.0442 0.000612 -0.0926* -0.0588 -0.100* -0.0686 
 (0.0489) (0.0472) (0.0493) (0.0484) (0.0514) (0.0505) 
Fine art -0.00152 0.0395 -0.0730 -0.0388 -0.0668 -0.0303 
 (0.144) (0.146) (0.0899) (0.0902) (0.0902) (0.0907) 
Humanities  -0.0532 -0.00284 -0.0362 0.00166 -0.00256 0.0335 
 (0.0521) (0.0511) (0.0528) (0.0518) (0.0546) (0.0537) 
Social sciences  -0.0375 0.00594 -0.0527 -0.0190 -0.0493 -0.0180 
 (0.0414) (0.0383) (0.0470) (0.0460) (0.0488) (0.0477) 
Commerce  0.00567 0.0434 -0.00140 0.0259 0.00446 0.0306 
 (0.0294) (0.0283) (0.0357) (0.0349) (0.0371) (0.0363) 
Agriculture  -0.112 -0.0518 -0.0736 -0.0319 -0.0148 0.0212 
 (0.0718) (0.0706) (0.0775) (0.0763) (0.0799) (0.0785) 
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Engineering  0.0292 0.0549* 0.00780 0.0253 0.0103 0.0272 
 (0.0302) (0.0300) (0.0367) (0.0364) (0.0382) (0.0378) 
Health  -0.0200 0.0191 -0.0321 -0.00442 -0.0583 -0.0345 
 (0.0566) (0.0566) (0.0679) (0.0674) (0.0704) (0.0698) 
Mathematics  0.190*** 0.211*** 0.171*** 0.185*** 0.171*** 0.183*** 
 (0.0536) (0.0533) (0.0522) (0.0521) (0.0543) (0.0542) 
Family class -0.000245 0.0174 -0.0236 -0.00550 -0.0571 -0.0410 
 (0.0566) (0.0583) (0.0521) (0.0524) (0.0527) (0.0530) 
Skilled workers -0.00710 0.00679 -0.0176 -0.00658 -0.0409 -0.0334 
 (0.0555) (0.0559) (0.0507) (0.0508) (0.0510) (0.0510) 
Provincial 
nominees 
-0.0588 -0.0540 -0.137 -0.132 -0.194 -0.188 
 (0.0924) (0.0930) (0.119) (0.119) (0.125) (0.125) 
Refuges  -0.0652 -0.0584 -0.121** -0.111* -0.140** -0.130** 
 (0.0659) (0.0673) (0.0594) (0.0598) (0.0591) (0.0595) 
Quebec -0.0157 -0.0194 0.00117 -0.000911 -0.00276 -0.00483 
 (0.0308) (0.0309) (0.0337) (0.0338) (0.0357) (0.0358) 
Ontario -0.0387 -0.0416* -0.0415 -0.0428 -0.0576** -0.0589** 
 (0.0244) (0.0245) (0.0266) (0.0267) (0.0284) (0.0284) 
Western -0.0236 -0.0266 -0.0272 -0.0296 -0.0551 -0.0579 
 (0.0327) (0.0328) (0.0344) (0.0345) (0.0366) (0.0367) 
Atlantic 0.185 0.189 0.101 0.103 0.0574 0.0597 
 (0.117) (0.118) (0.0967) (0.0968) (0.113) (0.114) 
Male  0.146*** 0.158*** 0.167*** 0.178*** 0.159*** 0.167*** 
 (0.0205) (0.0200) (0.0221) (0.0220) (0.0232) (0.0231) 
Constant 3.725*** 3.773*** 3.695*** 3.730*** 3.710*** 3.723*** 
 (0.172) (0.172) (0.148) (0.148) (0.168) (0.168) 
       
Observations 201123 200471 9338 9311 9338 9311 
R-squared 0.393 0.391   0.430 0.429 
Number of id   4168 4154 4168 4154 
Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 9  
The earning impact of job education mismatch- males- 
  OLS RE BE 




0.100*** 0.0979*** 0.0958*** 0.0964*** 0.118*** 0.119*** 
 (0.00994) (0.0103) (0.00789) (0.00757) (0.00961) (0.00949) 
Years of over-
education 
0.0132** 0.0130** 0.0125* 0.0157** 0.00893 0.0169** 
 (0.00628) (0.00540) (0.00726) (0.00660) (0.00794) (0.00730) 
Years of under- 
education 
-0.0324*** -0.0192** -0.0405*** -0.0245** -0.0411*** -0.0229** 
 (0.0113) (0.00929) (0.0122) (0.00992) (0.0133) (0.0113) 
Age  0.0255** 0.0253** 0.0367*** 0.0361*** 0.0136 0.0120 
 (0.0104) (0.0105) (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0116) (0.0117) 
Age square  -0.000312** -0.000314** -0.000417*** -0.000416*** -0.000156 -0.000144 
 (0.000130) (0.000132) (0.000124) (0.000125) (0.000140) (0.000141) 
Visible 
minority 
-0.162*** -0.147*** -0.158*** -0.138*** -0.146*** -0.127*** 




0.165*** 0.161*** 0.182*** 0.176*** 0.164*** 0.158*** 




0.0121 0.00956 -0.0474 -0.0466 0.0209 0.0256 
 (0.0412) (0.0415) (0.0526) (0.0526) (0.0549) (0.0550) 
Foreign exp is 
recognized 
0.300*** 0.301*** 0.312*** 0.313*** 0.298*** 0.299*** 
 (0.0297) (0.0298) (0.0339) (0.0340) (0.0354) (0.0356) 
Married  0.0432 0.0416 0.0284 0.0274 0.0737 0.0733 
 (0.0422) (0.0424) (0.0433) (0.0435) (0.0449) (0.0451) 
Part time -1.032*** -1.040*** -1.048*** -1.053*** -1.034*** -1.040*** 
 (0.0461) (0.0467) (0.0311) (0.0312) (0.0494) (0.0496) 
Experience in 
Canada 
0.00414*** 0.00419*** 0.00382*** 0.00386*** 0.00575*** 0.00592*** 
 (0.000286) (0.000290) (0.000249) (0.000249) (0.000707) (0.000711) 
Education and 
recreational 
-0.0151 0.00602 -0.0716 -0.0552 -0.0652 -0.0561 
 (0.0903) (0.0881) (0.0799) (0.0788) (0.0824) (0.0814) 
Fine art 0.173 0.197 0.100 0.122 0.181 0.201 
 (0.280) (0.285) (0.145) (0.145) (0.146) (0.145) 
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Humanities  -0.0448 -0.0162 -0.0378 -0.0161 -0.00787 0.00815 
 (0.0889) (0.0857) (0.0993) (0.0986) (0.101) (0.101) 
Social sciences  0.00380 0.0256 -0.0120 0.00257 0.000376 0.00790 
 (0.0604) (0.0572) (0.0668) (0.0656) (0.0686) (0.0675) 
Commerce  -0.00254 0.0189 -0.00422 0.0103 0.00741 0.0158 
 (0.0368) (0.0362) (0.0504) (0.0491) (0.0517) (0.0506) 
Agriculture  -0.147 -0.122 -0.107 -0.0971 -0.0569 -0.0609 
 (0.0936) (0.0918) (0.114) (0.112) (0.117) (0.115) 
Engineering  0.0307 0.0424 0.000151 0.00684 0.00856 0.0111 
 (0.0356) (0.0356) (0.0468) (0.0464) (0.0481) (0.0478) 
Health  0.0341 0.0501 0.0779 0.0819 0.0478 0.0428 
 (0.110) (0.111) (0.114) (0.113) (0.116) (0.115) 
Mathematics  0.199*** 0.202*** 0.184*** 0.179*** 0.199*** 0.186*** 
 (0.0617) (0.0619) (0.0651) (0.0651) (0.0667) (0.0667) 
Family class -0.120 -0.109 -0.145** -0.128* -0.180*** -0.163** 
 (0.0871) (0.0906) (0.0699) (0.0706) (0.0698) (0.0705) 
Skilled workers -0.0555 -0.0512 -0.0817 -0.0811 -0.103 -0.106 
 (0.0833) (0.0845) (0.0677) (0.0676) (0.0671) (0.0670) 
Provincial 
nominees 
-0.240** -0.234* -0.291* -0.282* -0.330** -0.320* 
 (0.122) (0.123) (0.156) (0.157) (0.163) (0.163) 
Refuges  -0.140 -0.133 -0.227*** -0.213*** -0.248*** -0.231*** 
 (0.0957) (0.0983) (0.0791) (0.0797) (0.0780) (0.0787) 
Quebec 0.0334 0.0301 0.0409 0.0390 0.0438 0.0416 
 (0.0385) (0.0382) (0.0455) (0.0457) (0.0480) (0.0482) 
Ontario -0.00124 -0.00265 -0.00943 -0.0100 -0.00553 -0.00620 
 (0.0300) (0.0300) (0.0358) (0.0360) (0.0381) (0.0382) 
Western 0.0335 0.0278 0.0399 0.0347 0.00106 -0.00633 
 (0.0418) (0.0419) (0.0464) (0.0465) (0.0495) (0.0497) 
Atlantic 0.337* 0.335* 0.277** 0.273** 0.214 0.208 
 (0.174) (0.177) (0.124) (0.124) (0.154) (0.154) 
Constant 4.316*** 4.340*** 4.248*** 4.239*** 4.248*** 4.244*** 
 (0.223) (0.222) (0.199) (0.198) (0.226) (0.228) 
Observations 112008 111657 5192 5177 5192 5177 
R-squared 0.394 0.393   0.419 0.417 
Number of id   2224 2216 2224 2216 





Table 10  
The earning impact of job education mismatch- females- 
  OLS RE BE 




0.120*** 0.107*** 0.115*** 0.103*** 0.108*** 0.0991*** 
 (0.0110) (0.0109) (0.00973) (0.00963) (0.0122) (0.0122) 
Years of over-
education 
0.0442*** 0.0258*** 0.0386*** 0.0202** 0.0387*** 0.0223** 
 (0.00893) (0.00870) (0.00811) (0.00802) (0.00883) (0.00878) 
Years of under- 
education 
-0.0111 -0.00931 -0.00451 -0.00746 -0.00138 -0.00164 
 (0.0105) (0.00970) (0.0108) (0.00966) (0.0113) (0.0103) 
Age  0.0547*** 0.0576*** 0.0563*** 0.0577*** 0.0586*** 0.0598*** 
 (0.0150) (0.0145) (0.0107) (0.0108) (0.0116) (0.0117) 
Age square  -0.000712*** -0.000751*** -0.000718*** -0.000738*** -0.000763*** -0.00078*** 
 (0.000204) (0.000196) (0.000137) (0.000137) (0.000148) (0.000149) 
Visible 
minority 
0.0548 0.0649* 0.0722* 0.0784* 0.0845** 0.0895** 




0.168** 0.179*** 0.153*** 0.159*** 0.179*** 0.182*** 




0.0449 0.0309 0.0412 0.0294 0.0549 0.0452 
 (0.0359) (0.0364) (0.0391) (0.0400) (0.0407) (0.0416) 
Foreign exp is 
recognized 
0.224*** 0.235*** 0.240*** 0.251*** 0.235*** 0.244*** 
 (0.0382) (0.0390) (0.0419) (0.0421) (0.0459) (0.0462) 
Married  -0.0103 -0.00539 -0.0137 -0.00545 -0.0147 -0.00601 
 (0.0423) (0.0429) (0.0432) (0.0435) (0.0461) (0.0464) 
Part time -0.935*** -0.944*** -0.923*** -0.928*** -0.958*** -0.963*** 
 (0.0381) (0.0382) (0.0289) (0.0290) (0.0408) (0.0411) 
Experience in 
Canada 
0.00333*** 0.00339*** 0.00338*** 0.00341*** 0.00340*** 0.00360*** 
 (0.000403) (0.000405) (0.000330) (0.000331) (0.000690) (0.000695) 
Education and 
recreational 
-0.0922 -0.0166 -0.123* -0.0621 -0.132** -0.0694 
 (0.0570) (0.0530) (0.0630) (0.0617) (0.0668) (0.0654) 
Fine art -0.134 -0.0681 -0.172 -0.115 -0.220* -0.157 
 (0.143) (0.144) (0.114) (0.115) (0.116) (0.117) 
55 
 
Humanities  -0.0880 -0.00276 -0.0631 0.00952 -0.0204 0.0530 
 (0.0654) (0.0630) (0.0640) (0.0623) (0.0677) (0.0659) 
Social sciences  -0.0942 -0.0142 -0.0962 -0.0290 -0.102 -0.0340 
 (0.0576) (0.0516) (0.0661) (0.0645) (0.0695) (0.0678) 
Commerce  0.0114 0.0661 0.00494 0.0480 0.00494 0.0500 
 (0.0465) (0.0441) (0.0504) (0.0496) (0.0532) (0.0524) 
Agriculture  -0.107 -0.0108 -0.0739 0.00901 -0.00632 0.0754 
 (0.107) (0.105) (0.105) (0.104) (0.109) (0.108) 
Engineering  0.00240 0.0568 0.0108 0.0560 0.0209 0.0676 
 (0.0605) (0.0599) (0.0638) (0.0637) (0.0673) (0.0671) 
Health  -0.0559 0.00496 -0.0879 -0.0354 -0.114 -0.0602 
 (0.0652) (0.0637) (0.0844) (0.0840) (0.0896) (0.0890) 
Mathematics  0.178* 0.226** 0.158* 0.200** 0.137 0.184* 
 (0.100) (0.0996) (0.0917) (0.0918) (0.0972) (0.0971) 
Family class 0.134** 0.157*** 0.112 0.130* 0.0822 0.0984 
 (0.0582) (0.0584) (0.0778) (0.0783) (0.0801) (0.0806) 
Skilled workers 0.0761 0.0908 0.0714 0.0839 0.0579 0.0663 
 (0.0566) (0.0564) (0.0762) (0.0766) (0.0781) (0.0785) 
Provincial 
nominees 
0.202 0.186 0.0780 0.0631 0.0156 -0.00535 
 (0.128) (0.126) (0.184) (0.185) (0.193) (0.194) 
Refuges  0.0386 0.0392 0.0210 0.0187 0.0187 0.0130 
 (0.0800) (0.0799) (0.0893) (0.0900) (0.0899) (0.0906) 
Quebec -0.0757 -0.0794 -0.0495 -0.0531 -0.0549 -0.0583 
 (0.0499) (0.0502) (0.0499) (0.0503) (0.0532) (0.0535) 
Ontario -0.0803** -0.0866** -0.0727* -0.0780** -0.105** -0.110*** 
 (0.0401) (0.0402) (0.0394) (0.0397) (0.0423) (0.0426) 
Western -0.0800 -0.0808 -0.0804 -0.0831 -0.0926* -0.0949* 
 (0.0506) (0.0509) (0.0510) (0.0513) (0.0543) (0.0547) 
Atlantic -0.00117 0.00288 -0.0723 -0.0721 -0.0772 -0.0739 
 (0.0739) (0.0733) (0.151) (0.152) (0.168) (0.168) 
Constant 3.148*** 3.266*** 3.166*** 3.293*** 3.254*** 3.344*** 
 (0.260) (0.255) (0.223) (0.223) (0.255) (0.256) 
Observations 89115 88814 4146 4134 4146 4134 
R-squared 0.349 0.344   0.389 0.384 
Number of id   1944 1938 1944 1938 




Table 11  
The earning impact of job education mismatch for source countries with high 
school quality - whole population - 
  OLS RE BE 
 Unadjusted  Adjusted  Unadjusted  Adjusted  Unadjusted Adjusted  
Years of required 
education 
0.109*** 0.107*** 0.106*** 0.104*** 0.116*** 0.115*** 
 (0.0129) (0.0135) (0.0105) (0.0106) (0.0129) (0.0131) 
Years of over-
education 
0.0276*** 0.0224*** 0.0279*** 0.0224** 0.0201* 0.0145 
 (0.00864) (0.00811) (0.00990) (0.00945) (0.0111) (0.0105) 
Years of under- 
education 
0.0297** 0.0343** 0.0323** 0.0380** 0.0492*** 0.0569*** 
 (0.0136) (0.0144) (0.0154) (0.0163) (0.0167) (0.0176) 
Age  0.00948 0.00890 0.0187 0.0182 0.00507 0.00435 
 (0.0122) (0.0124) (0.0147) (0.0148) (0.0163) (0.0164) 
Age square  -9.85e-05 -9.02e-05 -0.000190 -0.000181 -4.09e-05 -3.01e-05 
 (0.000156) (0.000158) (0.000188) (0.000189) (0.000207) (0.000208) 
Visible minority -0.0529 -0.0713** -0.0346 -0.0520 -0.0164 -0.0313 
 (0.0338) (0.0349) (0.0471) (0.0478) (0.0494) (0.0502) 
English/ French 
is mother tongue 
0.185*** 0.172*** 0.212*** 0.197*** 0.194** 0.174** 
 (0.0606) (0.0617) (0.0726) (0.0737) (0.0778) (0.0790) 
Full time foreign 
experience 
0.0194 0.0329 0.0207 0.0265 0.0928 0.1000 
 (0.0643) (0.0647) (0.0643) (0.0650) (0.0667) (0.0673) 
Foreign exp is 
recognized 
0.281*** 0.285*** 0.292*** 0.297*** 0.286*** 0.292*** 
 (0.0369) (0.0370) (0.0460) (0.0462) (0.0493) (0.0497) 
Married  0.0723 0.0694 0.0554 0.0541 0.0929* 0.0938* 
 (0.0460) (0.0463) (0.0535) (0.0540) (0.0562) (0.0567) 
Part time -0.969*** -0.970*** -0.978*** -0.978*** -0.874*** -0.865*** 
 (0.0504) (0.0510) (0.0360) (0.0363) (0.0544) (0.0548) 
Experience in 
Canada 
0.00485*** 0.00486*** 0.00452*** 0.00453*** 0.00639*** 0.00648**
* 
 (0.000417) (0.000420) (0.000358) (0.000360) (0.000828) (0.000835) 
Education and 
recreational 
0.0483 0.0511 0.00987 0.0133 0.00396 0.00767 
 (0.0963) (0.0962) (0.0918) (0.0919) (0.0956) (0.0957) 
Fine art 0.102 0.134 0.0398 0.0737 0.0113 0.0592 
 (0.198) (0.200) (0.144) (0.146) (0.147) (0.150) 
Humanities  -0.00216 0.00182 0.0274 0.0312 0.0859 0.0937 
 (0.0912) (0.0926) (0.0909) (0.0914) (0.0940) (0.0945) 
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Social sciences  0.116 0.111 0.0951 0.0961 0.0974 0.102 
 (0.0771) (0.0771) (0.0853) (0.0858) (0.0886) (0.0891) 
Commerce  0.0896* 0.0881* 0.0761 0.0748 0.106 0.106 
 (0.0470) (0.0473) (0.0643) (0.0646) (0.0673) (0.0675) 
Agriculture  -0.0359 -0.0313 -0.00343 0.00265 0.0617 0.0703 
 (0.112) (0.113) (0.143) (0.144) (0.147) (0.147) 
Engineering  0.0638 0.0625 0.0534 0.0532 0.0751 0.0777 
 (0.0445) (0.0449) (0.0633) (0.0635) (0.0663) (0.0665) 
Health  -0.0663 -0.0629 -0.102 -0.0990 -0.111 -0.106 
 (0.0665) (0.0673) (0.110) (0.110) (0.114) (0.114) 
Mathematics  0.201*** 0.203*** 0.170** 0.173** 0.177** 0.182** 
 (0.0671) (0.0675) (0.0801) (0.0804) (0.0840) (0.0842) 
Family class 0.0244 0.0242 -0.00911 -0.00618 -0.0171 -0.0136 
 (0.0625) (0.0630) (0.0863) (0.0868) (0.0874) (0.0879) 
Skilled workers 0.0365 0.0381 0.00412 0.00765 -0.00316 0.000944 
 (0.0588) (0.0594) (0.0787) (0.0792) (0.0787) (0.0792) 
Provincial 
nominees 
-0.185 -0.193 -0.219 -0.224 -0.238 -0.240 
 (0.135) (0.135) (0.219) (0.219) (0.234) (0.234) 
Refuges  0.0397 0.0429 0.0129 0.0142 0.0164 0.0162 
 (0.0899) (0.0907) (0.126) (0.126) (0.124) (0.125) 
Quebec -0.00333 -0.00493 -0.0172 -0.0197 -0.0248 -0.0273 
 (0.0530) (0.0533) (0.0588) (0.0591) (0.0623) (0.0627) 
Ontario -0.0843* -0.0892** -0.0895* -0.0945** -0.106** -0.112** 
 (0.0433) (0.0433) (0.0460) (0.0462) (0.0490) (0.0492) 
Western -0.0615 -0.0656 -0.0917 -0.0977 -0.103 -0.112* 
 (0.0525) (0.0526) (0.0592) (0.0595) (0.0631) (0.0634) 
Atlantic 0.0316 0.0327 0.0179 0.0178 -0.0737 -0.0752 
 (0.190) (0.188) (0.162) (0.163) (0.182) (0.182) 
Male  0.180*** 0.185*** 0.203*** 0.206*** 0.214*** 0.218*** 
 (0.0308) (0.0310) (0.0387) (0.0389) (0.0407) (0.0409) 
Constant 4.034*** 4.082*** 3.941*** 3.986*** 3.901*** 3.926*** 
 (0.246) (0.251) (0.268) (0.271) (0.301) (0.304) 
Observations 79034 78382 3610 3583 3610 3583 
R-squared 0.381 0.381   0.400 0.399 
Number of id   1691 1677 1691 1677 





Table 12  
The earning impact of job education mismatch for source countries with high 
school quality - males- 
  OLS RE BE 




0.105*** 0.103*** 0.0967*** 0.0947*** 0.124*** 0.123*** 
 (0.0190) (0.0201) (0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0175) (0.0177) 
Years of over-
education 
0.0127 0.00985 0.0153 0.0113 0.00522 0.00132 
 (0.0123) (0.0116) (0.0138) (0.0133) (0.0153) (0.0145) 
Years of under- 
education 
0.0449** 0.0558*** 0.0588** 0.0701*** 0.0797*** 0.0963*** 
 (0.0214) (0.0207) (0.0242) (0.0264) (0.0270) (0.0289) 
Age  -0.00143 -0.00187 0.0128 0.0123 -0.0111 -0.0135 
 (0.0173) (0.0175) (0.0220) (0.0223) (0.0249) (0.0251) 
Age square  7.76e-05 8.63e-05 -3.66e-05 -2.58e-05 0.000242 0.000274 
 (0.000219) (0.000221) (0.000273) (0.000276) (0.000308) (0.000311) 
Visible 
minority 
-0.102** -0.110** -0.0717 -0.0793 -0.0640 -0.0666 




0.259*** 0.252*** 0.298*** 0.287*** 0.280*** 0.265** 




0.0475 0.0458 -0.0757 -0.0768 0.0626 0.0741 
 (0.0872) (0.0870) (0.126) (0.127) (0.132) (0.134) 
Foreign exp is 
recognized 
0.321*** 0.322*** 0.330*** 0.331*** 0.321*** 0.322*** 
 (0.0492) (0.0495) (0.0622) (0.0627) (0.0649) (0.0654) 
Married  0.0958 0.0901 0.0711 0.0667 0.126 0.126 
 (0.0689) (0.0702) (0.0832) (0.0841) (0.0858) (0.0867) 
Part time -0.965*** -0.963*** -1.042*** -1.044*** -0.785*** -0.770*** 
 (0.0732) (0.0751) (0.0539) (0.0544) (0.0932) (0.0939) 
Experience in 
Canada 
0.00550*** 0.00552*** 0.00478*** 0.00479*** 0.00785*** 0.00804**
* 
 (0.000559) (0.000563) (0.000448) (0.000450) (0.00123) (0.00124) 
Education and 
recreational 
0.135 0.134 0.0986 0.101 0.0769 0.0752 
 (0.143) (0.144) (0.157) (0.157) (0.162) (0.162) 
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Fine art 0.145 0.146 0.120 0.123 0.153 0.158 
 (0.152) (0.151) (0.249) (0.250) (0.255) (0.256) 
Humanities  0.168 0.164 0.189 0.187 0.234 0.226 
 (0.252) (0.251) (0.199) (0.199) (0.203) (0.204) 
Social sciences  0.186 0.186 0.194 0.197 0.182 0.181 
 (0.129) (0.129) (0.128) (0.128) (0.131) (0.131) 
Commerce  0.0703 0.0696 0.0989 0.0988 0.124 0.122 
 (0.0606) (0.0608) (0.0999) (0.100) (0.103) (0.103) 
Agriculture  -0.0630 -0.0630 0.0652 0.0681 0.190 0.194 
 (0.192) (0.192) (0.213) (0.214) (0.221) (0.221) 
Engineering  0.0869 0.0840 0.0912 0.0905 0.117 0.116 
 (0.0558) (0.0564) (0.0897) (0.0899) (0.0923) (0.0924) 
Health  -0.00606 -0.00619 -0.0107 -0.00892 -0.0140 -0.0163 
 (0.0940) (0.0947) (0.181) (0.182) (0.185) (0.186) 
Mathematics  0.214*** 0.213*** 0.213** 0.216** 0.222** 0.221** 
 (0.0818) (0.0826) (0.108) (0.108) (0.111) (0.111) 
Family class -0.0683 -0.0602 -0.0563 -0.0488 -0.0557 -0.0446 
 (0.101) (0.103) (0.134) (0.136) (0.134) (0.135) 
Skilled workers 0.00581 0.0155 -0.00206 0.00698 0.0114 0.0227 
 (0.0987) (0.100) (0.116) (0.117) (0.113) (0.115) 
Provincial 
nominees 
-0.367** -0.362* -0.377 -0.372 -0.407 -0.397 
 (0.184) (0.184) (0.303) (0.304) (0.314) (0.315) 
Refuges  -0.0155 -0.0107 -0.0584 -0.0556 -0.0161 -0.00889 
 (0.144) (0.145) (0.182) (0.183) (0.182) (0.183) 
Quebec 0.122* 0.123* 0.0958 0.0960 0.118 0.121 
 (0.0713) (0.0716) (0.0849) (0.0855) (0.0887) (0.0893) 
Ontario -0.0343 -0.0348 -0.0379 -0.0388 -0.0140 -0.0143 
 (0.0549) (0.0549) (0.0677) (0.0681) (0.0713) (0.0717) 
Western -0.0346 -0.0359 -0.0603 -0.0630 -0.0324 -0.0369 
 (0.0680) (0.0681) (0.0842) (0.0846) (0.0900) (0.0904) 
Atlantic 0.134 0.138 0.171 0.175 0.0574 0.0636 
 (0.268) (0.267) (0.219) (0.219) (0.249) (0.250) 
Constant 4.378*** 4.415*** 4.311*** 4.353*** 4.058*** 4.092*** 
 (0.347) (0.356) (0.382) (0.388) (0.430) (0.436) 
Observations 42158 41807 1907 1892 1907 1892 
R-squared 0.372 0.370   0.375 0.374 
Number of id   868 860 868 860 
Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 13  
The earning impact of job education mismatch for source countries with high 
school quality - females- 
  OLS RE BE 




0.114*** 0.110*** 0.116*** 0.112*** 0.106*** 0.103*** 
 (0.0161) (0.0165) (0.0158) (0.0160) (0.0197) (0.0201) 
Years of over-
education 
0.0476*** 0.0394*** 0.0439*** 0.0356*** 0.0389** 0.0308** 
 (0.0129) (0.0122) (0.0144) (0.0137) (0.0163) (0.0154) 
Years of under- 
education 
0.0159 0.0160 0.0158 0.0184 0.0273 0.0300 
 (0.0166) (0.0181) (0.0197) (0.0206) (0.0213) (0.0222) 
Age  0.0227 0.0220 0.0345* 0.0333 0.0305 0.0299 
 (0.0192) (0.0193) (0.0205) (0.0206) (0.0226) (0.0228) 
Age square  -0.000308 -0.000298 -0.000469* -0.000452* -0.000439 -0.000430 
 (0.000251) (0.000252) (0.000265) (0.000267) (0.000293) (0.000295) 
Visible 
minority 
0.0153 -0.0180 0.0333 0.00319 0.0448 0.0159 




0.0265 0.00773 0.0439 0.0250 0.0341 0.00835 




0.0122 0.0271 0.0337 0.0418 0.0916 0.0966 
 (0.0837) (0.0847) (0.0740) (0.0748) (0.0772) (0.0779) 
Foreign exp is 
recognized 
0.200*** 0.209*** 0.214*** 0.223*** 0.196** 0.209*** 
 (0.0489) (0.0486) (0.0699) (0.0703) (0.0780) (0.0786) 
Married  0.0295 0.0285 0.00819 0.00911 0.0359 0.0356 
 (0.0607) (0.0608) (0.0699) (0.0705) (0.0756) (0.0762) 
Part time -0.959*** -0.963*** -0.935*** -0.937*** -0.893*** -0.889*** 
 (0.0679) (0.0681) (0.0486) (0.0489) (0.0682) (0.0687) 
Experience in 
Canada 
0.00432*** 0.00430*** 0.00419*** 0.00420*** 0.00562*** 0.00565**
* 
 (0.000629) (0.000636) (0.000568) (0.000572) (0.00113) (0.00114) 
Education and 
recreational 
-0.0338 -0.0239 -0.0665 -0.0569 -0.0618 -0.0504 
 (0.122) (0.122) (0.112) (0.112) (0.119) (0.119) 
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Fine art 0.0754 0.122 -8.75e-05 0.0463 -0.0673 -0.00391 
 (0.287) (0.295) (0.177) (0.180) (0.181) (0.185) 
Humanities  -0.0458 -0.0404 -0.0296 -0.0235 0.0422 0.0530 
 (0.102) (0.104) (0.104) (0.105) (0.110) (0.111) 
Social sciences  0.0432 0.0302 0.0356 0.0336 0.0265 0.0267 
 (0.0826) (0.0814) (0.115) (0.116) (0.122) (0.123) 
Commerce  0.104 0.103 0.0774 0.0766 0.0910 0.0940 
 (0.0699) (0.0708) (0.0837) (0.0841) (0.0898) (0.0903) 
Agriculture  -0.0504 -0.0340 -0.0933 -0.0763 -0.0675 -0.0499 
 (0.122) (0.122) (0.197) (0.197) (0.198) (0.198) 
Engineering  0.0109 0.0147 0.00460 0.00875 0.0290 0.0361 
 (0.0718) (0.0722) (0.0946) (0.0949) (0.101) (0.101) 
Health  -0.0677 -0.0647 -0.118 -0.114 -0.124 -0.117 
 (0.0931) (0.0935) (0.136) (0.137) (0.145) (0.146) 
Mathematics  0.234** 0.239** 0.177 0.182 0.172 0.180 
 (0.114) (0.114) (0.130) (0.131) (0.140) (0.140) 
Family class 0.0750 0.0715 0.0394 0.0382 0.0103 0.00971 
 (0.0757) (0.0760) (0.112) (0.112) (0.117) (0.117) 
Skilled workers 0.0539 0.0523 0.0278 0.0286 -0.00650 -0.00497 
 (0.0694) (0.0701) (0.105) (0.106) (0.110) (0.110) 
Provincial 
nominees 
0.0941 0.0757 0.0868 0.0733 0.0674 0.0570 
 (0.120) (0.120) (0.319) (0.320) (0.353) (0.354) 
Refuges  0.127 0.131 0.111 0.114 0.0826 0.0812 
 (0.108) (0.109) (0.176) (0.176) (0.171) (0.171) 
Quebec -0.131* -0.138* -0.124 -0.129 -0.148* -0.154* 
 (0.0735) (0.0739) (0.0821) (0.0825) (0.0888) (0.0893) 
Ontario -0.117* -0.128** -0.120* -0.128** -0.162** -0.173** 
 (0.0637) (0.0636) (0.0632) (0.0635) (0.0680) (0.0684) 
Western -0.0448 -0.0537 -0.0722 -0.0810 -0.112 -0.124 
 (0.0776) (0.0779) (0.0844) (0.0847) (0.0897) (0.0902) 
Atlantic -0.0684 -0.0729 -0.0841 -0.0880 -0.175 -0.182 
 (0.140) (0.140) (0.244) (0.244) (0.269) (0.270) 
Constant 3.789*** 3.876*** 3.600*** 3.687*** 3.740*** 3.802*** 
 (0.352) (0.355) (0.385) (0.388) (0.442) (0.447) 
Observations 36876 36575 1703 1691 1703 1691 
R-squared 0.334 0.334   0.355 0.353 
Number of id   823 817 823 817 




Table 14  
The earning impact of job education mismatch for source countries with low 
school quality - whole population - 
  OLS RE BE 




0.107*** 0.104*** 0.104*** 0.102*** 0.112*** 0.108*** 
 (0.00848) (0.00888) (0.00752) (0.00773) (0.00933) (0.00950) 
Years of over-
education 
0.0271*** 0.0302*** 0.0228*** 0.0223*** 0.0238*** 0.0277*** 
 (0.00654) (0.00802) (0.00627) (0.00760) (0.00671) (0.00823) 
Years of under- 
education 
0.0187** 0.0146* 0.0152* 0.0154** 0.00596 0.00366 
 (0.00933) (0.00883) (0.00919) (0.00784) (0.00959) (0.00837) 
Age  0.0503*** 0.0507*** 0.0510*** 0.0513*** 0.0428*** 0.0434*** 
 (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.00816) (0.00818) (0.00891) (0.00891) 







 (0.000138) (0.000137) (0.000100) (0.000100) (0.000109) (0.000109) 
Visible 
minority 
-0.0655 -0.0285 -0.0622* -0.0304 -0.0507 -0.0240 




0.164*** 0.155*** 0.161*** 0.152*** 0.167*** 0.159*** 




0.0481 0.0444 0.0157 0.0123 0.0377 0.0373 
 (0.0297) (0.0297) (0.0350) (0.0350) (0.0361) (0.0361) 
Foreign exp is 
recognized 
0.270*** 0.262*** 0.284*** 0.278*** 0.274*** 0.266*** 
 (0.0306) (0.0302) (0.0315) (0.0317) (0.0335) (0.0336) 
Married  -0.00377 0.00685 5.38e-05 0.00706 0.0175 0.0251 
 (0.0390) (0.0382) (0.0360) (0.0360) (0.0374) (0.0374) 
Part time -0.986*** -0.990*** -0.978*** -0.979*** -1.079*** -1.083*** 
 (0.0334) (0.0335) (0.0258) (0.0258) (0.0378) (0.0378) 
Experience in 
Canada 
0.00303*** 0.00303*** 0.00317*** 0.00317*** 0.00294*** 0.00293*** 
 (0.000300) (0.000298) (0.000241) (0.000241) (0.000616) (0.000616) 




 (0.0568) (0.0562) (0.0566) (0.0563) (0.0587) (0.0583) 
Fine art -0.0719 -0.0390 -0.162 -0.141 -0.110 -0.0846 
 (0.200) (0.203) (0.115) (0.114) (0.113) (0.113) 
Humanities  -0.0866 -0.0378 -0.0685 -0.0319 -0.0568 -0.00765 
 (0.0626) (0.0612) (0.0640) (0.0629) (0.0662) (0.0651) 
Social sciences  -0.129*** -0.0895* -0.137** -0.110** -0.137** -0.101* 
 (0.0486) (0.0458) (0.0548) (0.0540) (0.0566) (0.0557) 
Commerce  -0.0425 -0.0130 -0.0401 -0.0202 -0.0431 -0.0125 
 (0.0393) (0.0394) (0.0420) (0.0420) (0.0434) (0.0432) 
Agriculture  -0.157* -0.127 -0.109 -0.0832 -0.0525 -0.0200 
 (0.0933) (0.0922) (0.0892) (0.0884) (0.0918) (0.0908) 
Engineering  0.00691 0.0298 -0.0190 -0.00389 -0.0272 -0.00220 
 (0.0418) (0.0421) (0.0451) (0.0452) (0.0468) (0.0468) 
Health  0.00551 0.0395 0.0362 0.0592 -0.000611 0.0321 
 (0.0856) (0.0853) (0.0865) (0.0863) (0.0894) (0.0891) 
Mathematics  0.219** 0.243*** 0.213*** 0.230*** 0.215*** 0.243*** 
 (0.0919) (0.0914) (0.0735) (0.0736) (0.0764) (0.0764) 
Family class -0.0366 -0.0305 -0.0556 -0.0514 -0.146** -0.142** 
 (0.0960) (0.0973) (0.0692) (0.0692) (0.0708) (0.0707) 
Skilled workers -0.0514 -0.0387 -0.0530 -0.0441 -0.123* -0.114 
 (0.0934) (0.0938) (0.0683) (0.0680) (0.0695) (0.0692) 
Provincial 
nominees 
-0.0373 -0.0449 -0.110 -0.120 -0.218 -0.225 
 (0.124) (0.124) (0.140) (0.140) (0.145) (0.145) 
Refuges  -0.136 -0.135 -0.191** -0.193** -0.251*** -0.252*** 
 (0.105) (0.106) (0.0751) (0.0751) (0.0757) (0.0756) 
Quebec -0.0277 -0.0274 0.0123 0.0130 0.0130 0.0137 
 (0.0372) (0.0373) (0.0401) (0.0402) (0.0423) (0.0423) 
Ontario -0.0103 -0.0118 -0.00644 -0.00709 -0.0199 -0.0207 
 (0.0287) (0.0287) (0.0318) (0.0318) (0.0338) (0.0338) 
Western 0.00278 -0.000104 0.0185 0.0170 -0.00596 -0.00768 
 (0.0421) (0.0421) (0.0413) (0.0413) (0.0439) (0.0439) 
Atlantic 0.299** 0.310** 0.169 0.174 0.190 0.199 
 (0.139) (0.140) (0.119) (0.119) (0.144) (0.144) 
Male  0.117*** 0.123*** 0.142*** 0.146*** 0.123*** 0.126*** 
 (0.0277) (0.0273) (0.0267) (0.0267) (0.0277) (0.0277) 
Constant 3.646*** 3.667*** 3.660*** 3.680*** 3.828*** 3.854*** 
 (0.223) (0.221) (0.179) (0.179) (0.204) (0.203) 
Observations 122089 122089 5728 5728 5728 5728 
R-squared 0.411 0.410   0.471 0.471 
Number of id   2477 2477 2477 2477 




Table 15  
The earning impact of job education mismatch for source countries with low 
school quality - males- 
  OLS RE BE 




0.0947*** 0.0938*** 0.0944*** 0.0958*** 0.108*** 0.107*** 
 (0.00986) (0.00990) (0.00953) (0.00976) (0.0116) (0.0118) 
Years of over-
education 
0.0166** 0.0247*** 0.0139* 0.0217** 0.0155* 0.0266** 
 (0.00740) (0.00894) (0.00831) (0.00956) (0.00891) (0.0104) 
Years of under- 
education 
0.0306** 0.0145 0.0337** 0.0185* 0.0276* 0.0109 
 (0.0122) (0.0105) (0.0133) (0.0108) (0.0143) (0.0119) 
Age  0.0341*** 0.0336*** 0.0386*** 0.0378*** 0.0149 0.0147 
 (0.0126) (0.0128) (0.0111) (0.0112) (0.0123) (0.0123) 
Age square  -0.000430*** -
0.000433*** 
-0.000468*** -0.000467*** -0.000202 -0.000210 
 (0.000156) (0.000158) (0.000133) (0.000133) (0.000147) (0.000147) 
Visible 
minority 
-0.198*** -0.167*** -0.197*** -0.163*** -0.192*** -0.161*** 




0.126*** 0.114** 0.123** 0.111** 0.107** 0.0954* 




-0.00162 0.00339 -0.0391 -0.0330 0.0108 0.0169 
 (0.0465) (0.0467) (0.0538) (0.0536) (0.0556) (0.0554) 
Foreign exp is 
recognized 
0.289*** 0.282*** 0.300*** 0.294*** 0.287*** 0.281*** 
 (0.0362) (0.0357) (0.0389) (0.0390) (0.0405) (0.0405) 
Married  0.0108 0.0187 0.00865 0.0163 0.0489 0.0568 
 (0.0532) (0.0519) (0.0482) (0.0483) (0.0497) (0.0498) 
Part time -1.082*** -1.087*** -1.071*** -1.073*** -1.195*** -1.199*** 
 (0.0539) (0.0541) (0.0377) (0.0377) (0.0559) (0.0559) 
Experience in 
Canada 
0.00333*** 0.00334*** 0.00330*** 0.00332*** 0.00424*** 0.00417**
* 
 (0.000324) (0.000324) (0.000298) (0.000298) (0.000855) (0.000855) 
Education and 
recreational 
-0.100 -0.0799 -0.147* -0.134 -0.137 -0.117 
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 (0.113) (0.110) (0.0881) (0.0875) (0.0903) (0.0897) 
Fine art 0.219 0.266 0.100 0.141 0.279 0.322* 
 (0.455) (0.462) (0.175) (0.174) (0.171) (0.171) 
Humanities  -0.149** -0.113 -0.132 -0.108 -0.140 -0.105 
 (0.0712) (0.0689) (0.108) (0.107) (0.110) (0.109) 
Social sciences  -0.103* -0.0767 -0.115 -0.0997 -0.110 -0.0876 
 (0.0621) (0.0609) (0.0750) (0.0743) (0.0767) (0.0761) 
Commerce  -0.0463 -0.0249 -0.0447 -0.0333 -0.0466 -0.0264 
 (0.0492) (0.0487) (0.0559) (0.0558) (0.0569) (0.0568) 
Agriculture  -0.210** -0.201* -0.202 -0.202 -0.193 -0.189 
 (0.106) (0.106) (0.129) (0.127) (0.131) (0.129) 
Engineering  -0.00798 0.00878 -0.0451 -0.0363 -0.0543 -0.0376 
 (0.0489) (0.0487) (0.0533) (0.0539) (0.0543) (0.0549) 
Health  0.0832 0.114 0.194 0.205 0.152 0.176 
 (0.208) (0.205) (0.149) (0.148) (0.151) (0.150) 
Mathematics  0.235** 0.250** 0.224*** 0.229*** 0.239*** 0.252*** 
 (0.0999) (0.0992) (0.0865) (0.0866) (0.0884) (0.0885) 
Family class -0.166 -0.161 -0.208** -0.206** -0.318*** -0.318*** 
 (0.124) (0.126) (0.0827) (0.0825) (0.0835) (0.0833) 
Skilled workers -0.102 -0.0921 -0.142* -0.139* -0.235*** -0.233*** 
 (0.118) (0.119) (0.0819) (0.0810) (0.0826) (0.0815) 
Provincial 
nominees 
-0.192 -0.189 -0.238 -0.242 -0.334* -0.335* 
 (0.149) (0.148) (0.173) (0.173) (0.180) (0.180) 
Refuges  -0.218 -0.211 -0.325*** -0.321*** -0.398*** -0.395*** 
 (0.137) (0.139) (0.0910) (0.0911) (0.0905) (0.0906) 
Quebec -0.0297 -0.0309 -0.00315 -0.00292 -0.00768 -0.00904 
 (0.0412) (0.0411) (0.0515) (0.0515) (0.0541) (0.0541) 
Ontario 0.0217 0.0187 0.0132 0.0118 0.0103 0.00812 
 (0.0341) (0.0339) (0.0403) (0.0403) (0.0426) (0.0426) 
Western 0.0858 0.0792 0.102* 0.0982* 0.0495 0.0447 
 (0.0532) (0.0532) (0.0535) (0.0535) (0.0564) (0.0565) 
Atlantic 0.499** 0.499** 0.356** 0.355** 0.391** 0.395** 
 (0.210) (0.212) (0.148) (0.149) (0.193) (0.193) 
Constant 4.423*** 4.425*** 4.415*** 4.398*** 4.703*** 4.704*** 
 (0.278) (0.276) (0.230) (0.230) (0.263) (0.262) 
Observations 69850 69850 3285 3285 3285 3285 
R-squared 0.428 0.428   0.486 0.486 
Number of id   1356 1356 1356 1356 




Table 16  
The earning impact of job education mismatch for source countries with low 
school quality - females- 
  OLS RE BE 




0.127*** 0.122*** 0.116*** 0.110*** 0.114*** 0.107*** 
 (0.0150) (0.0159) (0.0124) (0.0128) (0.0157) (0.0160) 
Years of over-
education 
0.0393*** 0.0373*** 0.0328*** 0.0221* 0.0351*** 0.0288** 
 (0.0113) (0.0142) (0.00980) (0.0125) (0.0104) (0.0133) 
Years of under- 
education 
0.0111 0.0177 0.000714 0.0117 -0.00911 -0.000709 
 (0.0135) (0.0135) (0.0128) (0.0115) (0.0131) (0.0120) 
Age  0.0719*** 0.0732*** 0.0680*** 0.0690*** 0.0734*** 0.0741*** 
 (0.0181) (0.0178) (0.0125) (0.0126) (0.0135) (0.0136) 
Age square  -0.000921*** -0.000941*** -0.000853*** -0.000865*** -0.000940*** -0.000950*** 
 (0.000247) (0.000242) (0.000159) (0.000159) (0.000170) (0.000171) 
Visible 
minority 
0.0822 0.131** 0.0882 0.114** 0.0969* 0.118** 




0.184** 0.177** 0.173*** 0.166*** 0.211*** 0.205*** 




0.0879** 0.0799** 0.0782 0.0702 0.0791 0.0764 
 (0.0390) (0.0389) (0.0487) (0.0493) (0.0505) (0.0511) 
Foreign exp is 
recognized 
0.209*** 0.198*** 0.229*** 0.227*** 0.232*** 0.226*** 
 (0.0526) (0.0522) (0.0530) (0.0535) (0.0573) (0.0578) 
Married  -0.0295 -0.0210 -0.0281 -0.0227 -0.0483 -0.0406 
 (0.0586) (0.0584) (0.0555) (0.0558) (0.0586) (0.0588) 
Part time -0.917*** -0.922*** -0.909*** -0.909*** -0.991*** -0.993*** 
 (0.0426) (0.0426) (0.0360) (0.0361) (0.0521) (0.0523) 
Experience in 
Canada 
0.00257*** 0.00256*** 0.00286*** 0.00284*** 0.00180** 0.00182** 
 (0.000535) (0.000529) (0.000402) (0.000402) (0.000893) (0.000896) 
Education and 
recreational 
-0.137** -0.0907 -0.162** -0.125* -0.177** -0.126 
 (0.0637) (0.0628) (0.0754) (0.0750) (0.0795) (0.0788) 
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Fine art -0.302*** -0.269*** -0.330** -0.307** -0.352** -0.319** 
 (0.0661) (0.0644) (0.152) (0.153) (0.153) (0.153) 
Humanities  -0.0948 -0.0281 -0.0633 -0.00205 -0.0376 0.0384 
 (0.0854) (0.0815) (0.0821) (0.0799) (0.0869) (0.0843) 
Social sciences  -0.180** -0.120* -0.178** -0.126 -0.177** -0.115 
 (0.0759) (0.0676) (0.0801) (0.0784) (0.0835) (0.0816) 
Commerce  -0.0533 -0.0173 -0.0431 -0.0144 -0.0391 0.00134 
 (0.0640) (0.0645) (0.0635) (0.0637) (0.0666) (0.0666) 
Agriculture  -0.144 -0.103 -0.0653 -0.0163 0.0355 0.0942 
 (0.145) (0.144) (0.123) (0.122) (0.129) (0.128) 
Engineering  0.0833 0.127 0.109 0.149 0.117 0.167* 
 (0.110) (0.109) (0.0967) (0.0964) (0.102) (0.101) 
Health  -0.0506 -0.0147 -0.0455 -0.0131 -0.0765 -0.0319 
 (0.0890) (0.0891) (0.108) (0.108) (0.114) (0.114) 
Mathematics  0.174 0.206 0.185 0.213 0.174 0.221 
 (0.188) (0.188) (0.138) (0.138) (0.145) (0.145) 
Family class 0.213** 0.199** 0.188 0.188 0.141 0.143 
 (0.0959) (0.0936) (0.123) (0.123) (0.126) (0.126) 
Skilled workers 0.129 0.116 0.128 0.128 0.116 0.118 
 (0.0943) (0.0912) (0.121) (0.121) (0.123) (0.123) 
Provincial 
nominees 
0.276 0.232 0.117 0.0871 0.0455 0.0134 
 (0.170) (0.165) (0.233) (0.233) (0.237) (0.237) 
Refuges  0.0590 0.0333 0.0371 0.0190 0.0307 0.0146 
 (0.115) (0.112) (0.130) (0.130) (0.132) (0.132) 
Quebec -0.0393 -0.0352 0.0193 0.0202 0.0214 0.0239 
 (0.0673) (0.0675) (0.0631) (0.0635) (0.0665) (0.0668) 
Ontario -0.0520 -0.0523 -0.0243 -0.0265 -0.0478 -0.0486 
 (0.0505) (0.0504) (0.0507) (0.0509) (0.0540) (0.0542) 
Western -0.0936 -0.0956 -0.0699 -0.0744 -0.0560 -0.0591 
 (0.0672) (0.0669) (0.0641) (0.0644) (0.0682) (0.0684) 
Atlantic 0.0572 0.0712 -0.0450 -0.0417 0.0330 0.0391 
 (0.0828) (0.0819) (0.192) (0.193) (0.215) (0.216) 
Constant 2.720*** 2.784*** 2.870*** 2.957*** 2.931*** 3.023*** 
 (0.340) (0.332) (0.288) (0.288) (0.325) (0.325) 
Observations 52239 52239 2443 2443 2443 2443 
R-squared 0.371 0.368   0.436 0.433 
Number of id   1121 1121 1121 1121 







Male immigrants with a university degree in jobs with low educational 
requirements  
 









1991 1996 2001 2006
Low skill job %
Recent immigrants
Immigrants arrived 6 to 10 years age





Female immigrants with a university degree in jobs with low educational 
requirements  
 








1991 1996 2001 2006
Low skill job %
Recent immigrants
Immigrants arrived 6 to 10 years age





 Source country quality adjustment index 
 
Source: Author’s compilation 
  
0.74 0.76
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Distribution of job-education mismatch intensity for quality adjusted and 






 Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Quality unadjusted 2.54 3.11 -0.169 4.33 
Quality adjusted 1.3 3.38 0.099 3.58 

















Distribution of job-education mismatch intensity for quality adjusted and 




 Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Quality unadjusted 2.29 3.24 -0.158 4.83 
Quality adjusted 1.17 3.47 0.077 3.88 
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Figure 6  
Distribution of job-education mismatch intensity for quality adjusted and 




 Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Quality unadjusted 2.05 3.22 -0.195 4.54 
Quality adjusted 0.98 3.44 -0.022 3.58 


















What Can We Learn From Earnings of Immigrants? 
Quality Adjustment of Human Capital 
 
Abstract 
The economic assimilation literature documents that on average, immigrants receive a 
lower return to foreign-obtained schooling and have higher over-education rates, 
compared to the native-born. Given that schooling quality is not directly observed, 
previous studies mostly ignored the quality dimension of immigrants’ human capital, and 
focused only on quantity measures, such as years of schooling. The main objective of this 
study is to quality-adjust human capital acquired from different source countries. This is 
achieved by explicitly deriving quality-adjustment indices, using data on adult males 
from the 2001 Canadian census. The derived indices are then used to examine the role of 
schooling quality in explaining the differential returns to schooling and over-education 
rates by nativity. I also use these indices to identify important inputs in the production 
technology of schooling quality. The key finding of this study is that accounting for 
schooling quality virtually eliminates the native-immigrant gaps in the returns to 
schooling and in the incidence of over-education. Results also show wide variations in 
the return to schooling across countries. These variations are significantly explained by 
cross-country differences in educational resources, particularly government educational 
expenditure and the length of the school term. Results are robust to a variety of 
robustness checks including different sample selections and model specifications. This 
study confirms that quality of human capital is important for understanding economic 
integration of immigrants. 
 
Keywords: Economic Assimilation, Return to schooling, Over-education, Schooling 




Recent empirical evidence has shown that the quality of human capital plays an 
important role in accounting for differences in growth rates across countries (e.g. 
Hanushek and Kimko, 2000; Schoellman, 2011).37 However, measuring human capital 
quality remains an empirical challenge given that it is not directly observed. 
The original contribution of the current study is its explicit derivation of quality 
adjustment indices, to adjust human capital for cross-country schooling quality 
differences, using information on the earnings of immigrants in the Canadian labor 
market. The derived indices are then used to conduct the following two exercises: a) 
identifying important inputs in the production technology of schooling quality, b) 
examining the role of schooling quality in explaining the differential returns to schooling 
and over-education rates by nativity. 
The derivation of the quality-adjustment indices is based on the following two steps; 
first, I estimate the returns to immigrants’ foreign-obtained schooling, using an 
augmented version of the Mincerian earning function, and provide supportive evidence 
on the validity of these returns to measure the schooling quality of their country of origin. 
Second, I derive a quality adjustment index for each country of origin as a ratio between 
the return to schooling from each foreign country and the Canadian return.  
To identify the important quality inputs, I use two criteria, the explanatory power of 
the schooling quality production model, as measured by the coefficient of determination, 
and the statistical significance of the estimated coefficients. These two criteria yield a 
quality production model that accounts the best for the Canadian-foreign differential in 
                                                 
37 Human capital refers to the stock of skills which an individual acquires through education, 
training and experience, and which affect his/her earning capacity. 
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returns to schooling. This model produced the smallest difference between the mean of 
the returns to quality-adjusted foreign-obtained schooling and the return to Canadian 
schooling, and also produced the smallest standard deviation of the estimated returns to 
quality-adjusted foreign-obtained schooling across countries. 
Results show wide variations in the quality of schooling by country of origin, that are 
significantly explained by cross-country differences in educational resources, particularly 
government educational expenditure and the length of the school term. The fundamental 
finding of this study is that accounting for schooling quality virtually eliminates the 
native-immigrant gaps in the returns to schooling and in the incidence of over-education. 
In particular, the return to an extra year of quality-adjusted schooling of immigrants is 
6.87, which is very close to the Canadian return of 7.06. This is in contrast to 5.9 percent, 
obtained before the adjustment. Results also show that cross-country differences in 
schooling quality account for over 90 percent of the variation in the returns to foreign-
obtained schooling. Estimates show that the incidence of over-education among 
immigrants, after adjusting for quality differences, is 44.4 percent, which is very close to 
the Canadian incidence of 43.85 percent. This is in contrast to 58.5 percent, obtained 
before adjusting for schooling quality. This implies that when job-education mismatch is 
measured by years of schooling alone, as is standard in the literature, some of this 
apparent mismatch arises due to differences in the schooling quality between the host and 
home countries. In sum, the findings of this study confirm that quality of human capital is 
important for understanding economic integration of immigrants. 
This paper is organized as follow: Section 2 presents a review of related studies. 
Section 3 describes the data source and sample used. In section 4, I estimate the returns to 
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schooling, conduct some robustness checks, and provide supportive evidence on the 
validity of the return to schooling to measure schooling quality. Section 5 estimates a 
schooling quality production function to identify important educational inputs, and derive 
schooling quality adjustment indices to control for cross-country difference in schooling 
quality. Section 6 examines the effect of controlling for schooling quality in accounting 
for the differential over-education rates by nativity. Section 8 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Background and Literature  
 
2.1. Measuring schooling quality 
Given that education quality is not directly observed, previous studies mostly used 
two main methods to infer it. The first approach uses student outcomes such as scores on 
internationally standardized tests like the Programme for International Student 
Assessment (PISA) as a direct measure for schooling quality. The second approach 
involves estimating an education quality production function and relating educational 
inputs, such as pupils-teacher ratio and expenditures per pupil to an educational outcome. 
For example, Lee and Barro (2001) estimated a schooling quality production function 
that relates a set of measures for schooling quality such as international test scores, 
repetition rates and dropout rates to a set of family inputs and school resources. The 
authors found that the important factors in producing schooling quality include family 
characteristics such as parent’s income and education, and more school resources such as 
smaller class size, higher teacher salaries and greater school length.  
In addition to the use of educational inputs to measure education quality, several 
studies have used students’ scores in international achievement tests to infer the quality 
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of the educational system (e.g. Hanushek and Kimko, 2000; Sweetman, 2004; Chiswick 
and Miller, 2010). For example, Hanushek and Kimko (2000) used countries scores from 
international achievement tests to construct measures of the average quality of the labor 
force of each country, which were then used to explain cross-country differences in 
growth rates. The international test scores were found to be highly correlated with the 
labor market outcomes of immigrants, suggesting that they could be a reasonable 
measure of the average quality of human capital from a particular country. For example, 
in a Canadian study, Sweetman (2004) found a strong correlation between Hanushek and 
Kimko’s (2000) schooling quality measure and the return to schooling of immigrants in 
the Canadian labor market. In a related study, Chiswick and Miller (2010) found a strong 
positive relationship between the payoffs to schooling for immigrants in the US labor 
market and their source country schooling quality as measured by the PISA reading, 
mathematics and science literacy scores. 38 
Though international test scores and educational resources have been commonly 
used to measure schooling quality, they suffer from several shortcomings that affect their 
validity and accuracy. For instance, several studies found weak correlation between test 
scores of students and consequent labor market outcomes. The test scores also suffer 
from selectivity bias and difficulties in standardizing the tests (Betts, 1995). In addition 
these test scores are not available for many developing countries. For a more 
comprehensive review of the shortcomings of these methods see for example Betts 
(1995), Ladd and Loeb (2012).  
                                                 
38 PISA refers to the Programme for International Student Assessment. It is an international 
evaluation of 15-year-old school pupils' scholastic performance conducted every three years by 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 
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The current study adds to the existing literature on the cross-country differences in 
education quality by incorporating the idea that the earnings of foreign-educated 
immigrants in the same labor market can be used to measure the average quality of 
schooling of their home countries. The idea of using information on the labor market 
outcomes of foreign-educated immigrants to infer the quality of human capital in their 
country of origin derives from Hendricks (2002). Hendricks (2002) used the average 
labor earnings of immigrants, with identical measured skills in the US labor market, to 
estimate unmeasured human-capital endowments across countries. In a similar fashion, 
Mattoo et al. (2008) used the probability of placement of highly educated immigrants in 
skilled jobs in the US labor market as a measure of the “average quality” of human 
capital of the source country. The authors found that the occupational attainment of 
immigrants in the US labor market is largely affected by the characteristics of the source 
country that influence the quality of human capital such as the amount of educational 
resources devoted to schooling. They found that immigrants from source countries with 
low schooling quality are more likely to end up working in unskilled jobs than 
immigrants from source countries with better schooling quality. In a recent study, 
Schoellman (2011) estimated the return to schooling of immigrants in the US labor 
market and used these returns as a measure of schooling quality of the source countries. 
The author showed that cross-country differences in education quality are as important as 
cross-country differences in quantity of schooling in accounting for differences in output 
per worker across countries.  
The novelty of the current study is its explicit derivation of quality adjustment indices 
to adjust human capital for cross-country differences in schooling quality. The derived 
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indices are then used to identify important inputs in the production technology of 
schooling quality and to examine the role of schooling quality in explaining the 
differential returns to schooling and over-education rates by nativity. 
2.2. Returns to schooling and over-education prevalence by nativity 
The labor market performance of immigrants compared to the native-born has been 
the subject of intensive research (e.g. Galarneau and Morissette, 2004; Li et al., 2006; 
Green et al., 2007; Wald and Fang, 2008). Earnings and occupational placement have 
been commonly used to assess the degree of economic integration of immigrants. A key 
factor directly related to this integration process is the quality of foreign-acquired human 
capital brought into the host country (Friedberg, 2000; Chiswick and Miller, 2009).  
Two empirical regularities have emerged in the economic assimilation literature. 
First, foreign-obtained schooling is discounted in the destination country’s labor market, 
as reflected by lower return to immigrants’ education compared to the native-born (e.g.; 
Chiswick, 1978; Baker and Benjamin, 1994; Friedberg, 2000; Alboim et al., 2005; 
Chiswick and Miller, 2008). Second, the prevalence of over-education is on average 
higher among immigrants than the native-born (e.g. Li et al., 2006; Kler, 2007; Green et 
al., 2007; Galarneau and Morissette, 2008; Wald and Fang, 2008; Nielsen, 2011).39 In the 
current study, I examine how cross-country differences in schooling quality account for 
these empirical observations. 
The relatively lower return to foreign-obtained schooling has been established in the 
literature since Chiswick’s (1978) seminal study on the economic assimilation of foreign- 
born males in the US labor market. Using 1970 census data, Chiswick (1978) estimated 
                                                 
39 Over-education occurs when the educational attainment of a worker is greater than the 
educational requirement of the job. 
81 
 
that an extra year of schooling for the foreign born raises earnings by 5.7 percent, 
compared with 7.2 percent for the native born. He also found that the return to foreign-
obtained schooling varies by country of origin, where the return was larger for 
immigrants from English-speaking countries (6.6 percent) compared with other 
immigrants (5.2 percent). Similarly, Beggs and Chapman (1988) found that the return to 
schooling in the Australian labor market was 8.3 percent for immigrants from English-
speaking countries and 4.9 percent for immigrants from non English-speaking countries 
compared to 9 percent for the native born.  
Several studies have estimated the returns to immigrants' education in the Canadian 
labor market with the general finding that on average, the return to a year of schooling for 
immigrants is about half that of the native-born (Reitz ,2001; Ferrer et al., 2008;Wald and 
Fang, 2008). Baker and Benjamin (1994) found that the lower relative return to foreign-
obtained schooling was “permanent” among different cohorts of immigrants to Canada. 
They found that the return to schooling was 4.8 percent for immigrants and 7.3 percent 
for native-born in 1971, and 4.9 percent and 7.6 percent for the two groups respectively 
in 1986.40 Alboim et al. (2005) found that the low return on the foreign-obtained human 
capital, both education and experience, fully explains the earnings disadvantage of 
immigrants relative to the native-born. The authors found that foreign human capital was 
significantly discounted in the Canadian labor market, where the return to a foreign year 
of schooling was equal to 70 percent of the return to a Canadian year of schooling. 
Another empirical observation in the economic assimilation literature is that the 
prevalence of over-education is higher among immigrants than the native-born. For 
                                                 
40 For additional evidence from other countries on the lower return to foreign-obtained schooling 
see Shields and Price (1998) for UK, Friedberg (2000) for Israel and Nordin (2011) for Sweden.  
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example, using the survey of labor and income dynamics, Li et al. (2006) found that 
during the 1993-2001 period, 52 percent of recent immigrants to Canada, those in Canada 
for 10 years or less, were overqualified compared to 28 percent of their Canadian-born 
counterparts. They also found that recent immigrants were twice as likely to remain 
overqualified compared to native Canadians. Using census data, Galarneau and 
Morissette (2008) found that 28 percent of recent immigrant males, and 40 percent of 
females with university degrees were in jobs with low educational requirements 
compared to 10 percent and 12 percent for Canadian-born. Using data from the Canadian 
Workplace and Employee Survey, Wald and Fang (2008) found that 47.8 percent of the 
recent immigrants to Canada were over-educated compared to 34.6 percent among non-
recent immigrants and 31.3 percent among native-born. Evidence from European 
countries also confirmed this finding. For example, using data from Denmark, Nielsen 
(2011) found that the incidence of over-education among immigrants with foreign-
acquired education was 47 percent compared to 33 percent among native Danes. 41 
Studies also showed that the incidence of over-education among immigrants varied 
by the region of origin. For example, Green et al. (2007) found that the rate of over-
education in the Australian labor market among immigrants from non-English speaking 
countries was 50 percent to 100 percent higher than immigrants from English speaking 
countries. Evidence from US also confirms this finding. For example, using the 2000 US 
Census data on employed males, Chiswick and Miller (2009) noticed wide variations in 
the extent of over-education across source region. The authors found higher rates of over-
education among immigrants from the former USSR, Philippines, South Asia, other 
                                                 
41 For additional evidence on this empirical finding see Lindley and Lenton (2006) for evidence 




South Asia, Middle East and Sub Saharan Africa, while the rates of over-education were 
low among immigrants from Southern Europe, Indochina, Mexico, Cuba, Caribbean, 
Central and South America—Spanish, and Central and South America—non-Spanish. 
Several explanations have been suggested for the lower relative return to 
schooling for the foreign-acquired education and the higher incidence of over-education 
among immigrants. These include lower quality of foreign schooling (Chiswick and 
Miller, 2009), “country-specific aspects” of the knowledge acquired in schools 
(Chiswick, 1978), incompatibility of foreign-obtained schooling with the requirements of 
the host country labor market (Friedberg, 2000), lack of host country-specific human 
capital such as language proficiency (Alboim et al., 2005) and racial discrimination. For 
example, Oreopoulos (2009) conducted a study using thousands of resumes sent in response 
to online job postings for several occupations in Toronto. The author found considerable 
employer discrimination against applicants with ethnic names on the resume in terms of 
lower callback rates and interview requests compared to those with English-sounding names. 
3. Data source and sample characteristics 
The empirical analysis used data from the confidential master file of the 2001 
Canadian census of population. The merit of the census data set is that it includes a large 
sample of immigrants from a wide range of countries, along with information on a 
comprehensive set of demographic and labor market variables for a nationally 
representative sample of individuals.42 In addition, the census file includes detailed 
occupational codes for the job held by employed individuals at the time of the 
                                                 
42 For additional information on the 2001 Canadian census see Statistic Canada (2003). 
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interview.43 This was used to determine the years of schooling required in each 
occupation and hence determine the prevalence of over-education. 
The analysis was restricted to males, aged 24 to 65 years who were paid workers and 
working full time. In addition, the analysis excluded individuals with missing values on 
the relevant variables. Source countries with observations less than 500 immigrants were 
also excluded from the sample. These restrictions produced a sample of 5,117,249 
Canadians and 680,107 immigrants from 78 source countries. To control for the 
possibility that an immigrant may have obtained any Canadian education after 
immigration, I restricted the analyses to immigrants whose age at immigration is at least 
24 years old as a baseline specification. I further raised this threshold to 30 years old as a 
robustness check for the results. The rationale behind this exclusion is that any post 
immigration investment in education is likely to raise the return to the foreign obtained 
schooling and hence will bias upward the estimate of the source country schooling 
quality (Duleep and Regets, 1999). 
<Insert Table 1 here> 
Table 1 reports the characteristics of the baseline sample that is used in the analysis. 
Immigrants represent 12.3 percent of the sample. On average, immigrants are older, more 
educated, have more work experience and more likely to be married than the native-
born.44 About one quarter of the immigrants reported English or French as their mother 
tongue. Immigrants are concentrated in four main provinces; Ontario (58 percent), British 
                                                 
43 The occupational coding system is based on the 1980 Standard Occupational Classification. 
44 Work experience is determined based on potential work experience, defined as age-years of 
schooling-6. The fact that immigrants are on average more educated than their Canadian 




Columbia (16.3 percent), Quebec (13.2 percent) and Alberta (8.5 percent). 53.88 percent 
of the immigrants arrived to Canada during the period 1990-2001, 22.8 percent 
immigrated during 1980-1989, 17.57 percent during 1970-1979 and 5.76 percent during 
1960-1969. 
<Insert Table 2 here> 
Table 2 presents weighted summary statistics on average years of schooling, average 
annual wages and salaries and the number of observations of the baseline sample for each 
source country. India was the source of the largest percentage of immigrant males (8.73 
percent) followed by United Kingdom (7.8 percent), China (7.75 percent), Philippines 
(5.49 percent), Hong Kong (4.42 percent), United States of America (3.80 percent) and 
Poland (3.67 percent). Table 2 illustrates wide cross-country variation in the average 
years of schooling and average annual wages and salaries of immigrants.  
Methodology 
The empirical analysis agenda is as follows: first, I estimate the returns to foreign-
obtained schooling, conduct several robustness checks, and provide supportive evidence 
on the validity of these returns to measure schooling quality. Second, the estimated 
returns to schooling are used to identify important factors in producing schooling quality, 
derive schooling quality adjustment indices and revisiting the evidence on the differential 




4.1. Estimating the return to schooling  
The first step in the analysis is to estimate the returns to foreign-obtained schooling, 
which are used to measure schooling quality for each country of origin.45 This is 
accomplished by estimating the following augmented version of the Mincer earning 
function:  
log() = Z +E		 + 	 +	j      (1) 
Specifying the earning function as in equation 1 allows each country of origin to have 
its own intercept and return to schooling which is central to the current study. Equation 1 
is showing that the logarithm of the weekly wage of individual  from country 	 is 
determined by a country-specific fixed effect	Z, total years of schooling , a set of 
common observed covariates  and a stochastic error term j. The control variables 
included in  are a quartic in potential experience, measured by age minus years of 
schooling minus 6 years, three indicators for marital status (single, married and 
separated), four indicators for cohort fixed effects ( 1960-1969, 1970-1979, 1980-1989, 
1990-2000) , ten indicators for provincial fixed effects and two indicators for language 
proficiency.46  
  
                                                 
45 The methodology used here is an application of the idea developed by Card and Krueger (1992) 
who used the cross-state return to schooling of migrants to measure schooling quality of states. 
The idea was also applied to cross-country comparisons by Betts and Lofstrom (2000), Bratsberg 
and Terrell (2002), Sweetman(2004), Chiswick and Miller (2010), Schoellman (2011). 
 
46 Mother tongue was used in the regression analysis rather than ability to speak English or 
French since the former is exogenous and not affected by an individual’s ability to learn new 




4.2. Baseline estimation results 
<Insert Table 3 here> 
The estimated country-specific returns to schooling are presented in the first column 
of Table 3. Consistent with the existing evidence, estimates from the earning function 
reveals the discounting of foreign-obtained schooling in the Canadian labor market. In 
particular, an extra year of Canadian schooling raises earnings by 7.06 percent, while the 
average return to a foreign-obtained year of schooling is estimated at 5.9 percent.47 
Results also show wide variation in the returns to schooling across source countries 
(STD= 1.8), with a general conclusion that the value of a year of schooling in the 
Canadian labor market depends on its origin. It is evident from Table 3 that the returns to 
schooling for most of the source countries were lower than the Canadian return of 7.06 
percent.48 Nicaragua was the source country with the lowest return to schooling, 
estimated at 1.66 percent, followed by the Dominican Republic (2.4 percent), El Salvador 
(2.9 percent) and Syria (3.1 percent). For source countries with substantial number of 
immigrants, the returns to schooling were 6.7 percent for both, China and India, 
Philippines (4 percent), United Kingdom (6.5 percent) and Poland (4.6 percent). On the 
upper segment of the returns distribution, the country-specific returns to schooling from 
12 countries were higher than the Canadian return. These include Switzerland (11.5 
percent), South Africa (9 percent), Hong Kong (8.7 percent), Denmark (8.3 percent), 
Belgium (8.1 percent), France (7.6 percent), Malaysia (7.5 percent), Australia (7.3 
                                                 
47 The regression analysis was conducted using Stata 11. All estimations and descriptive statistics 
are population weighted using the sampling weight provided in the census. 
 
48 These results are consistent with the findings of earlier studies on the discounting of foreign-
obtained schooling in the Canadian labor market (see for e.g. Baker and Benjamin, 1994; Alboim 




percent), Czechoslovakia (7.2 percent), Sri Lanka (7.2 percent), Hungary (7.2 percent) 
and Israel (7.1 percent). These results are consistent with the empirical evidence on how 
the national origin of an individual’s education matters for its return in the labor market 
(Friedberg, 2000; Bratsberg and Terrell, 2002; Sweetman, 2004; Chiswick and Miller, 
2010).  
4.3. Robustness checks  
Several robustness checks were conducted to check the sensitivity of the estimated 
returns to schooling to the sample selection restrictions and to the model specification.  
<Insert Table 4 here> 
A summary of the results of the baseline specification of the earnings function are 
reported in table 4. In the second specification, I excluded immigrants whose age at 
immigration was less than 30 years instead of 24 to further reduce any bias that may 
result from taking any education in Canada. In the third specification, returns to 
schooling are allowed to vary by immigration cohort and by occupational skill level 
(skilled and un-skilled) in the fourth specification. The 508 occupations identified in the 
census are grouped into skilled and un-skilled categories based on the educational 
requirement of each occupation; skilled if the occupation requires more than 12 years of 
schooling, otherwise it is classified as unskilled. Given the finding of several previous 
studies that foreign-acquired work experience has zero return in the Canadian labor 
market (e.g. Alboime et al., 2005), I estimated another specification that includes only 
potential Canadian work experience. The country specific returns to schooling from these 
different specifications were in general very close to the baseline model. For example, the 
difference between the Canadian return to schooling and the average returns to foreign 
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obtained schooling was 1.16 percentage points, and ranges from 0.7 to 1.3 percentage 
points in the alternative specifications.  
In figure 1, I compare my estimated returns to schooling to those obtained by 
Sweetman (2004). The goal of this comparison is to check whether there is something 
special about the 2001 Canadian census data set, or that it has particular features that may 
affect the empirical findings. As shown in Figure 1, my estimated country-specific 
returns to schooling are in general very close to those obtained using other data sets.49 
 
4.4. Supporting evidence for using returns to schooling to measure 
schooling quality 
It has been widely documented that immigrants from countries with high quality 
educational systems receive higher economic returns to schooling than those from 
                                                 
49 Sweetman (2004) estimated the return to schooling of immigrants from a wide set of countries 
using a pooled sample of the 1986, 1991 and 1996 Canadian census. Part of the deviation of my 
estimated returns from the estimates of Sweetman (2004) may be attributable to differences in the 
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Figure 1. Comparing my estimated return to schooling to estimates based on 1986,1991 and 1996 Canadian census
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countries with low quality educational systems (Sweetman, 2004; Chiswick and Miller, 
2010). This implies that the return to schooling could be used as a “productivity-based” 
or a “market-based” measure for schooling quality (Bratsberg and Terrell, 2002)  
To check the soundness of the returns to schooling as being a reasonable measure of 
schooling quality, I compare these returns to alternative measures that are widely used in 
the literature as proxies for schooling quality. Figure 2 plots the estimated country-
specific returns to schooling against the log of PPP GDP per-capita obtained from the 
Penn World Tables (Heston et al, 2011). Results show that on average, immigrants from 
source countries with higher per-capita real GDP earned higher returns on their foreign-
obtained schooling than immigrants from countries with lower per-capita real GDP 
(correlation coefficient = 0.41). 
 
In figure 3, the estimated country-specific returns to schooling were plotted against test 
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Figure 2. Return to schooling and PPP percapita GDP
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(2000).50 The Hanushek and Kimko (2000) constructed index is an educational outcome, 
widely used in the literature as a proxy for the average quality of schooling in each 
country. Figure 3 shows that there is a positive correlation (correlation coefficient= 0.39) 
between the estimated country-specific returns to schooling and international 




Figure 4 displays the estimated return to schooling against the dropout rate at primary 
schools, a commonly used proxy for schooling quality. Data on dropout rates are 
                                                 
50 Hanushek and Kimko (2000) constructed a measure of the average schooling quality for a pool 
of countries based on students’ performance on international tests of academic achievement in 
mathematics and science conducted between 1965 and 1991 by two different international 
education testing organizations. 
 
51 In a recent study, Schoellman (2011) also found a positive correlation between return to 
schooling of immigrants in the US labor market and another set of international test scores 
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Figure 3. Return to schooling and international test scores
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obtained from Lee and Barro (1997).52 As expected, there is a negative correlation 
(correlation coefficient= -0.54) between estimated return to schooling and dropout rate at 
primary schools as shown in figure 3. 
 
Additional evidence for the validity of schooling returns as a measure for schooling 
quality can be observed by plotting these estimated returns to schooling against several 
educational inputs that are directly related to schooling quality.53 These include student-
teacher ratio at primary schools, real government educational expenditure per pupil at 
primary schools, and real average salary of primary school teachers as a proxy for 
teachers’ quality. Data for these variables were obtained from Lee and Barro (1997).  
                                                 
52 Dropout rates were defined as the percentage of students who started primary schools but did 
not attain the final grade of primary schools. 
 
53 To better capture the attributes of the educational system that were prevailing at the time 
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As evident from Figure 5, on average, immigrants from countries with low pupil 
teacher ratios in primary schools earned a higher return on their foreign obtained 
schooling in the Canadian labor market (correlation coefficient= -0.35). In a similar 
fashion, estimated schooling returns were positively correlated (correlation coefficient= 
0.48) with log of real government educational expenditure per pupil at primary schools as 
shown in figure 6.54 
These relationships are in general consistent with findings from other countries and 
data sets (e.g. Betts and Lofstrom, 2000; Bratsberg and Terrell, 2002; Sweetman, 2004; 
Chiswick and Miller, 2010). 55 
                                                 
54  Similar findings were reached when the estimated return to schooling were plotted against 
educational inputs data related to secondary schooling. 
 
55 A potential bias in the estimated returns to schooling may arise if the quality of schooling 
changed over time within a country (Hanushek and Zhang, 2009). I believe that this bias is 
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Figure 7.  Return to schooling and average real salary of primary school teachers
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Figures 7 and 8 display a positive correlation between country of origin returns to 
schooling and teachers’ quality as measured by their average salary (correlation 
coefficient=0.52) and average schooling (correlation coefficient=0.35).56 
 
 
The evidence provided in this section on the relationship between the estimated 
returns to schooling and several educational inputs, motivates estimating the contribution 
of these educational inputs in producing schooling quality as will be shown in the next 
section. 
 
5. Estimating a schooling quality production function 
In this section I identify important educational inputs in producing schooling quality 
by estimating a schooling quality production function similar to that of Lee and Barro 
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Figure 8. Return to schooling and Average years of schooling 
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(2001), and Bratsberg and Terrell (2002).57 A typical schooling quality production 
function relates a schooling quality measure to a set of educational inputs as follow: 
 = (		, ) + 	j        (2);  
where  denotes schooling quality,  represents parental characteristics,  represents 
educational resources and j captures unmeasured factors affecting schooling quality. In a 
more technical term, equation 2 can be specified as follow 
 = Z + E + E +	j      (3); 
where 	 indexes countries,  denotes the country of origin-specific return to schooling, 
as a measure of schooling quality,  denotes a set of parental factors,  denotes a vector 
of educational resources and j captures country-specific unmeasured factors affecting 
schooling quality. 
In the analysis, educational resources are measured by the pupil-teacher ratio in 
primary schools, log of real government educational expenditure per pupil in primary 
schools, number of school days per year at primary schools (as a measure of the intensity 
of education), and the log of real salary of primary school teachers (as a measure of 
teachers’ quality). Data on educational resources are obtained from Lee and Barro (1997).  
In addition to school resources, it has been shown that the academic achievement of a 
student is largely affected by non-school factors such as family background. Several 
studies have shown that family background such as the parent’s education and income 
level are important determinants of the educational outcomes of their children 
(Psacharopoulos and Woodhall, 1985; Hanushek, 1995).  
                                                 
57 Lee and Barro (2001) estimated a schooling quality production function that relates three 
measures of schooling quality; dropout rates, repetition rates and test scores, to a set of parental 
factors and educational resources. Bratsberg and Terrell (2002) related country of origin specific 
return to immigrants’ education in the US labor market to several schooling quality measures. 
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Parental factors are measured by the log of real per capita GDP (as a proxy for family 
income) obtained from Penn World Tables (Heston et al, 2011), and average years of 
primary schooling of adults aged 25 and above (as a proxy for the family education) 
obtained from Barro and Lee (2010).58  
To better capture the attributes of the educational system and parental factors that 
were prevailing at the time immigrants undertook their education, I used lagged data from 
the period 1975 to 1980.59  
5.1. Results for alternative specifications of the schooling quality production 
function 
<Insert Table 5 here> 
The schooling quality production function was estimated under several model 
specifications to check the sensitivity of the results as shown in Table 5. Model 1 
includes only educational resources (pupil-teacher ratio and real government educational 
expenditure per pupil); model 2 includes the real salary of primary schools teachers in 
addition to the variables of model 1, while parental factors (real per capita GDP and 
average years of primary schooling) are added in models 3, 4 and 5. 
Given that source countries have different sample sizes, I also estimated the schooling 
quality production function using weighted least square, with the number of individuals 
from each source country is used as a weight. The results from the weighted least square 
are presented in model 5. 
                                                 
58 In addition the average years of primary schooling could also reflect the education level of the 
teachers.  
59 In a related study, Bratsberg and Terrell (2002) lagged the educational quality data for 20 years. 
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The quality production function is used to generate predicted values for the returns to 
schooling of each country of origin (see last three columns in Table 3), which are used to 
identify important inputs in the production technology of schooling quality as follows: 
first, the predicted returns are used to derive adjustment indices to adjust years of 
schooling for quality differences across countries. Second, I re-estimate the Mincerian 
earnings function (equation 1) using the quality-adjusted years of schooling, where years 
of schooling from different source countries are now expressed in the same “quality unit” 
(Canadian terms).  
To identify the important quality inputs, I use two criteria, the explanatory power of 
the model, as measured by the coefficient of determination, and the statistical 
significance of the estimated coefficients. In this regard, model 5 is the preferred model 
because it has the biggest explanatory power  = 0.39 and produces statistically 
significance coefficients. An important prediction of this model is that it produces the 
smallest difference between the mean of the returns to quality-adjusted foreign-obtained 
schooling and the return to Canadian schooling. In particular, the mean of the returns to 
schooling of immigrants becomes 6.9 percent, which is very close to the Canadian return 
of 7.04 percent. This is in contrast to 5.9 percent obtained before the adjustment. In 
addition, model 5 also produced the lowest cross-country variation in the returns to 
schooling, where the standard deviation of the returns to schooling of immigrants 
becomes 0.15, in contrast to 1.8 obtained before the adjustment. This means that cross-
country differences in schooling quality account for over 90 percent of the variation in 
the returns to foreign-obtained schooling. Given these two predictions, I conclude that 
model 5 does a good job in identifying the production technology for human capital. 
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Results show that the pupil-teacher ratio has a negative relationship, though not 
statistically significant, with schooling quality. This is consistent with the expectation 
that smaller class sizes enhance quality of education. Results also show that both the 
length of the school term (as a measure of education intensity), and real government 
educational expenditure per pupil have a positive and statistically significant effect on 
schooling quality. A one percent increase in government expenditure per pupil at primary 
schools raises the return to schooling on average by half a percentage point. Similarly, 
having twelve more days of schooling raises the return to schooling on average by nearly 
as much. The regression also included the average years of schooling as a measure of 
parental education level. This variable has the correct sign but is not statistically 
significant.  
5.2. Deriving schooling quality adjustment indices 
The predicted values of the country-specific returns to schooling obtained from the 
schooling quality production function, in addition to the actual returns to schooling, are 
used to derive schooling quality adjustment indices to convert years of schooling from 
different countries into Canadian terms.  
The rationale behind the derivation of adjustment indices is as follows: consider two 
workers, an immigrant from country 	 and a native-born, who are identical in observed 
characteristics ( =\d) --apart from schooling level-- and earn the same wage net of 
country fixed effects. Since the country-of-origin fixed effect (	α) is potentially affected 
by selection of immigrants based on unobserved characteristics, or may be affected by 
other factors unrelated to schooling quality, I discard the intercept (	α) in equation (1)  
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and focus only on the country-specific return to schooling (β). From equation (1), the 
predicted wages are  
  = E 	 +	 =	E\d	\d + \d =	 	 \d   (4); 
So that  
E	 =	E\d	\d 
Then the schooling level of the immigrant is equivalent to the schooling level of the 
native-born. In other words, years of foreign-obtained schooling can be transformed into 
Canadian-equivalent years using the relative return to schooling as follows 
̃ = 		 		         (5); 
where ̃ denotes total years of schooling from country j expressed in its Canadian 
equivalence, which I will call “quality-adjusted schooling”, β

β		 is a country-specific 
adjustment index that covert foreign-obtained years of schooling into its Canadian 
equivalence and  is the quality unadjusted years of schooling.  
<Insert Table 6 here> 
The derived country-specific quality adjustment indices are presented in Table 6, 
which shows considerable variation among source countries, ranging from 0.217 for 
Albania to 1.63 for Switzerland.60 Two useful reference countries with considerable 
number of immigrants are Philippines (adjustment index= 0.57) and Hong Kong 
(adjustment index= 1.24).These adjustment indices can be interpreted as follows: On 
average, ten years of schooling from Philippines are equivalent to 5.7 years of Canadian 
                                                 




schooling. Similarly, ten years of schooling from Hong Kong are equivalent to 12.4 years 
when expressed in Canadian terms.  
 
5.3. Returns to schooling using quality-adjusted data 
Now I examine the role of the quality-adjusted years of schooling in accounting for 
the differential returns to schooling of immigrants and native born. In this regard, I re-
estimate the Mincerian earnings function using the quality-adjusted years of schooling.61 
Years of schooling from different source countries are now expressed in the same 
“quality unit” (Canadian terms). Accordingly, if the quality adjustment indices accurately 
capture differences in schooling quality across countries, then the return to a year of 
quality-adjusted foreign-obtained schooling should be close to the return to a Canadian 
year of schooling. In line with this a priori expectation, the return to an extra year of 
quality-adjusted schooling of immigrants is 6.87, which is very close to the Canadian 
return of 7.06, obtained earlier. This is in contrast to 5.9 percent, obtained before the 
adjustment. The main conclusion from this exercise is that cross-country differences in 
schooling quality substantially explains the lower return to immigrants’ education in the 
labor market and that the gap in returns to schooling nearly disappears once the quality of 
schooling is taken into account. In a similar fashion, the lower return to immigrants’ 
schooling from many source countries compared to the native-born is mainly due to the 
low quality of foreign-obtained schooling.  
  
                                                 
61 Here, years of schooling are quality-adjusted using adjustment indices based on the predicted 
returns to schooling obtained from the quality production function. 
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6. Schooling quality and over-education prevalence by nativity 
The schooling quality adjustment derived above shows that immigrants’ quality-
unadjusted years of schooling, on average, overstate their earning capacity. Hence, an 
immigrant holding a job that requires less schooling than what he/she has may appear to 
be over-educated when in fact he/she is not. Accordingly, the quality adjustment indices 
reported in Table 6 can be used to re-examine the evidence on the prevalence of over-
education among immigrants, which is the objective of this section. 
The classification of a worker into being over-educated is based on the realized 
match method. According to this method an individual is considered to be over-educated 
if his educational attainment is greater than a reference measure for the educational 
requirements of the job (Hartog, 2000; Chiswick and Miller, 2008). The current study 
uses the modal (i.e. most frequent) years of schooling of Canadian-born workers to 
determine required years of schooling in each of the 508 occupation identified in the 
census. As standard, job-education mismatch is measured by the following equation. 
	 =  -            (6); 
where  is an indicator variable of whether a worker is over-educated or not,   
represents total years of schooling completed by worker  working in job 	, and 
S	represents years of schooling required by job j. A worker is considered to be over-
educated if   > . 
Figure 9 depicts the aggregate incidence of over-education by nativity, using the 
quality-adjusted and unadjusted years of schooling. The quality-adjustment of schooling 
in the over-education exercise is done using adjustment indices based on the actual 
103 
 
estimated returns to schooling obtained from the Mincerian earnings function (see the 
first column in table 3). 
 
It is evident from figure 9 that the aggregate incidence of over-education, using 
quality unadjusted years of schooling, is higher among immigrants compared to native-
born. Estimates show that 58.5 percent of immigrant males were over-educated in 2001 
compared to 43.85 percent of the Canadian born.62 Another key result is that immigrants 
not only have a higher incidence of over-education, but also have a higher intensity of 
over-education, measured in terms of years of surplus schooling above what is required 
by the job, than their Canadian-born counterparts. Estimates, using quality-unadjusted 
years of schooling, show that immigrant males have on average 3.6 (STD= 2.28) years of 
surplus schooling, compared to 2.82 years (STD=1.84) for the natives-born.  
                                                 
62 The high incidence of over-education among immigrants is in line with several previous 
studies. For instance, using the survey of labor and income dynamics, Li et al. (2006) found 
that during the 1993-2001 period, 52 percent of recent immigrants to Canada-those in Canada 
for 10 years or less-were over-educated. Lindley and Lenton (2006) found that 63 percent of male 
immigrants to UK are overeducated compared to 37 percent of male natives. In another study, 
Wald and Fang (2008) found that about 50 percent of the immigrants arriving between 




















As previously mentioned, this differential over-education rates by nativity may be due 
to differences in schooling quality that are not captured by years of schooling alone. 
Accordingly, the objective now is to see how these aggregate moments (over-education 
rates) change when schooling quality is taken into account using the quality adjustment 
indices derived in the previous section. 
The fundamental result from this quality adjustment exercise is that accounting for 
schooling quality virtually eliminates the native-immigrant gap in the incidence of over-
education. In particular, the estimates show that the incidence of over-education among 
immigrants, after adjusting for quality differences, becomes 44.4 percent, which is very 
close to the Canadian incidence of 43.85 percent. This is in contrast to 58.5 percent, 
obtained before adjusting for schooling quality. The intensity of over-education among 
immigrants declined but only a little (from 3.6 to 3.39) after adjusting for quality 
differences. The general conclusion from these findings is that when job-education 
mismatch is measured by years of schooling alone, as is standard in the literature, some 
of this apparent mismatch arises due to differences in the schooling quality between the 
host and home countries. 
Looking at figure 9 gives a population-average measure of over-education rates 
among immigrants and native-born, and shows the average effect of adjusting for quality 
differences. However, one may ask what factors are driving these differential over-
education rates? Are the effects of quality adjustment uniform across different subgroups 
of immigrants? Answering these questions helps to identify which groups of immigrants 
that are genuinely more over-educated, which is of interest to policy makers concerned 
with immigrants’ assimilation. In an attempt to answer these questions, I stratify the 
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analysis by several socio-demographic characteristics such as age, occupation-skill level, 
immigration period and country of origin. 
 
Figure 10 shows that the prevalence of over-education among immigrants and native-
born, decreases with age, where the young are more likely to be over-educated than the 
old. This is consistent with the job-search behavior of young workers and the fact that 
young workers lack job experience or training relative to older workers. However, with 
age, workers start to acquire more skills and experience which helps them to find jobs 
matching their education level.  
An important observation is that the immigrant-native gap in over-education rates 
increases with age. This is consistent with the findings of several studies which 
documented that over-education is highly persistent among immigrants compared to the 
native-born, and that immigrants face long term difficulties in finding jobs that match 
their qualifications (Galarneau and Morissette, 2004; Li et al., 2006; Wald and Fang, 
2008). Another key observation concerns the effect of quality adjustment on the 
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though the gap has on average disappeared, the effect was not uniform across all age 
groups, with a more substantial reduction for the young than the old. This raises the 
question of what is special about the old immigrants. To this end, I continue stratifying 
the analysis by other characteristics such as immigration period as shown in figure 11. 
 
Figure 11 shows that recent cohorts of immigrants have higher incidence of over-
education than earlier cohorts. For example, 60.6 percent of immigrants who immigrated 
during 1991-2000 were over-educated compared to 48.2 percent of immigrants who 
immigrated during 1955-1969. Results also show that the quality-adjustment reduced the 
incidence of over-education for all cohorts of immigrants, but with a smaller effect 
among recent cohort. In particular, as a result of quality-adjustment, over-education rates 
among the 1990-2001 cohort decreases by 23.3 percent. This is in contrast to a 28 percent 
and a 29 percent decline among the 1955-1969 and the 1980-1989 cohorts respectively. 
Statistics from the 2001 census show that these results are not driven by the prevalence of 
the old in each cohort. For instance, 20.6 percent of immigrants aged 50 to 65 arrived 
during the 1990-2001 period compared to 20.2 percent in the 1980-1989 period, 43.3 

































Figure 11. over-education incidence by immigration period
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To further understand what is driving the aggregate results, I also stratify the analysis 
by the occupational skill level. As before, the 508 occupations identified in the census are 
grouped into un-skilled occupations (require less than 12 years of schooling) and skilled 
occupations (require more than 12 years of schooling). 
 
Figure 12 illustrates the incidence of over-education by occupational skill level. A 
key observation is the differential effect of the quality adjustment across occupational 
skill levels. The quality-adjustment reduces the immigrant-native gap in over-education 
rates for the skilled occupations. However, over-education rate among immigrants 
remains higher than that of natives. On the contrary, the gap is reversed for the unskilled 
occupations, after adjusting for quality differences. This differential effect of schooling 
quality-adjustment by the skill level suggests that quality of education matters more for 
unskilled occupations, i.e. the quality of lower level of education is relatively more 
important.63 This is in line with my earlier finding that increasing government 
                                                 
63 This is consistent with the finding that investments at early ages have the largest effect on 






























expenditure on primary education and increasing the length of the school term in primary 
schools significantly increase the quality of education.  
Recall the earlier finding that over-education is more prevalent among older 
immigrants and more recent cohorts, after adjusting for quality differences. In my 
sample, recent cohorts of immigrants have more skilled workers than do earlier cohorts. 
For instance 56 percent of immigrants working in skilled-occupations arrived during 
1990-2001 period compared to 20 percent for the 1980-1989 period, 17 percent in 1970-
1979 and 6.8 percent in the 1955-1969 period. However, this is not the case with old 
immigrants where only 29 percent of immigrants aged 50 to 65 were working in high 
skilled- occupations. 
 
Stratifying figure 12 further by age shows a more noticeable reduction in the 
immigrant/native over-education gap- as a result of the quality adjustment- for 
individuals working in the un-skilled occupations, especially for the young, as shown in 
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To sum up, over-education is more prevalent among older immigrants, recent cohorts 
and skilled workers, after adjusting for quality differences. Additional insights of what 
explains these observations can be obtained by slicing the sample by country of origin, as 
shown in figures 15 and 16. 
 
Estimates in figure 15 indicate significant variations in the incidence of over-
education by country of origin, as measured by raw years of schooling. The effect of 
quality-adjustment on the over-education rates is not uniform across all countries: the 
effect is stronger for source countries with lower schooling quality as measured by their 
estimated schooling returns.  
Notice that the prevalence of over-education did not decrease much, or even 
increased, after adjusting for quality, among immigrants from such countries as Australia, 
Hong Kong, Switzerland, Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Denmark, Malaysia, Algeria 
and South Africa. In my sample, 60 percent of the recent cohort of immigrants, 65 





















































































to 65) are from source countries with high schooling quality (quality-adjustment 
index≥0.9). This means that the quality-adjustment will either increase their adjusted 
years of schooling, or will make a minor reduction to it, and hence the quality-adjusted 
incidence of over-education will either increase or decrease slightly. This suggests that 
the origin of the human capital could explain the high variation in over-education rates 
among different sub-groups of immigrants. 
To sum up, results show that accounting for schooling quality virtually eliminates the 
aggregate native-immigrant gap in the incidence of over-education. However, the effect 
of the quality-adjustment was not uniform across all age groups, immigration cohort, 
occupational skill levels and countries of origin. Though the current study tried to suggest 
possible explanations for these heterogeneous effects, further research would be required 













This study explicitly derives schooling quality adjustment indices to account for 
cross-country schooling quality differences using information on the labor market 
earnings of immigrants. The derived indices are used to identify important inputs in the 
production technology of schooling quality and to explain the differential returns to 
schooling and over-education rates by nativity. 
To derive the quality-adjustment indices, I estimate the returns to immigrants’ foreign-
obtained schooling, and use the ratio between each of these returns to schooling and the 
Canadian return as a quality-adjustment index for each country of origin. To identify 
important inputs in the production technology of schooling quality, I re-estimate the 
Mincerian earnings function using the quality-adjusted years of schooling.  
To identify the important quality inputs, I use two criteria, the explanatory power of 
the model, as measured by the coefficient of determination, and the statistical 
significance of the estimated coefficients. These two criteria yield a quality production 
model that accounts the best for the Canadian-foreign differential in returns to schooling. 
This model produced the smallest difference between the mean of the returns to quality-
adjusted foreign-obtained schooling and the return to Canadian schooling, and also 
produced the smallest standard deviation of the estimated returns to quality-adjusted 
foreign-obtained schooling across countries. 
The fundamental finding of this study is that accounting for schooling quality 
virtually eliminates the native-immigrant gaps in the returns to schooling and in the 
incidence of over-education. In particular, the return to an extra year of quality-adjusted 
schooling of immigrants is 6.87, which is very close to the Canadian return of 7.06, 
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obtained earlier. This is in contrast to 5.9 percent, obtained before the adjustment. 
Estimates also show that the incidence of over-education among immigrants, after 
adjusting for quality differences, is 44.4 percent, which is very close to the Canadian 
incidence of 43.85 percent. This is in contrast to 58.5 percent, obtained before adjusting 
for schooling quality. This implies that when job-education mismatch is measured by 
years of schooling alone, as is standard in the literature, some of this apparent mismatch 
arises due to differences in the schooling quality between the host and home countries.  
Though accounting for schooling quality virtually eliminates the aggregate native-
immigrant gap in the incidence of over-education, the effect of the quality-adjustment is 
not uniform across different subgroups of immigrants. Over-education is more prevalent 
among older immigrants, recent cohorts and skilled workers, after adjusting for quality 
differences. 
Estimates from the earnings and the quality production functions show wide 
variations in the returns to schooling by country of origin (STD= 1.8), which are 
significantly explained by cross-country differences in educational resources, particularly 
government expenditure on education and the length of the school term in primary 
schools. Results also show that cross-country differences in schooling quality account for 
over 90 percent of the variation in the returns to foreign-obtained schooling.  
The findings of this study emphasize the importance of controlling for the source 
(quality) of human capital when evaluating the economic integration of immigrants. 
“Quantity of schooling alone is misleading”, it is important to account for quality too 





Table1. Descriptive statistics (Mean) 
Variable  Whole population Natives Immigrants 
Age 40.37 39.67 45.81 
Potential experience 20.7 20.15 25.14 
Years of schooling 13.66 13.52 14.66 
Wages & salaries 43,322.85 43,694 40,439 
Single 32.63 35.68 9.64 
Separated 10.78 11.19 7.89 
Married 56.07 52.63 81.85 
New found land 1.78 2 0.17 
Prince Edward 0.48 0.54 0.05 
Nova Scotia 3.11 3.46 0.59 
New Brunswick 2.69 3.01 0.32 
Quebec 25.53 27.20 13.18 
Ontario 36.26 33.33 57.72 
Saskatchewan 3.06 3.39 0.69 
Alberta 11.16 11.52 8.51 
British Columbia 11.93 11.33 16.28 
Manitoba 3.67 3.86 2.35 
English/French is mother tongue  87.54 95.82 27.83 
Working in unskilled occupations 74.56 75.44 68.69 
Immigration period 1990-2001   53.88 
Immigration period 1980-1989   22.80 
Immigration period 1970-1979   17.57 
Immigration period 1960-1969   5.76 
Observations 5,797,356 5,117,249 680,107 
Source: Canadian 2001 census. With the exception of age, years of schooling, wages & salaries 
and potential total experience which are continuous variables, the mean of all other variables 
represent the percentage of individuals belonging to each sub-category. All statistics are weighted 
using the sampling weight available in the census.  
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Table 2. Average annual wages and years of schooling by country of origin 
 








Canada  43656 13.51 5100605 
USA 66549 16.62 27210 
El Salvador  27184 12.4 6661 
Guatemala 27097 12.2 2205 
Mexico 28267 11.7 6623 
Nicaragua 28866 14.8 1552 
Barbados 43856 13.6 2303 
Cuba 26637 16.5 1277 
Dominican Republic 24978 12.7 674 
Grenada 31450 12.6 1268 
Haiti 26306 13.2 6723 
Jamaica 35346 12.6 14774 
Trinidad and Tobago 41427 14 9769 
Argentina 40387 14.9 2252 
Brazil 50591 16.3 2075 
Colombia 39231 16.3 2776 
Ecuador 34141 13.1 1589 
Guyana 37451 13.5 13090 
Paraguay 34291 10.7 478 
Peru 32458 15.7 2901 
Uruguay 36338 13.5 1010 
Venezuela 38602 16.12 1046 
Austria 62692 15.1 996 
Belgium 55212 16 1597 
France 45858 16.1 13231 
Germany 53271 15.27 12473 
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Netherlands 54019 15.5 4896 
Switzerland 56877 15.4 2722 
Bulgaria 34071 16.7 1976 
Czechoslovakia 49361 15.8 1258 
Hungary 40703 14.9 3023 
Poland 42762 15.15 26263 
Romania 43352 16.6 12568 
U.S.S.R 40686 17 1051 
Russian Federation 37767 16.6 7967 
Ukraine 35292 16.6 5455 
Ireland 69644 15.5 2561 
U.K 66708 15.6 55758 
Denmark 61246 14.7 956 
Finland 58404 14.4 650 
Norway 85377 16.12 484 
Sweden 64950 15.4 838 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 32354 14.2 5155 
Croatia 42111 13.5 4683 
Greece 32823 10.8 5722 
Italy 40024 9.7 13786 
Portugal 36828 7.6 17960 
Slovenia 45789 13.2 526 
Spain 44549 14.14 1369 
Yugoslavia 42932 15 9469 
Ghana 34821 14.9 4173 
Nigeria 34595 17.2 2587 
Algeria 30950 17.4 4913 
Egypt 50623 17.7 6597 
Morocco 34502 16.3 4375 
Sudan 27398 15.8 1279 
South Africa 74535 16.8 6628 
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Iran 34013 16.5 13629 
Turkey 35772 13.5 2841 
Iraq 34586 14.3 4569 
Israel 53050 15.3 1946 
Syria 37897 14.8 2290 
China 29880 15.1 55370 
Hong Kong 41107 14.8 31594 
Japan 65145 15.7 3795 
Korea, South 30280 16.07 8618 
Taiwan 32431 16.2 5806 
Indonesia 40277 16.7 1312 
Malaysia 47194 15.6 3676 
Philippines 33049 15.2 39238 
Singapore 48588 16 1488 
Bangladesh 25422 16.2 4872 
India 37043 14.7 62426 
Pakistan 31909 15.7 15730 
Sri Lanka 30061 13.6 20314 
Australia 64818 15.9 3229 
Fiji 32613 12.5 3371 
New Zealand 59576 15.7 1789 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Canadian 2001 census. All statistics are 




Table 3. Estimates for return to schooling by country of origin- 














Argentina 6.12 5.92 5.87 5.19 
Australia 7.34 6.57 6.53 6.52 
Austria 5.74 6.87 6.51 6.76 
Bangladesh 6.32 4.46 4.64 5.71 
Barbados 5.36 6.10 6.03 6.34 
Belgium 8.07 6.48 6.40 6.18 
Brazil 5.25 5.67 5.04 4.88 
Bulgaria 5.68    
Canada 7.06 6.90 6.88 7.03 
China 6.72 6.07 6.52 6.56 
Colombia 6.08 5.44 5.33 5.63 
Cuba 5.65    
Czechoslovakia 7.15 6.00  5.50 
Denmark 8.26 7.47 7.58 7.23 
Dominican Rep. 2.44 4.54 4.56 5.93 
Egypt 6.83 6.17 6.15 7.18 
El Salvador 2.89 4.82 4.82 6.58 
Fiji 6.49 5.94 6.32 6.55 
France 7.62 6.14 5.76 5.82 
Germany, West 5.64 6.92 6.61 7.38 
Ghana 5.66 5.47 5.56 5.43 
Greece 5.97 5.53 5.32 5.61 
Grenada 4.85 5.72   
Guatemala 5.48 5.01 4.52 4.96 
Guyana 5.73 5.55 5.94 5.90 
Haiti 4.77 5.33 5.17 6.34 
Hong Kong 8.74 6.22 6.11 6.92 
Hungary 7.17 6.18 6.46 5.43 
India 6.72 5.03 5.12 5.85 
Indonesia 6.31 5.64 5.68 5.76 
Iran, I.R. of 6.96 6.17 5.63 6.48 
Iraq 6.87    
Ireland 5.63 5.67 6.04 6.01 
Israel 7.05 7.11 7.08 7.09 
Italy 3.30 6.86 6.63 6.80 
Jamaica 5.56 5.68 5.72 6.11 
Korea 5.71 4.95 5.33 6.84 
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Malaysia 7.47 6.16 6.23 6.85 
Mexico 5.77 5.19 5.08 6.41 
Morocco 6.66 6.10 6.11 7.63 
Netherlands 6.40 6.54 6.61 7.17 
New Zealand 5.69 6.89 7.29 6.99 
Nicaragua 1.66 5.35 5.26 6.06 
Nigeria 6.49    
Norway 6.61 7.30 7.38 6.58 
Pakistan 5.32 4.52 4.38 4.67 
Peru 4.99 5.34 5.39 6.16 
Philippines 4.02 5.30 5.52 5.13 
Poland 4.60 6.24 6.46 6.01 
Portugal 3.03 6.05 5.72 5.40 
Romania 6.88 5.45 5.42 4.51 
South Africa 8.97    
Sri Lanka 7.17 5.85 6.63 6.30 
Sudan 4.14 5.66 5.56 6.30 
Sweden 6.76 7.13 7.18 7.41 
Switzerland 11.50 6.86 6.89 7.64 
Syria 3.12 6.12 6.05 6.97 
Taiwan 6.39    
Trinidad & Tobago 6.69 6.20 6.43 6.88 
Turkey 6.87 5.85 5.57 6.20 
U.S.S.R. 4.65    
United Kingdom 6.45 6.66 6.62 6.56 
United States 6.16 6.49 6.48 6.48 
Venezuela 4.47 5.62 5.27 5.66 
Yugoslavia 5.32 5.24   
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Canadian 2001 census. All results are weighted 




Table 4. Returns to Canadian and foreign-obtained schooling for different 
specifications of the earnings function 
 
 Canadian return Average foreign return 




Second specification 7.08 5.7 
 
Third specification   
















Fourth specification   








Standard deviations are in parentheses. In the second specification, I restrict the analysis to 
immigrants whose age at immigration is more than 30 years. I allowed the returns to schooling to 





Table 5. Estimates for schooling quality production function 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Educational inputs      












Log real government 
educational expenditure per 











Number of school days per year 


















Parental factors       





















Observations 58 45 55 43 56 
R-squared 0.192 0.227 0.215 0.261 0.386 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Under Model 5, schooling 
quality production function was estimated using weighted least square, with the number of 






Table 6. Quality adjustment indices and over-education rates by country of 
origin. 
 







Algeria 1.185 80.05 94.4 
Argentina 0.869 63.06 35.52 
Australia 1.042 61.85 79.28 
Austria 0.815 62.65 35.34 
Bangladesh 0.898 74.73 63.71 
Barbados 0.761 47.29 14.33 
Belarus 0.668 72.65 10.86 
Belgium 1.146 62.62 90.73 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.756 54.61 20.72 
Brazil 0.746 63.95 18.65 
Bulgaria 0.807 71.1 41.45 
Canada 1.000 43.47 43.47 
Chile 1.256 67.79 94.39 
China 0.955 55.07 54.88 
Colombia 0.864 74.24 51.12 
Croatia 0.756 50.12 18.15 
Cuba 0.803 78.07 48.55 
Czech Republic 1.016 72.59 85.52 
Czechoslovakia 1.016 64.86 85.61 
Denmark 1.173 60.67 83.05 
Egypt 0.970 79.41 79.41 
Fiji 0.922 38.45 27.97 
Finland 0.626 52.31 2.46 
France 1.083 65.43 83.23 
Germany 0.801 60.36 32.61 
Ghana 0.804 66.79 34.51 
Greece 0.848 29.88 15.85 
Grenada 0.689 44.24 1.42 
Guatemala 0.778 46.3 23.36 
Guyana 0.814 50.15 22.73 
Haiti 0.678 54.29 7.82 
Hong Kong 1.241 54.71 90.1 
Hungary 1.019 61.63 81.41 
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India 0.954 58.91 58.59 
Indonesia 0.896 73.78 58.46 
Iran 0.988 71.5 71.5 
Iraq 0.976 59.42 59.42 
Ireland 0.800 54.71 19.45 
Israel 1.002 54.83 78.31 
Italy 0.469 24.27 0 
Jamaica 0.790 41.33 11.7 
Japan 0.554 67.4 0.69 
Korea, South 0.811 69.96 47.73 
Malaysia 1.061 60.96 78.78 
Malta 0.270 46.58 0 
Mexico 0.820 41.42 22.12 
Morocco 0.946 71.84 70.93 
Netherlands 0.909 65.89 52.1 
New Zealand 0.808 57.57 26.38 
Nigeria 0.921 81.06 67.45 
Norway 0.938 60.54 54.96 
Pakistan 0.756 67.13 34.28 
Peru 0.709 77.15 28.06 
Philippines 0.571 71.25 0.81 
Poland 0.653 68.52 5.27 
Portugal 0.430 10.75 0 
Romania 0.977 64.68 64.68 
Russian Federation 0.668 67.2 9.98 
Singapore 0.588 62.3 1.48 
Slovakia 1.016 73.1 86.98 
South Africa 1.274 64.54 97.24 
Spain 0.670 54.71 7.52 
Sri Lanka 1.019 52.46 72.74 
Sudan 0.588 69.43 3.44 
Sweden 0.960 64.92 64.92 
Switzerland 1.634 68.19 98.97 
Syria 0.443 62.75 0.35 
Taiwan 0.908 65.79 54.13 
Trinidad and Tobago 0.950 55.33 55.12 
Turkey 0.976 44.6 44.6 
U.S.S.R 0.661 68.51 11.80 
UK 0.917 58.03 44.52 
Ukraine 0.661 73.51 9.22 
USA 0.875 58.16 40.03 
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Venezuela 0.635 74.09 4.88 
Yugoslavia 0.756 57.13 21.79 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Canadian 2001 census. All results are weighted 






The effect of graphic cigarette warning labels on smoking 
behavior: Evidence from the Canadian experience 
 
Abstract 
There is a substantial literature that graphic health warnings on cigarette packs are 
effective tobacco control measure, however, there is limited evidence based on actual 
smoking behavior. The objective of this paper is to assess the effect of graphic cigarette 
warning labels on smoking prevalence and quit attempts. A nationally representative 
sample of individuals aged 15 years and older from the Canadian National Population 
Health Survey (1998-2008) is used. The sample consists of 4,853 individuals for the 
smoking prevalence regression, and 1,549 smokers for quit attempts. The Generalized 
Estimating Equations (GEE) model is used to examine the population-averaged 
(marginal) effects of tobacco graphic warnings on smoking prevalence and quit attempts. 
To assess the effect of graphic tobacco health warnings on smoking behavior, we use a 
scaled variable that takes the value of zero for the first six months in 2001, then increases 
gradually to one starting from December, 2001. We find that graphic warnings have a 
statistically significant association with lower smoking prevalence and increased quit 
attempts. In particular, the warnings are associated with lower odds of being a smoker 
(Odds ratio [OR] = 0.875, CI = 0.821-0.932) and increased odds of making a quit attempt 
(OR = 1.330, CI = 1.187-1.490). Similar results are obtained when we allow for more 
time for the warnings to appear in retail outlets. This study adds to the growing body of 
evidence on the effectiveness of graphic warnings. The findings suggest that warnings 
have a significant effect on smoking prevalence and quit attempts in Canada. 




The adverse health effects of tobacco use are well established (Center for Disease 
Control and Prevention, 2008). Globally, annual smoking attributable deaths are 
estimated to be 6 million, with 600,000 nonsmokers exposed to environmental tobacco 
smoke (World Health Organization [WHO], 2011). In Canada, smoking is the leading 
cause of premature and preventable mortality. It is responsible for more than 45,000 
deaths and a total economic burden of $15 billion per year (Health Canada, 2002). To 
address the rising smoking epidemic, the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco 
Control (FCTC) requires member countries to implement measures aimed at reducing the 
demand for tobacco products (WHO, 2008). Article 11 of the FCTC provides guidelines 
for warning messages on cigarette packages. It recommends the use of rotating, large, 
clear, and visible graphic warning messages and it should cover 50% or more of the 
principal display areas of the package (WHO, 2008). As of June 2011, more than 40 
countries have implemented similar warning messages (Tobacco Free Center, 2011).64 
In line with the global effort to address the rising smoking epidemic, the Government 
of Canada implemented several measures to discourage smoking. In January 2001, 
Canada became the first country in the world to enforce graphic health warning labels on 
cigarette packages. The warnings occupied 50% of the principal display area and 
appeared in English and French on both sides of the package. 65 
Externality in the form of nonsmokers’ exposure to tobacco smoke, lack of self- 
control, and imperfect knowledge of the health risks of tobacco use are widely used to 
                                                 
64 See Table 1 for a list of countries that have implemented graphic warnings as of June 2011. 
65 See Figure 1 for a comprehensive overview of the 16 graphic warnings that were implemented 




justify the need for intervention measures (Chaloupka and Warner, 2000). Some smokers 
are unaware of the health risks of tobacco use (WHO, 2011), and graphic warnings have 
been documented as a useful channel for informing individuals about the health hazards 
of smoking. A one pack-per- day smoker is exposed to graphic warnings up to 20 times a 
day (Hammond, 2011). 
Several studies have assessed the effectiveness of graphic warnings in discouraging 
smoking (For a recent review of the literature, see Hammond, 2011). Evidence from 
population-based surveys, together with empirical research, shows that graphic warnings- 
particularly large, prominent and comprehensive warnings- are effective in discouraging 
smoking initiation (European Commission, 2009; Vardavas et al., 2009) and encouraging 
smoking cessation (Hammond et al., 2003; Miller et al., 2009). A number of Canadian 
studies find that pictorial cigarette health warnings are effective (e.g., Health Canada, 
2001; Hammond et al., 2003; Hammond et al., 2004). Empirical evidence from other 
countries (e.g., Health Promotion Board, 2004; Nascimento et al., 2008; Webster and 
Wakefield, 2008; Vardavas et al., 2009; Miller et al., 2009; Li and Grigg, 2009) and 
cross-country studies (e.g., Hammond et al., 2006; Givel, 2007; Hammond et al., 2007; 
Borland et al., 2009) have shown that graphic health warnings are effective. For example, 
in Australia, Miller et al. (2009) noted that the call volume to the help quit line increased 
following the introduction of warning messages on cigarette packs. In Singapore, 47% of 
smokers reported decreased cigarette consumption after pictorial warning labels were 
introduced (Health Promotion Board, 2004) 
Research has shown that graphic warnings were more effective than text-only 
messages. Graphic warnings induced a greater emotional response, were more likely to 
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retain their salience over time, and increased awareness of health risks, compared with 
text warnings (Hammond et al., 2006; Hammond, 2011). Similarly, cross-country studies 
found that large and graphic health warning images were more effective in stimulating 
cognitive reactions (i.e., quit intentions as a result of increased knowledge of the health 
risks of smoking) compared with text-only warnings (Hammond et al., 2006; Hammond 
et al., 2007; Borland et al., 2009). Givel (2007) compared Canadian cigarette pictorial 
warning labels to the United States’ text-only messages and found Canadian pictorial 
labels to be more effective in promoting smoking cessation.  
There is also evidence that graphic warnings supplement other tobacco-control 
measures to discourage smoking. For example, Chang et al. (2011) found that the 
implementation of Taiwan’s graphic cigarette warning labels, in combination with 
smoke-free laws, were effective in increasing awareness of the harmful effects of 
smoking and thoughts of cessation. Similarly, Brennan et al. (2011) found evidence of 
complementary effects between graphic warnings and television advertisement in 
increasing the knowledge of the health risks of smoking and motivating smoking 
cessation in Australia.  
There is a substantial literature that graphic health warnings on cigarette packs are 
effective tobacco control measure; however, there is limited evidence based on actual 
smoking behavior. Previous studies have relied on respondents answers to questions 
about the graphic health warnings to determine their effectiveness. Some of the measures 
of effectiveness include desire to quit, increased health knowledge of tobacco risks, 
ability to recall the messages, and self reported effectiveness. Although these measures 
may predict future behavior, subjects tend to provide logical responses to questions that 
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involve an appeal to fear. These answers may not reflect actual behavior, and hence may 
not provide an objective assessment of the effect of graphic warnings (Hastings et al., 
2004; Ruiter and Kok, 2005).  
Accordingly, this study takes a different approach by using survey data that have 
smoking-related information without any health warning questions. The objective of this 
paper is to assess the effect of graphic cigarette warning labels on actual smoking 
behavior. We used longitudinal data from the Canadian National Population Health 
Survey (NPHS, 1998-2008), which covers both pre- and post policy periods.  
The structure of this paper is as follows: in Section 1.2, we present a brief 
background on the economic rationale models for intervention and the tobacco control 
policy environment in Canada. Section 1.3 describes the data and methodology. Section 
1.4 presents the results and conclusions are provided in Section 1.5. 
2.1. Economic Rationale Models for Intervention 
Economists have formulated models to explain the rationale for addictive 
consumption. The general point of reference is the rational addiction (RA) model of 
Becker and Murphy (BM) (1988). In this model, consumers optimally make smoking 
decisions with knowledge of the health consequences of tobacco use, the addictive nature 
of cigarette smoking and all the monetary costs. Therefore, government legislation that 
mandates health warnings will be of no use in the BM model. A central assumption of the 
RA framework is time consistency, that is to say, future preferences coincide with the 
current decision to smoke.  
In contrast to the time consistent preferences in the RA model, the behavioral 
economics literature uses hyperbolic discounting to characterize consumers’ preferences 
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for addictive goods as time inconsistent66. Smokers in this framework place a higher 
value to immediate gratification, hence, significantly discount the long-term negative 
impact. O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999; 2002), and Gruber and Koszegi (2001) showed 
how time-inconsistent behavior depends on perceived future beliefs of self-control. Naive 
agents tend to overestimate their ability to control future behavior while sophisticated 
agents fully understand future self-control problems. Due to the incentive effect, 
sophisticated smokers are more likely to refrain from smoking than naive smokers.67 
Gruber and Koszegi suggested that government intervention in the tobacco market should 
not be limited to externalities (costs that smokers impose on others) but should also 
include smoking internalities. Self control and failure to attain a desired future level of 
smoking are the two key features that separate time-consistent from time-inconsistent 
agents. Hersh (2005) argued that smokers’ support for government regulations on 
restricting smoking in public areas is an indication of the lack of self control among 
smokers. Bernheim and Rangel (2004; 2005) argued that addictive goods can sometimes 
interfere with the decision part of the brain, and lead to wrong “cue-conditioned” craving. 
The implication is that provocative counter-cue policies, like graphic cigarette health 
warnings, may moderate neurotic behavior but their impact is limited on smokers that are 
“neurologically sensitized” to nicotine. 
Until recently, the impact of health warnings (text only messages) on tobacco 
consumption was embedded in the advertising bans literature. The effect of tobacco 
advertising on tobacco consumption has remained a contentious public health concern. 
                                                 
66 O‘Donoghue and Rabin (1999) described time inconsistent preferences as ‘present-biased 
preferences’ 
67 Incentive effect here refers to a situation where sophisticated smokers refrain from current 




There is mixed empirical evidence from studies that examined the effects of the tobacco 
advertising ban on consumption. For example, Saffer and Chaloupka (2000) and Blecher 
(2008) used cross-country data and found that the tobacco advertising ban is effective in 
reducing cigarette consumption while Nelson (2003) found advertising bans to be 
ineffective. The mixed results in the tobacco advertising literature is largely due to the 
varying level of advertising ban in different countries and the difficulty in defining a ban 
variable that truly reflects these levels. 
 
2.2. Canadian Tobacco Control Policy Environment 
The Canadian health warning labels started with four rotating text messages, 
covering 20% of the front and back of the package, in English and French, under the 
federal law of 1989. Subsequently, there has been an increase in the number of messages. 
In 1994, a new set of eight rotating black-and-white text-warning messages, occupying 
35% of the front and back of the package were implemented (Cismaru and Lavack, 2007; 
Non Smokers’ Rights Association ). In 1995, the Supreme Court of Canada removed the 
legal basis for imposing these warnings. It was not until 1997 when the parliament passed 
the Tobacco Act that the government got the right to regulate the packaging of cigarettes. 
The Tobacco Act of 1997 enforced a set of regulations concerning advertising and 
packaging of tobacco products. In June 2000, the Tobacco Products Information 
Regulations (TPIR) under the Tobacco Act became a law, and tobacco companies were 
given a grace period until the end of December 2000 to add the new warning labels. The 
new regulation mandated the display of one of 16 different-colored graphic warnings on 
at least 50% of the principal display area. It appears in English and French on both sides 
of the package. The regulation also mandated the inclusion of messages inside the 
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package about the health risks of smoking and messages to help smokers quit (Health 
Canada, 2000). Since then, the warning message labelling on tobacco products became an 
integral component of a comprehensive tobacco-control strategy to discourage smoking. 
Parallel to the introduction of the Canadian graphic warnings, there has been a substantial 
increase in cigarette taxes both at the federal and provincial levels, which resulted in 
higher cigarette prices. In April 2001, the Federal Tobacco Control Strategy proposed 
raising tobacco taxes, in addition to other measures, to reduce smoking and exposure to 
secondhand smoke (Health Canada, 2002). This triggered a sequence of tax hikes. At the 
federal level, the excise tax was first raised to $10.99 per carton in May 2001, and then to 
$12.62 by the end of 2001. In mid-2002, the federal tax was further raised to $13.86 per 
carton and then to $15.85 in July 2002 (Gabler and Katz, 2010). 
Canadian provinces followed the federal government and increased their taxes on 
cigarettes, but by different magnitudes. For example, between 2000 and 2003, real 
cigarette taxes almost doubled in Ontario, Alberta, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia. 
Taxes increased by 83% in Quebec, 70% in Manitoba and Saskatchewan, 45% in British 
Columbia, and 37% in Newfoundland. After 2003, nominal taxes were subject to small 
increases to offset the impact of inflation.  
In line with the Federal Tobacco Act, Canadian provinces implemented legislation to 
ban smoking in public places and workplaces (Health Canada, 2007). In January 1, 2005, 
the Saskatchewan Tobacco Control Act banned smoking in all enclosed public places, 
including restaurants, bars, and casinos. This was followed by the Newfoundland and 
Labrador Smoke-free Environmental Act in July 1, 2005. In January 1, 2006, Alberta 
enforced its Smoke-free Places Act. The Smoke-free Ontario Act and Quebec's Tobacco 
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Act became effective on May 31, 2006. Nova Scotia enforced its Smoke-free Places Act 
on December 1, 2006. In January 2008, British Columbia enforced legislation for 
banning smoking throughout the province (Shields, 2007).  
Though the Tobacco Act of 1997 called for banning tobacco advertising, it continued 
to allow point-of-sale display of tobacco products, as well as sponsorship promotion by 
tobacco companies. As of October 1, 2003, tobacco companies were prohibited from 
using the sponsorship of cultural and sports events as an avenue to advertise their tobacco 
products. Tobacco companies tried to get around these restrictions by using retail stores 
as a channel to promote tobacco products (Cohen et al., 2008). To address this challenge, 
the point-of-sale displays of tobacco products were the target of provincial policies. 
Saskatchewan was the first province to adopt a display restriction in 2002, but the policy 
was struck down after a challenge from tobacco companies. Since then, all Canadian 
provinces have implemented a display ban, beginning with Manitoba (2004), followed by 
Saskatchewan (2005), Prince Edward Island (2006), Nova Scotia (2007), British 
Columbia, Ontario, Quebec and Alberta (2008), New Brunswick (2009), and 
Newfoundland and Labrador (2010) (The Ontario Tobacco Research Unit, 2010). 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Data  
This study used nationally representative data from the Canadian NPHS. A detailed 
description of the NPHS has been documented elsewhere (Statistics Canada, 2009). 
Briefly, the NPHS is a longitudinal dataset that contains information on each 
respondent’s health-related characteristics, as well as corresponding economic and socio-
demographic variables. The first cycle of the NPHS was conducted in 1994/1995 and, 
since then, respondents have been re-interviewed every two years. We used balanced 
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panel data from Cycle three (1998/1999) to Cycle eight (2008/2009) and the sample is 
restricted to the adult population aged 15 years and older. The sample consisted of 4,853 
individuals, resulting in 29,118 person-year observations for smoking prevalence, 
whereas for quit attempts, there were 1,549 smokers and 6,269 person-year observations.  
3.2. Measures 
 
Outcome Variables: Smoking Behavior. We used two self-reported measures of 
smoking behavior: smoking prevalence and quit attempts. Smoking prevalence is derived 
from participants’ responses to the survey question, “At the present time do you smoke 
cigarettes daily, occasionally or not at all?” We created a dichotomous indicator for 
smoking status, which takes the value of 1 if an individual reported smoking cigarettes 
daily or occasionally; and zero otherwise. If daily and occasional smokers reported trying 
to quit smoking in the past six months, they were assigned the value one, indicating a quit 
attempt; otherwise a zero was recorded.  
We did not examine the intensity of smoking. This is normally measured by the 
number of cigarettes consumed. Recent evidence suggested that the quantity smoked does 
not necessarily reflect the actual intensity of smoking (Farrelly et al., 2004; Adda and 
Cornaglia, 2006). Smokers may reduce the quantity of cigarettes smoked but increase the 
intensity with which they smoke each cigarette. Moreover, in response to higher cigarette 
prices, Farrelly et al. (2004) found that some smokers increased tar and nicotine intake in 
order to compensate for a reduction in the quantity of cigarettes smoked. Unfortunately, 
the level of nicotine intake is not available in the NPHS. 
Graphic Warnings Variable. To assess the effect of graphic tobacco health warnings 
on smoking behavior, we created a policy variable to capture pre-and post policy periods 
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using three approaches. First, we used a dichotomous indicator that takes the value of one 
starting from July, 2001 onward and zero otherwise. July 2001 is used as the starting 
point to capture the period when graphic warnings were prevalent in retail shops. In the 
second approach, we allowed more time for the policy to take effect by creating a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one starting from December 2001 onward and zero 
otherwise. Third, we used a scaled variable that takes the value of zero for the first six 
months in 2001, then increases gradually to one starting from December, 2001 (the 
following scale was used: 0.1 for July 2001; 0.3 for August; 0.5 for September; 0.7 for 
October, and 0.9 for November). 
Control Variables. We included the following standard covariates in the analyses: 
gender; age groups: 15-24 (reference group= ref), 25-34, 45-64, and 65 or older; 
educational attainment: less than secondary (ref), secondary, some post-secondary and 
post secondary; household income in quartiles adjusted for the household size: low 
income (ref), low-middle income, high-middle income, and high income; marital status: 
single (ref), separated or widowed, and married; household size; employment status; 
employed (ref) and unemployed; immigration status: non-immigrant (ref) and immigrant; 
workplace smoking bans: no ban (ref), partial ban, and full ban; and province of 
residence. The analysis also controlled for cigarette prices. We constructed a yearly 
average of cigarette prices from 1998 to 2009 using the monthly cigarette price index for 
each province from the Canadian Socioeconomic Information Management System 
(CANSIM) and the provincial nominal cigarette prices, as of March 31, 2006, from the 
Non-Smokers’ Right Association (Non-Smokers’ Rights Association, 2006). To obtain 
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the inflation-adjusted cigarette price, the province-specific consumer price index obtained 
from CANSIM was used to deflate the nominal cigarette prices.  
Following Herrick (2000), Fagan et al. (2007) and Kahende et al. (2011), we used a 
standard set of variables including a proxy for nicotine dependence in the quit attempt 
analysis. For our measure of nicotine dependence among smokers, we used the time to 
the first cigarette after waking and the average number of cigarettes smoked per day. 
Previous studies using structural equation modeling have shown both these as good 
measures for nicotine dependence (Richardson and Ratner, 2005; Nonnemaker and 
Homsi, 2007). We used three categories for quantity smoked: less than 11 (ref); 11 to 19; 
and 20 or more cigarettes per day. The time to first cigarette after waking was 
categorized: within 30 minutes (ref); 31 to 60 minutes; and more than 60 minutes.  
3.3. Statistical Analysis 
 
A generalized estimating equation (GEE) model was used to examine the population-
averaged (marginal) effects of tobacco graphic warnings on smoking prevalence and quit 
attempts. In an extension to generalized linear models, Liang and Zeger (1986) proposed 
the GEE approach to account for correlated responses in longitudinal data.68 The 
estimating equations are derived from a working generalized linear model for the 
marginal distribution of , without specifying a form for the joint distribution of 
individual repeated observations. Liang and Zeger showed that the GEE approach gives 
                                                 
68 According to Zeger et al. (1988) pg.1051 “an advantage of population-averaged models is that 
the population-averaged response for a given covariate, ,, is directly estimable from 
observations without assumptions about the heterogeneity across individuals in the parameters. 




consistent estimates of the regression parameters and of their variances under weak 
assumptions about the joint distribution.69  
Following Liang and Zeger (1986), the marginal density for of , is represented as  
f(y,) = exp	[y,θ, − aθ, + by,¡ϕ]      (1) 
where  
 denotes individuals, for  = 1,… . . , ¦ 
 denotes time, for j = 1,… . . , t 
§ are the outcome values 
 is the dispersion parameter 
θ, equals h(η,) 
η, equals x,β 
x, are the explanatory variables 
Under this specification, the first two moments of y, are given by 
E(y,) = a′(θ,)          (2) 
Var(y,) = a′′(θ,)/	ϕ          (3) 
The GEE model for a binary outcome using logit as the link function can be expressed in 
the following form; 
logit	P ¬ ­(N®,)¯­(N®,)° =±,β          (4) 
E(y,) = µ,           (5) 
Var(y,) = µ,(1 − µ,	)        (6) 
                                                 
69 See Liang & Zeger (1986) for detailed discussion on the regularity conditions. 
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where y, denotes a binary measure for the two dependent variables of interest in the 
study; 
(a) Smoking prevalence (i.e. smoking, 0 = no and 1 = yes)  
(b) Quit attempt (i.e. tried to quit smoking, 0 = no and 1 = yes) 
The solution to the GEE score equation can be written as 
²(β) = ∑ δµ®δβ³ V¯ (α)y − µ = 0        (7) 
V(α) = A/R(α)A/         (8) 
where µ is a diagonal matrix of variance functions }({,), the dependency between 
repeated observations can be accounted for by using different within-panel correlation 
structure, (Z). This correlation structure may depend on a vector of unknown 
parameters, is assumed to be the same for all individuals. The GEE treats the covariance 
structure as a nuisance and an average dependence is assumed by specifying a “working” 
correlation matrix. In this study, we briefly describe the three most often used working 
correlation structures: exchangeable (also known as equal correlation or compound 
symmetry); autoregressive (AR1) and unstructured (unrestricted) correlation.70 The GEE 
estimates are robust to misspecification of the within-panel correlation structure.71 
3.3.1. Exchangeable Correlation 
An exchangeable correlation assumes equal correlations across repeated measures. 
The working correlation matrix takes the following form; 
  
                                                 
70 Other forms of working correlation structure are independent, stationary and non-stationary. 
71 See Liang & Zeger (1986); Hardin & Hilbe (2003) for detailed discussion. 
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R(α) = 	 ¶··
·¸1 α αα 1 αα α 1
⋯⋯⋯
	α	αα⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮α α α ⋯ 1¼½½
½¾        (9) 
which can be written as: RG, = ¿ 1						if		s = t	α			otherwise        (10) 
The ancillary correlation parameter, Z, is estimated using model fit Pearson residuals, À̂,. 
r, = N®¯ÂÃ®,ÄÅÂÃ®,           (11) 
αÃ = 	 Æ∑ Ç
∑ ∑ È®,È®,É®ÉÊË Ì∑ È®,Í®ÊË®ÊË ®®ÌË ÎÏ®ÊË ÐÑ         (12) 
  
Ò = ∑ ∑ ̂ÓÍÓÊËÔÓÊË∑ dÓÔÓÊË          (13) 
 
3.3.2. Autoregressive Correlation 
Autoregressive working correlation assumes that repeated observations depend on 
their past values in systematic order. A first-order autoregressive process is commonly 
used. The correlation structure requires Õ parameters to be estimated such that Z has a 
vector of length Õ + 1.72    
αÃ = 	 Ö∑ Ç
∑ È®,Í®ÊË® ,∑ È®,	È®,×Ë
®ÌËÊË ® ,….,∑ È®,	È®,×É
®ÌÉÊË ® ÎÏ®ÊË ØÙ       (14) 
 W = ∑ ∑ ®,Í®ÊËO®³ 	         (15) 
 
where the Pearson residuals is defined in equation (11). 
 
The working correlation structure is given by 
 
                                                 
72 Where the first element of Z is 1. 
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RG, = ¿α|s − t|					if		|s − t| ≤ k		0														otherwise         (16) 
 
 
3.3.3. Unstructured Correlation 
Unstructured correlation uses the unconstrained correlation matrix. The working 
correlation model can be written as  
RG, = Ü 1						if		s = t	αG,			otherwise        (17) 
α = 	 ¶··
·¸ ÝË,ËÌË®,ËÍ ÝË,ÍÌË®,Ë®,ÍÝÍ,ËÌË®,Í®,Ë ÝÍ,ÍÌË®,ÍÍ …… ÝË,
ÌË ®,Ë®,ÝÍ,ÌË ®,Í®,⋮																			 ⋮ ⋱ ⋮Ý,ËÌË ®,®®,Ë Ý,ÍÌË ®,®®,Í ⋯ Ý,ÌË ®,Í ¼½
½½¾
Ù       (18) 
 
where  
Nß,L = ∑ I(i, p, q)³          (19) 
 I(i, p, q) = ¿1			if	panel	i	has	observations	at	indexes	p	and	u0					otherwise																																																																     (20) 
 
Pearson residuals and W are represented by equations (11) and (15) respectively.  
N, = minN, N , N = number of panels observed at time , and 
n = max( n, n, … . n³)  
Separate analyses are performed using the three measures of graphic warnings. To 
determine if graphic health warnings, as a dichotomous variable, and cigarette prices in 
levels can be identified separately in the regression, we used a rule of thumb by 
estimating a variance inflation factor (VIF). A VIF of 7.64 is obtained when a graphic 
dummy is regressed on cigarette prices. The VIF thus confirms that there is sufficient 
independent price variation in the sample to identify the price effect in the analysis. 
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To check whether the analyses are sensitive to the inclusion of additional control 
variables, three model specifications are used. Model 1, the baseline specification, 
controlled for gender, age, educational attainment, income level, marital status, 
household size, employment status and immigration status. In addition to the baseline 
covariates in Model 1, Model 2 included workplace smoking bans and provincial fixed 
effects. In Model 3, we re-estimated Model 2 but restricted the sample to daily smokers.  
Insert Table 2 here 
Insert Figure 1 here 
4. Results 
Table 2 presents the characteristics of the respondents included in the study. Among 
the study sample, about half are male, a large percentage is 35 years and older, more than 
80% are non immigrants. A significant proportion of the sample is well educated, with 
most (more than 70%) having completed more than secondary education. The trend of 
both smoking prevalence and smokers quit attempts from 1998 to 2008 are shown in 
Figure 1. For smoking prevalence, there has been a gradual decrease in the smoking 
participation rate. The percentage of smokers reporting past quit attempts increased 
between 1998 and 2002, with a significant drop in 2004 and 2008. Although there has 
been a decline in smoking prevalence in Canada, the largest decrease in smoking 
prevalence, and the largest increase in quit attempts for our study period occurred 
between 2000 and 2002 (see Figure 1). We cannot determine from the unconditional 
analysis whether the graphic warnings had any significant impact on smoking behavior 
during this period because there was also a major increase in cigarette taxes and hence 
prices. Tables 3 to 22 report the odds ratios (OR) and the corresponding 95% confidence 
intervals (CI) from the GEE regression for the smoking prevalence and quit attempts 
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respectively. The estimates from the GEE model are interpreted as population-average 
(marginal) effects rather than subject-specific effects. 
 
4.1. Unstructured Working Correlation 
4.1.1. Smoking Prevalence Results  
The tobacco graphic cigarette warnings, represented by the scaled variable, had a 
statistically significant effect on smoking prevalence (see Table 3). The policy variable 
decreased the odds of being a smoker (OR = 0.875, CI = 0.821-0.932; Model 2). The 
graphic warnings also decreased the odds of being a daily smoker (OR = 0.868, CI = 
0.809-0.931; Model 3). The results were similar when the policy dummy is defined to be 
one starting from July 2001, and zero otherwise (OR = 0.874, CI = 0.820-0.931; Model 
2) and (OR = 0.864, CI = 0.805-0.927) (Model 3) (see Table 4). The results from the 
warnings variable, defined to be one starting from December 2001, indicated that 
warnings decreased the odds of being a smoker (OR = 0.875, CI = 0.821-0.932; Model 2) 
and the odds of being a daily smoker (OR = 0.869, CI = 0.810-0.931; Model 3) ( see 
Table 5). 
Insert Table 3 here 
Insert Table 4 here 
Insert Table 5 here 
In terms of the other control variables (Table 3), those older (age 25-34: OR = 0.990, 
CI = 0.876 - 1.117; age 35-44: OR = 0.904, CI = 0.786 - 1.041; age 45-64: OR = 0.766, 
CI = 0.657 - 0.892; age 65+: OR = 0.587, CI = 0.493 - 0.698) and with a higher education 
status (except secondary)(some post secondary: OR = 0.863, CI = 0.737 - 1.010; post 
secondary: OR = 0.840, CI = 0.719 - 0.983) were less likely to be smokers compared to 
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their respective reference categories. Males were more likely to be smokers than females 
(OR = 1.156, CI = 1.025-1.304). The income variable showed the standard 
socioeconomic gradient in smoking, where those with higher income status were less 
likely to be smokers (low-middle income: OR = 0.936, CI = 0.865 - 1.014; high-middle 
income: OR = 0.888, CI = 0.812 - 0.971; high income: OR = 0.868, CI = 0.787 - 0.957). 
The odds of being a smoker were found to be lower for those who were married (OR = 
0.842, CI = 0.759-0.934), immigrants (OR = 0.579, CI = 0.458-0.732), and had higher 
household size (OR = 0.984, CI = 0.962-1.001). Those separated or widowed (OR = 
1.066, CI = 0.934-1.217) were more likely to be smokers than those who were single, and 
those employed (OR = 1.173, CI = 1.084-1.269) had higher odds of being smokers than 
those unemployed. Lower odds of smoking were associated with cigarette price (OR = 
0.790, CI = 0.663-0.942) and full ban on workplace smoking (OR = 0.916, CI = 0.857-
0.979). 
4.1.2. Quit Attempts Results 
 
The reported results in Table 6 indicated that graphic warnings, using a scale 
variable representation, had a positive and statistically significant effect on quit attempts 
among smokers. Graphic warnings increased the odds of making a quit attempt (OR = 
1.330, CI = 1.187-1.490; Model 2). Among daily smokers, graphic warnings also 
increased the odds of making a quit attempt (OR = 1.331, CI = 1.175-1.508; Model 3). A 
similar result was obtained when the policy dummy is defined to be one starting from 
July, 2001 and zero otherwise (OR = 1.329, CI = 1.188-1.490; Model 2) (see Table 7). 
Using the warnings variable defined to be one starting from December 2001 indicated 
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that warnings increased the odds of making a quit attempt among daily smokers (OR = 
1.332, CI = 1.176-1.508) (Model 3) ( see Table 8). 
Results for the other covariates revealed no statistically significant difference in the 
odds of attempting to quit by gender (male: OR = 0.961, CI = 0.808 - 1.143), income 
status; (low-middle income: OR = 1.047, CI = 0.843 - 1.300; high-middle income: OR = 
0.985, CI = 0.787 - 1.234; high income: OR = 0.824, CI = 0.635 - 1.068), marital status 
(married: OR = 0.883, CI = 0.710 - 1.096; separated: OR = 0.922, CI = 0.720 - 1.181), 
household size (OR = 1.031, CI = 0.969 - 1.098), immigration status (immigrant: OR = 
1.030, CI = 0.748 - 1.418), and workplace smoking bans (full ban: OR = 0.943, CI = 
0.762 - 1.167; partial ban: OR = 0.898, CI = 0.725 - 1.113). Older adults and those 
employed were less likely to make a quit attempt (age 25-34: OR = 0.572, CI = 0.431 - 
0.760; age 35-44: OR = 0.541, CI = 0.400 - 0.730; age 45-64: OR = 0.491, CI = 0.357 - 
0.676; age 65+: OR = 0.398, CI = 0.257 - 0.617; employed: OR = 0.824, CI = 0.660 - 
1.029). Immigrants (OR = 1.030, CI = 0.748 - 1.418) and the well educated (secondary: 
OR = 1.120, CI = 0.846 - 1.483; some post secondary: OR = 1.164, CI = 0.912 - 1.485; 
post secondary: OR = 1.194, CI = 0.935 - 1.524) were more likely to have attempted 
quitting smoking. The measure for nicotine dependence showed a statistically significant 
effect on quit attempt. Decreased odds of making a quit attempt were associated with 
consuming 20 or more cigarettes per day (OR = 0.561, CI = 0.478-0.658; Model 2) and 
between 11 and 19 cigarettes per day (OR = 0.690, CI = 0.597-0.798) compared with 
those consuming less than 11 cigarettes per day. Among daily smokers (reported in Table 
6, Model 3), increased odds of making a quit attempt were associated with having the 
146 
 
first cigarette after waking between 31 and 60 minutes (OR = 1.166, CI = 0.991-1.371) 
and more than 60 minutes (OR = 1.050, CI = 0.876-1.259). 
Insert Table 6 here 
Insert Table 7 here 
Insert Table 8 here 
 
4.2. Exchangeable Working Correlation 
4.2.1. Smoking Prevalence Results  
When we changed the structure of the correlation matrix to be exchangeable, results 
were qualitatively similar to the unstructured specification in the previous subsection. In 
particular, the tobacco graphic cigarette warnings, represented by the scaled variable, had 
a statistically significant effect on smoking prevalence (see Table 9). The policy variable 
decreased the odds of being a smoker (OR = 0.867, CI = 0.812 - 0.926) (Model 2). The 
graphic warnings also decreased the odds of being a daily smoker (OR = 0.852, CI = 
0.792 - 0.916) (Model 3). The results were similar when the policy dummy is defined to 
be one starting from July, 2001 and zero otherwise (OR = 0.866, CI = 0.812 - 0.925) 
(Model 2) and (OR = 0.850, CI = 0.791 - 0.914) (Model 3) (see Table 10). The results 
from the warnings variable defined to be one starting from December, 2001, indicated 
that warnings decreased the odds of being a smoker (OR = 0.867, CI = 0.813 - 0.926) 
(Model 2) and the odds of being a daily smoker (OR = 0.852, CI = 0.793 - 0.916) (Model 
3) ( see Table 11). 
Insert Table 9 here 
Insert Table 10 here 
Insert Table 11 here 
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In terms of the other control variables (Table 9), those older (age 35-44: OR = 0.952, 
CI = 0.817 - 1.109; age 45-64: OR = 0.811, CI = 0.688 - 0.957; age 65+: OR = 0.653, CI 
= 0.541 - 0.788) and with a higher education classes (some post secondary: OR = 0.875, 
CI = 0.740 - 1.034; post secondary: OR = 0.856, CI = 0.724 - 1.012) were less likely to 
be smokers compared to their respective reference categories. Males were more likely to 
be a smoker than females (OR = 1.146, CI = 1.015 - 1.294). The income variable also 
confirmed the standard socioeconomic gradient in smoking, where those with higher 
income status were less likely to be smokers (low-middle income: OR = 0.936, CI = 
0.859 - 1.020; high-middle income: OR = 0.884, CI = 0.801 - 0.974; high income: OR = 
0.864, CI = 0.778 - 0.960). The odds of being a smoker were found to be lower for those 
who were married (OR = 0.827, CI = 0.738 - 0.926), immigrants (OR = 0.566, CI = 0.446 
- 0.717), and had higher household size (OR = 0.979, CI = 0.955 - 1.005). Those 
separated or widowed (OR = 1.031, CI = 0.896 - 1.188) were more likely to be smokers 
than singles and those employed (OR = 1.189, CI = 1.091 - 1.296) had higher odds of 
being a smoker than those unemployed. A lower odds of smoking was associated with 
cigarette price (OR = 0.784, CI = 0.656 - 0.938) and workplace smoking bans: full ban 
(OR = 0.913, CI = 0.848 - 0.983). 
4.2.2. Quit Attempts Results 
 
The reported results in Table 12 showed that graphic warnings, using a scale variable 
representation, had a positive and statistically significant effect on quit attempts among 
smokers. Graphic warnings increased the odds of making a quit attempt (OR = 1.313, CI 
= 1.172 - 1.472; Model 2). Among daily smokers, graphic warnings also increased the 
odds of making a quit attempt (OR = 1.314, CI = 1.161 - 1.488; Model 3). A similar 
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result was obtained when the policy dummy is defined to be one starting from July 2001 
and zero otherwise (OR = 1.313, CI = 1.172 - 1.472; Model 2) (see Table 13). Using the 
warnings variable defined to be one starting from December 2001 indicated that warnings 
increased the odds of making a quit attempt among daily smokers (OR = 1.315, CI = 
1.161 - 1.489; Model 3) (see Table 14). 
Results for the other covariates revealed no statistically significant relationship 
between gender, income status, marital status, household size, immigration, workplace 
smoking ban and the odds of attempting to quit. Older adults and those employed were 
less likely to make a quit attempt. Immigrants and the well educated were more likely to 
have attempted quitting smoking. The measure for nicotine dependence, showed a 
statistically significant effect on quit attempt. Decreased odds of making a quit attempt 
were associated with consuming 20 or more cigarettes per day (OR = 0.614, CI = 0.509 - 
0.741; Model 3) and between 11 and 19 cigarettes per day (OR = 0.726, CI = 0.618 - 
0.854) compared to those with less than 11 cigarette per day. Among daily smokers 
(reported in Table 12, Model 3), increased odds of making a quit attempt were associated 
with having the first cigarette after waking between 31 to 60 minutes (OR = 1.163, CI = 
0.986 - 1.372) and more than 60 minutes (OR = 1.038, CI = 0.865 - 1.246). 
Insert Table 12 here 
Insert Table 13 here 




4.3. Autoregressive Correlation (AR1) 
4.3.1. Smoking Prevalence Results  
Results based on the AR (1) working correlation structure revealed similar pattern to 
the previous two specifications, and hence confirm the robustness of the results to 
changing the structure of the working correlation matrix. The tobacco graphic cigarette 
warnings, represented by the scaled variable, had a statistically significant effect on 
smoking prevalence (see Table 15). In particular, warnings decreased the odds of being a 
smoker (OR = 0.885, CI = 0.827 - 0.948; Model 2). The graphic warnings also decreased 
the odds of being a daily smoker (OR = 0.860, CI = 0.797 - 0.927; Model 3). The results 
were similar when the policy dummy is defined to be one starting from July 2001 and 
zero otherwise (OR = 0.884, CI = 0.827 - 0.946; Model 2) and (OR = 0.857, CI = 0.794 - 
0.924; Model 3) (see Table 16). The results from the warnings variable defined to be one 
starting from December, 2001, indicated that warnings decreased the odds of being a 
smoker (OR = 0.886, CI = 0.827 - 0.948; Model 2) and the odds of being a daily smoker 
(OR = 0.860, CI = 0.798 - 0.928; Model 3) (see Table 17).  
Insert Table 15 here 
Insert Table 16 here 
Insert Table 17 here 
In terms of the other control variables (Table 15), the results were qualitatively 
similar to the previous two specifications. For example, those older (age 25-34: OR = 
0.964, CI = 0.847 - 1.098; age 35-44: OR = 0.858, CI = 0.737 - 0.998; age 45-64: OR = 
0.703, CI = 0.598 - 0.828; Age 65+: OR = 0.477, CI = 0.394 - 0.576) and with a higher 
education classes (secondary: OR = 0.959, CI = 0.793 - 1.159; some post secondary: OR 
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= 0.820, CI = 0.698 - 0.963; post secondary: OR = 0.778, CI = 0.663 - 0.912) were less 
likely to be smokers compared with their respective reference categories. Males were 
more likely to be a smoker than females (OR = 1.168, CI = 1.035 - 1.319). The income 
variable revealed the standard socioeconomic gradient in smoking, where those with 
higher income status were less likely to be smokers (low-middle income: OR = 0.934, CI 
= 0.857 - 1.018; high-middle income: OR = 0.877, CI = 0.798 - 0.964; high income: OR 
= 0.850, CI = 0.766 - 0.942). The odds of being a smoker were found to be lower for 
those who were married (OR = 0.847, CI = 0.760 - 0.944), immigrants (OR = 0.600, CI = 
0.473 - 0.761), and had higher household size (OR = 0.988, CI = 0.964 - 1.013). Those 
separated or widowed (OR = 1.118, CI = 0.973 - 1.286) were more likely to be smokers 
than singles and also, those employed (OR = 1.177, CI = 1.082 - 1.280) had higher odds 
of being a smoker than those unemployed. A lower odds of smoking was associated with 
cigarette price (OR = 0.820, CI = 0.677 - 0.994) and workplace smoking bans: full ban 
(OR = 0.909, CI = 0.848 - 0.975). 
4.3.2. Quit Attempts Results 
 
The reported results in Table 18 indicated that graphic warnings, using a scale 
variable representation, had a positive and statistically significant effect on quit attempts 
among smokers. Graphic warnings increased the odds of making a quit attempt (OR = 
1.333, CI = 1.163 - 1.528; Model 2). Among daily smokers, graphic warnings also 
increased the odds of making a quit attempt (OR = 1.398, CI = 1.200 - 1.629; Model 3). 
A similar result was obtained when the policy dummy is defined to be one starting from 
July 2001 and zero otherwise (OR = 1.332, CI = 1.162 - 1.527; Model 2) (see Table 19). 
Using the warnings variable defined to be one starting from December 2001, indicated 
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that warnings increased the odds of making a quit attempt among daily smokers (OR = 
1.398, CI = 1.201-1.629; Model 3) (see Table 20). 
Results for the other covariates revealed no statistically significant relationship 
between gender, income status, marital status, household size, immigration, workplace 
smoking ban and the odds of attempting to quit. Older adults and those employed were 
less likely to make a quit attempt. Immigrants and the well educated were more likely to 
have attempted quitting smoking. The measure for nicotine dependence, showed a 
statistically significant effect on quit attempt. Decreased odds of making a quit attempt 
were associated with consuming 20 or more cigarettes per day (OR = 0.512, CI = 0.423 - 
0.621; Model 2) and between 11 and 19 cigarettes per day (OR = 0.679, CI = 0.571 - 
0.806) compared with those with less than 11 cigarette per day. Among daily smokers 
(reported in Table 18, Model 3), increased odds of making a quit attempt were associated 
with having the first cigarette after waking between 31 and 60 minutes (OR = 1.179, CI = 
0.969 - 1.433) and more than 60 minutes (OR = 1.144, CI = 0.901 - 1.453). 
Insert Table 18 here 
Insert Table 19 here 




In January 2001, Canada became the first county in the world to introduce pictorial 
warning messages on cigarette packs. As of June 2011, more than 40 countries have 
implemented similar warning messages (Tobacco Free Center, 2011). Since then, a 
growing body of research has been conducted to assess the effectiveness of this policy in 
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discouraging smoking. Previous studies mostly agree that graphic cigarette warnings 
appear effective, however, there is limited evidence based on actual smoking behavior.  
This study adds to the existing literature by using longitudinal data from the 
Canadian NPHS (1998-2008), which covers pre- and post-policy periods to assess the 
effect of graphic warning labels on actual smoking behavior. The multivariate analysis 
shows that graphic warnings have a statistically significant association with lower 
smoking prevalence and increased quit attempts (for a summary of the results, see Tables 
21 and 22).  
The positive effect of the graphic warning on quit attempts is in line with the 
findings of several previous studies (e.g., Hammond et al, 2003; Borland et al., 2009). 
For example, in a Canadian study, Hammond et al (2003) found that smokers who 
noticed, thought about and discussed the new graphic labels at baseline were more likely 
to quit or to make a quit attempt. Borland et al (2009) found that forgoing cigarettes and 
cognitive reactions as a result of warnings, consistently predicts quit attempts. Though 
not directly comparable, our results are consistent with projection-based studies that have 
assessed the potential effect of warning labels on smoking prevalence within the context 
of a tobacco-control-simulation framework, “SimSmoke” (e.g., Levy et al., 2008; 
Nagelhout et al., 2011). The findings of an early study by Gospodinov and Irvine (2004), 
runs contrary to our results. The authors used cross-sectional data collected six months 
before the graphic warnings policy was introduced and five months after introduction to 
evaluate the immediate effect of the policy on smoking behavior. They found that 
pictorial warnings had no significant impact on smoking prevalence. However, in this 
current study, we use a longer time period and longitudinal data. Also, the warnings 
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variable is captured in ways that allow the messages to diffuse throughout the retail 
shops. 
Some potential limitations of this study warrant discussion. First, the outcome 
measures, smoking participation and quit attempts are self-reported. However, this is 
standard in the literature. Second, due to data limitations, there may be other relevant 
confounding factors that we did not control for. For example, there is no information in 
the survey about participation in the black market or about the type of cigarettes (discount 
or premium) smokers consumed. Also, there is no information about compensatory 
behaviors. As a result, our estimates of the effect of graphic warnings on smoking 
prevalence and quit attempts may be biased. The smuggling of cigarettes and the 
existence of a considerable black market (estimated to satisfy about 30% of demand in 
Canada), may partially offset the effects of the graphic warnings on smoking behavior 
(Gabler and Katz, 2010). For example, cigarette packs smuggled from the United States 
into Canada do not currently contain graphic warnings. Nonetheless, the inclusion of 
provincial dummies may help capture some of the smuggling effect in Canadian border 
provinces. The scope of the contraband cigarette market in Canada has been steadily 
expanding. According to estimates by Physicians for a Smoke-Free Canada (2010), 
contraband cigarette sales as a percentage of the total cigarette sales has increased from 
7% (2002) to 10% (2003), 20% (2006), 27% (2007), and 31% (2008).  
Graphic warnings may also be prone to wear out (Hammond et al., 2007). In 
response to the wear-out effect, in September, 2011, Canada introduced new tobacco 
graphic warning regulations, which increased the size of the graphic warnings to 75% 
along with other modifications. The new regulations allow for a transition period of up to 
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six months for industry to introduce the new labels on packages, and an additional three 
months for retailers to clear up their inventory with the old warning labels (Health 
Canada, 2011). Despite these limitations, we believe that this study is timely and relevant 
for policy makers to understand the Canadian experience, especially for countries that are 
in the process of implementing graphic cigarette warnings. For example, from September 
2012, the United States will implement graphic warning labels on cigarette packs.  
In summary, existing evidence on the effectiveness of graphic warnings are mainly 
based on emotional responses and projections from simulation models. The current study 
is among the first to provide longitudinal evidence at the population level that graphic 
tobacco warnings have a statistically significant impact on smoking prevalence. Given 
the differences in the anti-smoking policy environment across countries, further empirical 








Countries and jurisdictions that require pictures or images on cigarette packs 
 
1- Canada 23-  Mauritius 
2- Brazil 24- India 
3- Singapore 25- Latvia 
4- Thailand 26- Pakistan 
5- Venezuela 27- Switzerland 
6- Jordan 28- Mongolia 
7- Australia 29- Colombia 
8- Uruguay 30- Turkey 
9- Panama 31- Mexico 
10- Belgium 32- Philippines 
11- Chile 33- Norway 
12- Hong Kong 34- Malta 
13- New Zealand 35- France 
14- Romania 36- Guernsey 
15- United Kingdom 37- Spain 
16- Egypt 38- Honduras 
17- Brunei 39- Ukraine 
18- Iran 40- Nepal 
19- Malaysia 41- Argentina 
20- Taiwan 42- Bolivia 
21- Peru 43- Israel 
22- Djibouti 44- United States 






Selected characteristics of the respondents included in the study analyses 
 
 Percentage( standard deviation) 
 Smoking prevalence Quit attempts 
Male 50.5 (0.500) 50.9 (0.500) 
Female 49.5 (0.500) 49.1 (0.500) 
Age 15-24 7.1 (0.257) 10.2 (0.302) 
Age 25-34 17.7 (0.381) 23.1 (0.422) 
Age 35-44 24.8 (0.432) 28 (0.449) 
Age 45-64 38.7 (0.487) 33.4 (0.472) 
Age above 64 11.7 (0.321) 5.3 (0.224) 
Less secondary 12.6 (0.332) 13.6 (0.342) 
Secondary 14.3 (0.350) 17.8 (0.383) 
Some post secondary 27.4 (0.446) 29.3 (0.455) 
Post secondary 45.7 (0.498) 39.2 (0.488) 
Low income  6.1 (0.240) 10.4 (0.305) 
Low middle income 15.7 (0.364) 16.8 (0.374) 
High middle income 35.9 (0.480) 37.6 (0.484) 
High income  42.3 (0.494) 35.3 (0.478) 
Married 67.4 (0.469) 56.7 (0.495) 
Separated 13.8 (0.345) 18.2 (0.386) 
Single 18.9 (0.391) 25.1 (0.433) 
Employed 74.3 (0.437) 79.4 (0.404) 
Unemployed 25.7 (0.437) 20.6 (0.404) 
Immigrant 16.6 (0.372) 11.1 (0.314) 
Non immigrant 83.4 (0.372) 88.9 (0.314) 
Full ban 47.0 (0.500) 36.2 (0.481) 
Partial ban 20.0 (0.400) 27.1 (0.445) 
No ban 32.6 (0.468) 36.6 (0.482) 
Newfoundland 1.8 (0.134) 1.8 (0.134) 
Prince Edward 0.6 (0.074) 0.9 (0.095) 
Nova Scotia 3.4 (0.182) 3.7 (0.189) 
New Brunswick 2.6 (0.158) 2.5 (0.155) 
Quebec 24.8 (0.432) 25.6 (0.437) 
Ontario 40.2 (0.490) 39 (0.488) 
Manitoba 3.3 (0.178) 3.5 (0.184) 
Saskatchewan 2.8 (0.164) 3.5 (0.184) 
Alberta 9.8 (0.298) 11 (0.312) 
British Columbia 10.8 (0.310) 8.5 (0.279) 
Observations         29118  6269  





Odd ratios (95% confidence intervals) for the smoking prevalence regression using 
warning scale (unstructured working correlation) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    
Graphic warnings 0.874*** 0.875*** 0.868*** 
 (0.821 - 0.930) (0.821 - 0.932) (0.809 - 0.931) 
Male  1.167** 1.156** 1.153** 
 (1.035 - 1.315) (1.025 - 1.304) (1.014 - 1.311) 
Age 25-34 0.989 0.990 1.102 
 (0.876 - 1.116) (0.876 - 1.117) (0.958 - 1.268) 
Age 35-44 0.901 0.904 1.011 
 (0.783 - 1.038) (0.786 - 1.041) (0.860 - 1.188) 
Age 45-64 0.763*** 0.766*** 0.896 
 (0.655 - 0.888) (0.657 - 0.892) (0.753 - 1.066) 
Age 65+ 0.588*** 0.587*** 0.629*** 
 (0.494 - 0.698) (0.493 - 0.698) (0.516 - 0.767) 
Secondary  1.003 1.009 0.949 
 (0.827 - 1.217) (0.832 - 1.222) (0.781 - 1.155) 
Some post secondary 0.861* 0.863* 0.837** 
 (0.736 - 1.009) (0.737 - 1.010) (0.717 - 0.976) 
Post secondary 0.837** 0.840** 0.730*** 
 (0.715 - 0.979) (0.719 - 0.983) (0.622 - 0.856) 
Low middle income 0.938 0.936 0.926* 
 (0.866 - 1.015) (0.865 - 1.014) (0.846 - 1.014) 
High middle income 0.888*** 0.888*** 0.865*** 
 (0.812 - 0.971) (0.812 - 0.971) (0.783 - 0.955) 
High income 0.868*** 0.868*** 0.834*** 
 (0.787 - 0.957) (0.787 - 0.957) (0.751 - 0.926) 
Married  0.842*** 0.842*** 0.842*** 
 (0.759 - 0.933) (0.759 - 0.934) (0.749 - 0.947) 
Separated  1.061 1.066 1.030 
 (0.929 - 1.211) (0.934 - 1.217) (0.890 - 1.192) 
Household size 0.984 0.984 0.981 
 (0.962 - 1.007) (0.962 - 1.008) (0.955 - 1.007) 
Employed  1.121*** 1.173*** 1.116** 
 (1.055 - 1.191) (1.084 - 1.269) (1.023 - 1.218) 
Immigrant  0.567*** 0.579*** 0.546*** 
 (0.451 - 0.714) (0.458 - 0.732) (0.421 - 0.707) 
Cigarette price 0.787*** 0.790*** 0.714*** 
 (0.662 - 0.936) (0.663 - 0.942) (0.587 - 0.868) 
Full ban  0.916*** 0.933* 
  (0.857 - 0.979) (0.868 - 1.002) 
Partial ban  0.988 1.030 
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  (0.918 - 1.062) (0.952 - 1.114) 
Newfoundland   0.963 0.892 
  (0.720 - 1.288) (0.656 - 1.211) 
Prince Edward   1.201 1.237 
  (0.891 - 1.619) (0.903 - 1.694) 
Nova Scotia    1.127 1.171 
  (0.852 - 1.491) (0.887 - 1.546) 
New Brunswick   1.044 1.199 
  (0.788 - 1.382) (0.910 - 1.580) 
Quebec   1.083 1.133 
  (0.857 - 1.368) (0.894 - 1.435) 
Ontario   1.050 1.055 
  (0.842 - 1.309) (0.861 - 1.292) 
Manitoba   0.985 1.048 
  (0.755 - 1.285) (0.803 - 1.367) 
Saskatchewan   1.209 1.265* 
  (0.939 - 1.556) (0.986 - 1.623) 
Alberta   1.249* 1.308** 
  (0.974 - 1.601) (1.053 - 1.625) 
Observations 29118 29118 29118 




Table 4  
Odd ratios (95% confidence intervals) for the smoking prevalence regression 
(Warnings are defined to be in effect from July, using unstructured working 
correlation) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    
Graphic warnings 0.873*** 0.874*** 0.864*** 
 (0.820 - 0.929) (0.820 - 0.931) (0.805 - 0.927) 
Male  1.167** 1.156** 1.153** 
 (1.035 - 1.315) (1.025 - 1.304) (1.014 - 1.311) 
Age 25-34 0.989 0.990 1.103 
 (0.876 - 1.117) (0.877 - 1.118) (0.958 - 1.269) 
Age 35-44 0.902 0.905 1.011 
 (0.783 - 1.038) (0.786 - 1.042) (0.860 - 1.188) 
Age 45-64 0.763*** 0.766*** 0.896 
 (0.656 - 0.888) (0.658 - 0.892) (0.753 - 1.066) 
Age 65+ 0.588*** 0.587*** 0.629*** 
 (0.494 - 0.698) (0.493 - 0.698) (0.516 - 0.766) 
Secondary  1.003 1.008 0.949 
 (0.827 - 1.217) (0.832 - 1.222) (0.781 - 1.155) 
Some post secondary 0.861* 0.863* 0.837** 
 (0.736 - 1.008) (0.737 - 1.009) (0.717 - 0.976) 
Post secondary 0.837** 0.840** 0.730*** 
 (0.715 - 0.979) (0.719 - 0.983) (0.622 - 0.856) 
Low middle income 0.938 0.937 0.926* 
 (0.866 - 1.016) (0.865 - 1.014) (0.846 - 1.014) 
High middle income 0.888*** 0.888*** 0.865*** 
 (0.812 - 0.971) (0.812 - 0.971) (0.784 - 0.955) 
High income 0.868*** 0.868*** 0.834*** 
 (0.788 - 0.958) (0.787 - 0.957) (0.751 - 0.925) 
Married  0.842*** 0.842*** 0.843*** 
 (0.759 - 0.933) (0.759 - 0.934) (0.749 - 0.948) 
Separated  1.061 1.067 1.031 
 (0.929 - 1.211) (0.934 - 1.218) (0.890 - 1.193) 
Household size 0.984 0.985 0.981 
 (0.962 - 1.008) (0.962 - 1.008) (0.955 - 1.007) 
Employed  1.121*** 1.173*** 1.116** 
 (1.055 - 1.191) (1.084 - 1.269) (1.023 - 1.218) 
Immigrant  0.567*** 0.579*** 0.546*** 
 (0.451 - 0.714) (0.458 - 0.732) (0.421 - 0.707) 
Cigarette price 0.788*** 0.792*** 0.721*** 
 (0.663 - 0.937) (0.665 - 0.943) (0.592 - 0.878) 
Full ban  0.916*** 0.933* 
  (0.857 - 0.979) (0.868 - 1.002) 
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Partial ban  0.987 1.029 
  (0.918 - 1.062) (0.951 - 1.114) 
Newfoundland   0.962 0.891 
  (0.719 - 1.287) (0.656 - 1.211) 
Prince Edward   1.200 1.236 
  (0.891 - 1.618) (0.903 - 1.694) 
Nova Scotia    1.126 1.170 
  (0.851 - 1.490) (0.886 - 1.545) 
New Brunswick   1.043 1.200 
  (0.788 - 1.382) (0.910 - 1.581) 
Quebec   1.082 1.134 
  (0.857 - 1.367) (0.895 - 1.436) 
Ontario   1.050 1.056 
  (0.842 - 1.309) (0.862 - 1.294) 
Manitoba   0.984 1.047 
  (0.754 - 1.283) (0.802 - 1.365) 
Saskatchewan   1.208 1.263* 
  (0.939 - 1.555) (0.985 - 1.621) 
Alberta   1.248* 1.308** 
  (0.974 - 1.600) (1.053 - 1.625) 
Observations 29118 29118 29118 







Table 5  
Odd ratios (95% confidence intervals) for the smoking prevalence regression 
(warnings are defined to be in effect from December, using unstructured working 
correlation) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    
Graphic warnings 0.874*** 0.875*** 0.869*** 
 (0.821 - 0.930) (0.822 - 0.933) (0.810 - 0.931) 
Male  1.167** 1.156** 1.153** 
 (1.035 - 1.315) (1.025 - 1.304) (1.014 - 1.311) 
Age 25-34 0.989 0.989 1.102 
 (0.876 - 1.116) (0.876 - 1.117) (0.958 - 1.268) 
Age 35-44 0.901 0.904 1.011 
 (0.783 - 1.038) (0.786 - 1.041) (0.860 - 1.188) 
Age 45-64 0.763*** 0.766*** 0.896 
 (0.655 - 0.888) (0.657 - 0.892) (0.753 - 1.066) 
Age 65+ 0.588*** 0.587*** 0.629*** 
 (0.494 - 0.698) (0.493 - 0.698) (0.516 - 0.767) 
Secondary  1.003 1.009 0.949 
 (0.827 - 1.217) (0.832 - 1.222) (0.781 - 1.155) 
Some post secondary 0.861* 0.863* 0.837** 
 (0.736 - 1.009) (0.738 - 1.010) (0.717 - 0.976) 
Post secondary 0.837** 0.840** 0.730*** 
 (0.715 - 0.979) (0.719 - 0.983) (0.622 - 0.856) 
Low middle income 0.938 0.936 0.926* 
 (0.866 - 1.015) (0.865 - 1.014) (0.846 - 1.014) 
High middle income 0.888*** 0.888*** 0.865*** 
 (0.812 - 0.971) (0.812 - 0.971) (0.783 - 0.955) 
High income 0.868*** 0.868*** 0.834*** 
 (0.787 - 0.957) (0.787 - 0.957) (0.751 - 0.926) 
Married  0.842*** 0.842*** 0.842*** 
 (0.759 - 0.933) (0.759 - 0.934) (0.749 - 0.947) 
Separated  1.061 1.066 1.030 
 (0.929 - 1.211) (0.934 - 1.217) (0.890 - 1.192) 
Household size 0.984 0.984 0.981 
 (0.962 - 1.007) (0.962 - 1.008) (0.955 - 1.007) 
Employed  1.121*** 1.173*** 1.116** 
 (1.055 - 1.191) (1.084 - 1.269) (1.023 - 1.218) 
Immigrant  0.567*** 0.579*** 0.546*** 
 (0.451 - 0.714) (0.458 - 0.732) (0.421 - 0.707) 
Cigarette price 0.786*** 0.789*** 0.712*** 
 (0.661 - 0.936) (0.662 - 0.941) (0.586 - 0.866) 
Full ban  0.916*** 0.933* 
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  (0.857 - 0.979) (0.868 - 1.002) 
Partial ban  0.988 1.030 
  (0.918 - 1.062) (0.952 - 1.114) 
Newfoundland   0.963 0.892 
  (0.720 - 1.289) (0.656 - 1.211) 
Prince Edward   1.201 1.237 
  (0.891 - 1.619) (0.903 - 1.694) 
Nova Scotia    1.127 1.171 
  (0.852 - 1.492) (0.887 - 1.546) 
New Brunswick   1.044 1.199 
  (0.788 - 1.382) (0.910 - 1.580) 
Quebec   1.083 1.132 
  (0.857 - 1.368) (0.894 - 1.434) 
Ontario   1.050 1.055 
  (0.842 - 1.309) (0.861 - 1.292) 
Manitoba   0.985 1.048 
  (0.755 - 1.285) (0.803 - 1.367) 
Saskatchewan   1.209 1.265* 
  (0.939 - 1.556) (0.986 - 1.623) 
Alberta   1.249* 1.308** 
  (0.974 - 1.601) (1.053 - 1.624) 
Observations 29118 29118 29118 





 Odd ratios (95% confidence intervals) for the quit attempts regression using 
warning scale (Unstructured Working Correlation) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    
Graphic warnings 1.326*** 1.330*** 1.331*** 
 (1.184 - 1.485) (1.187 - 1.490) (1.175 - 1.508) 
Male  1.009 1.008 0.961 
 (0.865 - 1.176) (0.863 - 1.176) (0.808 - 1.143) 
Age 25-34 0.624*** 0.626*** 0.572*** 
 (0.482 - 0.809) (0.482 - 0.813) (0.431 - 0.760) 
Age 35-44 0.554*** 0.559*** 0.541*** 
 (0.421 - 0.730) (0.423 - 0.738) (0.400 - 0.730) 
Age 45-64 0.489*** 0.491*** 0.491*** 
 (0.366 - 0.654) (0.366 - 0.660) (0.357 - 0.676) 
Age 65+ 0.427*** 0.418*** 0.398*** 
 (0.287 - 0.634) (0.282 - 0.621) (0.257 - 0.617) 
Secondary  1.136 1.138 1.120 
 (0.877 - 1.472) (0.876 - 1.478) (0.846 - 1.483) 
Some post secondary 1.161 1.157 1.164 
 (0.925 - 1.459) (0.920 - 1.455) (0.912 - 1.485) 
Post secondary 1.104 1.098 1.194 
 (0.880 - 1.387) (0.873 - 1.383) (0.935 - 1.524) 
Low middle income 1.042 1.048 1.047 
 (0.848 - 1.279) (0.853 - 1.288) (0.843 - 1.300) 
High middle income 1.003 1.021 0.985 
 (0.812 - 1.239) (0.825 - 1.263) (0.787 - 1.234) 
High income 0.876 0.890 0.824 
 (0.692 - 1.108) (0.701 - 1.132) (0.635 - 1.068) 
Married  0.987 0.963 0.883 
 (0.810 - 1.203) (0.789 - 1.174) (0.710 - 1.096) 
Separated  1.042 1.022 0.922 
 (0.828 - 1.312) (0.811 - 1.288) (0.720 - 1.181) 
Household size 1.010 1.012 1.031 
 (0.955 - 1.068) (0.957 - 1.070) (0.969 - 1.098) 
Employed  0.756*** 0.801** 0.824* 
 (0.653 - 0.876) (0.653 - 0.984) (0.660 - 1.029) 
Immigrant  1.044 1.064 1.030 
 (0.792 - 1.377) (0.805 - 1.407) (0.748 - 1.418) 
cigarettes smoked per day 
11-19 
0.693*** 0.690*** 0.726*** 
 (0.600 - 0.801) (0.597 - 0.798) (0.617 - 0.855) 
cigarettes smoked per day 
>20 
0.561*** 0.561*** 0.615*** 
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 (0.479 - 0.658) (0.478 - 0.658) (0.510 - 0.741) 
Smoke within 31-60 mins 
after waking 
  1.166* 
   (0.992 - 1.372) 
Smoke after 60 mins from 
waking 
  1.050 
   (0.876 - 1.259) 
Full ban  0.931 0.943 
  (0.767 - 1.129) (0.762 - 1.167) 
Partial ban  0.916 0.898 
  (0.753 - 1.114) (0.725 - 1.113) 
Newfoundland   1.134 0.955 
  (0.765 - 1.682) (0.612 - 1.490) 
Prince Edward   1.044 0.964 
  (0.704 - 1.546) (0.616 - 1.509) 
Nova Scotia    1.187 1.067 
  (0.817 - 1.722) (0.705 - 1.613) 
New Brunswick   0.894 0.916 
  (0.590 - 1.355) (0.584 - 1.437) 
Quebec   1.003 1.024 
  (0.730 - 1.377) (0.716 - 1.464) 
Ontario   1.024 1.015 
  (0.755 - 1.390) (0.714 - 1.444) 
Manitoba   1.089 0.947 
  (0.736 - 1.612) (0.614 - 1.461) 
Saskatchewan   1.602** 1.440 
  (1.074 - 2.388) (0.916 - 2.265) 
Alberta   1.119 1.016 
  (0.802 - 1.561) (0.690 - 1.496) 
Observations 6269 6269 5204 





 Odd ratios (95% confidence intervals) for the quit attempts regression 
(Warnings are defined to be in effect from July, using unstructured working 
correlation) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    
Graphic warnings 1.326*** 1.329*** 1.325*** 
 (1.183 - 1.485) (1.186 - 1.490) (1.170 - 1.500) 
Male  1.009 1.008 0.961 
 (0.865 - 1.176) (0.863 - 1.176) (0.808 - 1.143) 
Age 25-34 0.624*** 0.626*** 0.573*** 
 (0.482 - 0.808) (0.482 - 0.812) (0.431 - 0.761) 
Age 35-44 0.554*** 0.559*** 0.541*** 
 (0.421 - 0.730) (0.423 - 0.738) (0.401 - 0.731) 
Age 45-64 0.489*** 0.491*** 0.493*** 
 (0.366 - 0.654) (0.366 - 0.659) (0.358 - 0.677) 
Age 65+ 0.427*** 0.419*** 0.400*** 
 (0.287 - 0.634) (0.282 - 0.621) (0.258 - 0.619) 
Secondary  1.136 1.138 1.120 
 (0.877 - 1.472) (0.875 - 1.478) (0.846 - 1.483) 
Some post secondary 1.161 1.156 1.164 
 (0.925 - 1.458) (0.919 - 1.455) (0.912 - 1.485) 
Post secondary 1.103 1.097 1.193 
 (0.879 - 1.386) (0.872 - 1.382) (0.934 - 1.524) 
Low middle income 1.042 1.048 1.048 
 (0.848 - 1.280) (0.853 - 1.288) (0.844 - 1.301) 
High middle income 1.004 1.021 0.987 
 (0.813 - 1.240) (0.826 - 1.263) (0.788 - 1.236) 
High income 0.877 0.892 0.826 
 (0.693 - 1.109) (0.702 - 1.133) (0.637 - 1.070) 
Married  0.987 0.962 0.882 
 (0.810 - 1.202) (0.789 - 1.174) (0.710 - 1.096) 
Separated  1.042 1.021 0.922 
 (0.827 - 1.311) (0.811 - 1.287) (0.720 - 1.180) 
Household size 1.010 1.012 1.031 
 (0.955 - 1.068) (0.957 - 1.070) (0.969 - 1.098) 
Employed  0.757*** 0.801** 0.824* 
 (0.653 - 0.876) (0.652 - 0.984) (0.660 - 1.029) 
Immigrant  1.044 1.064 1.029 
 (0.791 - 1.376) (0.804 - 1.407) (0.747 - 1.417) 
cigarettes smoked 
per day 11-19 
0.694*** 0.690*** 0.726*** 
 (0.600 - 0.801) (0.597 - 0.798) (0.617 - 0.854) 
cigarettes smoked 0.561*** 0.561*** 0.614*** 
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per day >20 
 (0.479 - 0.658) (0.478 - 0.658) (0.509 - 0.740) 
Smoke within 31-60 
mins after waking 
  1.166* 
   (0.991 - 1.371) 
Smoke after 60 mins 
from waking 
  1.050 
   (0.876 - 1.259) 
Full ban  0.932 0.944 
  (0.768 - 1.131) (0.763 - 1.169) 
Partial ban  0.917 0.899 
  (0.754 - 1.115) (0.726 - 1.114) 
Newfoundland   1.134 0.955 
  (0.765 - 1.682) (0.612 - 1.490) 
Prince Edward   1.044 0.964 
  (0.704 - 1.547) (0.616 - 1.509) 
Nova Scotia    1.186 1.066 
  (0.817 - 1.721) (0.705 - 1.612) 
New Brunswick   0.895 0.917 
  (0.591 - 1.356) (0.585 - 1.438) 
Quebec   1.003 1.024 
  (0.730 - 1.377) (0.716 - 1.464) 
Ontario   1.024 1.015 
  (0.754 - 1.390) (0.713 - 1.443) 
Manitoba   1.088 0.946 
  (0.736 - 1.610) (0.613 - 1.459) 
Saskatchewan   1.602** 1.440 
  (1.074 - 2.388) (0.916 - 2.264) 
Alberta   1.118 1.015 
  (0.801 - 1.560) (0.689 - 1.495) 
Observations 6269 6269 5204 







 Odd ratios (95% confidence intervals) for the quit attempts regression 
(Warnings are defined to be in effect from December, using unstructured working 
correlation) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    
Graphic warnings 1.325*** 1.329*** 1.332*** 
 (1.183 - 1.484) (1.187 - 1.489) (1.176 - 1.508) 
Male  1.009 1.008 0.961 
 (0.865 - 1.176) (0.863 - 1.176) (0.808 - 1.143) 
Age 25-34 0.624*** 0.626*** 0.572*** 
 (0.482 - 0.809) (0.482 - 0.813) (0.431 - 0.760) 
Age 35-44 0.554*** 0.559*** 0.540*** 
 (0.421 - 0.730) (0.423 - 0.738) (0.400 - 0.730) 
Age 45-64 0.489*** 0.491*** 0.491*** 
 (0.366 - 0.654) (0.366 - 0.660) (0.357 - 0.676) 
Age 65+ 0.427*** 0.418*** 0.398*** 
 (0.287 - 0.634) (0.282 - 0.621) (0.257 - 0.617) 
Secondary  1.136 1.138 1.120 
 (0.877 - 1.472) (0.876 - 1.478) (0.846 - 1.483) 
Some post secondary 1.162 1.157 1.164 
 (0.925 - 1.459) (0.920 - 1.455) (0.912 - 1.485) 
Post secondary 1.104 1.099 1.194 
 (0.880 - 1.387) (0.873 - 1.383) (0.935 - 1.524) 
Low middle income 1.042 1.048 1.047 
 (0.848 - 1.279) (0.853 - 1.287) (0.843 - 1.300) 
High middle income 1.003 1.021 0.985 
 (0.812 - 1.239) (0.825 - 1.263) (0.787 - 1.234) 
High income 0.876 0.890 0.823 
 (0.692 - 1.108) (0.701 - 1.132) (0.635 - 1.067) 
Married  0.987 0.963 0.883 
 (0.810 - 1.203) (0.789 - 1.174) (0.710 - 1.096) 
Separated  1.042 1.022 0.922 
 (0.828 - 1.312) (0.811 - 1.288) (0.720 - 1.181) 
Household size 1.010 1.012 1.031 
 (0.955 - 1.068) (0.957 - 1.070) (0.969 - 1.098) 
Employed  0.756*** 0.801** 0.824* 
 (0.653 - 0.876) (0.653 - 0.984) (0.660 - 1.029) 
Immigrant  1.044 1.064 1.030 
 (0.792 - 1.377) (0.805 - 1.408) (0.748 - 1.418) 
cigarettes smoked 
per day 11-19 
0.693*** 0.690*** 0.727*** 
 (0.600 - 0.801) (0.597 - 0.798) (0.617 - 0.855) 
cigarettes smoked 0.561*** 0.561*** 0.615*** 
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per day >20 
 (0.479 - 0.658) (0.478 - 0.658) (0.510 - 0.741) 
Smoke within 31-60 
mins after waking 
  1.167* 
   (0.992 - 1.372) 
Smoke after 60 mins 
from waking 
  1.050 
   (0.876 - 1.259) 
Full ban  0.931 0.943 
  (0.767 - 1.129) (0.762 - 1.167) 
Partial ban  0.916 0.898 
  (0.753 - 1.114) (0.725 - 1.113) 
Newfoundland   1.134 0.955 
  (0.765 - 1.682) (0.612 - 1.490) 
Prince Edward   1.043 0.964 
  (0.704 - 1.546) (0.616 - 1.509) 
Nova Scotia    1.187 1.067 
  (0.818 - 1.722) (0.705 - 1.613) 
New Brunswick   0.894 0.916 
  (0.590 - 1.355) (0.584 - 1.437) 
Quebec   1.003 1.024 
  (0.730 - 1.377) (0.716 - 1.464) 
Ontario   1.024 1.015 
  (0.755 - 1.391) (0.714 - 1.445) 
Manitoba   1.089 0.947 
  (0.736 - 1.612) (0.614 - 1.461) 
Saskatchewan   1.602** 1.440 
  (1.074 - 2.388) (0.916 - 2.265) 
Alberta   1.119 1.016 
  (0.802 - 1.561) (0.690 - 1.496) 
Observations 6269 6269 5204 





 Odd ratios (95% confidence intervals) for the smoking prevalence regression using 
warning scale (exchangeable working correlation) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    
Graphic warnings 0.869*** 0.867*** 0.852*** 
 (0.815 - 0.927) (0.812 - 0.926) (0.792 - 0.916) 
Male  1.162** 1.146** 1.145** 
 (1.029 - 1.311) (1.015 - 1.294) (1.006 - 1.304) 
Age 25-34 1.040 1.038 1.162** 
 (0.909 - 1.190) (0.908 - 1.187) (1.002 - 1.347) 
Age 35-44 0.952 0.952 1.081 
 (0.817 - 1.109) (0.817 - 1.109) (0.914 - 1.279) 
Age 45-64 0.811** 0.811** 0.977 
 (0.688 - 0.956) (0.688 - 0.957) (0.814 - 1.172) 
Age 65+ 0.657*** 0.653*** 0.729*** 
 (0.545 - 0.792) (0.541 - 0.788) (0.592 - 0.899) 
Secondary  1.065 1.066 1.043 
 (0.861 - 1.317) (0.863 - 1.317) (0.834 - 1.305) 
Some post secondary 0.877 0.875 0.888 
 (0.741 - 1.037) (0.740 - 1.034) (0.745 - 1.058) 
Post secondary 0.856* 0.856* 0.783*** 
 (0.724 - 1.013) (0.724 - 1.012) (0.655 - 0.936) 
Low middle income 0.939 0.936 0.922 
 (0.861 - 1.023) (0.859 - 1.020) (0.835 - 1.018) 
High middle income 0.885** 0.884** 0.854*** 
 (0.803 - 0.976) (0.801 - 0.974) (0.766 - 0.953) 
High income 0.868*** 0.864*** 0.820*** 
 (0.781 - 0.963) (0.778 - 0.960) (0.732 - 0.918) 
Married  0.827*** 0.827*** 0.826*** 
 (0.737 - 0.927) (0.738 - 0.926) (0.732 - 0.932) 
Separated  1.028 1.031 0.993 
 (0.892 - 1.185) (0.896 - 1.188) (0.853 - 1.156) 
Household size 0.979 0.979 0.978 
 (0.954 - 1.004) (0.955 - 1.005) (0.950 - 1.007) 
Employed  1.136*** 1.189*** 1.160*** 
 (1.066 - 1.210) (1.091 - 1.296) (1.054 - 1.277) 
Immigrant  0.558*** 0.566*** 0.528*** 
 (0.443 - 0.704) (0.446 - 0.717) (0.405 - 0.690) 
Cigarette price 0.771*** 0.784*** 0.722*** 
 (0.646 - 0.921) (0.656 - 0.938) (0.592 - 0.882) 
Full ban  0.913** 0.916** 
  (0.848 - 0.983) (0.845 - 0.992) 
Partial ban  0.994 1.029 
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  (0.919 - 1.076) (0.944 - 1.122) 
    
Newfoundland   0.903 0.816 
  (0.662 - 1.232) (0.582 - 1.144) 
Prince Edward   1.213 1.165 
  (0.888 - 1.656) (0.835 - 1.626) 
Nova Scotia    1.170 1.179 
  (0.880 - 1.555) (0.902 - 1.541) 
New Brunswick   1.027 1.112 
  (0.766 - 1.376) (0.836 - 1.480) 
Quebec   1.108 1.109 
  (0.872 - 1.407) (0.874 - 1.407) 
Ontario   1.069 1.002 
  (0.852 - 1.341) (0.813 - 1.235) 
Manitoba   0.899 0.967 
  (0.669 - 1.209) (0.736 - 1.272) 
Saskatchewan   1.205 1.201 
  (0.930 - 1.563) (0.936 - 1.541) 
Alberta   1.266* 1.268** 
  (0.979 - 1.638) (1.008 - 1.594) 
Observations 29118 29118 29118 





 Odd ratios (95% confidence intervals) for the smoking prevalence regression 
(Warnings are defined to be in effect from July, using exchangeable working 
correlation) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    
Graphic warnings 0.868*** 0.866*** 0.850*** 
 (0.814 - 0.926) (0.812 - 0.925) (0.791 - 0.914) 
Male  1.162** 1.146** 1.146** 
 (1.029 - 1.312) (1.015 - 1.294) (1.006 - 1.304) 
Age 25-34 1.040 1.039 1.162** 
 (0.909 - 1.190) (0.908 - 1.188) (1.002 - 1.347) 
Age 35-44 0.953 0.953 1.081 
 (0.818 - 1.110) (0.818 - 1.110) (0.914 - 1.279) 
Age 45-64 0.811** 0.811** 0.977 
 (0.688 - 0.957) (0.688 - 0.957) (0.814 - 1.173) 
Age 65+ 0.657*** 0.653*** 0.730*** 
 (0.545 - 0.793) (0.541 - 0.788) (0.592 - 0.899) 
Secondary  1.065 1.066 1.043 
 (0.861 - 1.317) (0.863 - 1.318) (0.834 - 1.305) 
Some post secondary 0.877 0.874 0.888 
 (0.741 - 1.037) (0.740 - 1.034) (0.745 - 1.058) 
Post secondary 0.856* 0.856* 0.783*** 
 (0.724 - 1.013) (0.724 - 1.012) (0.655 - 0.936) 
Low middle income 0.939 0.936 0.922 
 (0.861 - 1.023) (0.858 - 1.020) (0.835 - 1.018) 
High middle income 0.885** 0.884** 0.855*** 
 (0.803 - 0.976) (0.801 - 0.974) (0.766 - 0.953) 
High income 0.867*** 0.864*** 0.820*** 
 (0.781 - 0.963) (0.778 - 0.960) (0.732 - 0.918) 
Married  0.827*** 0.827*** 0.826*** 
 (0.737 - 0.927) (0.738 - 0.926) (0.732 - 0.932) 
Separated  1.028 1.032 0.994 
 (0.892 - 1.185) (0.896 - 1.188) (0.854 - 1.157) 
Household size 0.979 0.979 0.978 
 (0.954 - 1.004) (0.955 - 1.005) (0.950 - 1.007) 
Employed  1.136*** 1.189*** 1.160*** 
 (1.066 - 1.210) (1.091 - 1.296) (1.053 - 1.277) 
Immigrant  0.558*** 0.566*** 0.528*** 
 (0.443 - 0.704) (0.446 - 0.717) (0.405 - 0.689) 
Cigarette price 0.772*** 0.785*** 0.725*** 
 (0.647 - 0.921) (0.656 - 0.939) (0.593 - 0.885) 
Full ban  0.913** 0.916** 
  (0.848 - 0.983) (0.845 - 0.992) 
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Partial ban  0.994 1.029 
  (0.918 - 1.075) (0.944 - 1.122) 
Newfoundland   0.902 0.817 
  (0.661 - 1.231) (0.583 - 1.145) 
Prince Edward   1.212 1.165 
  (0.888 - 1.656) (0.835 - 1.626) 
Nova Scotia    1.170 1.179 
  (0.880 - 1.555) (0.902 - 1.541) 
New Brunswick   1.027 1.113 
  (0.766 - 1.376) (0.836 - 1.480) 
Quebec   1.107 1.109 
  (0.872 - 1.406) (0.874 - 1.407) 
Ontario   1.069 1.002 
  (0.852 - 1.342) (0.813 - 1.235) 
Manitoba   0.899 0.967 
  (0.669 - 1.208) (0.736 - 1.272) 
Saskatchewan   1.205 1.201 
  (0.929 - 1.563) (0.936 - 1.540) 
Alberta   1.266* 1.268** 
  (0.979 - 1.637) (1.008 - 1.594) 
Observations 29118 29118 29118 





Odd ratios (95% confidence intervals) for the smoking prevalence regression 
(Warnings are defined to be in effect from December, using exchangeable working 
correlation) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    
Graphic warnings 0.869*** 0.867*** 0.852*** 
 (0.815 - 0.927) (0.813 - 0.926) (0.793 - 0.916) 
Male  1.162** 1.146** 1.145** 
 (1.029 - 1.311) (1.015 - 1.294) (1.006 - 1.304) 
Age 25-34 1.040 1.038 1.161** 
 (0.909 - 1.190) (0.908 - 1.187) (1.002 - 1.347) 
Age 35-44 0.952 0.952 1.081 
 (0.817 - 1.109) (0.817 - 1.109) (0.914 - 1.279) 
Age 45-64 0.811** 0.811** 0.977 
 (0.688 - 0.956) (0.688 - 0.957) (0.814 - 1.172) 
Age 65+ 0.657*** 0.653*** 0.729*** 
 (0.545 - 0.792) (0.541 - 0.788) (0.592 - 0.899) 
Secondary  1.065 1.066 1.043 
 (0.861 - 1.317) (0.863 - 1.317) (0.834 - 1.305) 
Some post secondary 0.877 0.875 0.888 
 (0.741 - 1.037) (0.740 - 1.034) (0.745 - 1.058) 
Post secondary 0.856* 0.856* 0.783*** 
 (0.724 - 1.013) (0.724 - 1.012) (0.655 - 0.936) 
Low middle income 0.939 0.936 0.922 
 (0.861 - 1.023) (0.859 - 1.020) (0.835 - 1.018) 
High middle income 0.886** 0.884** 0.854*** 
 (0.803 - 0.976) (0.801 - 0.974) (0.766 - 0.953) 
High income 0.868*** 0.864*** 0.820*** 
 (0.781 - 0.963) (0.778 - 0.960) (0.732 - 0.918) 
Married  0.827*** 0.827*** 0.826*** 
 (0.737 - 0.927) (0.738 - 0.926) (0.732 - 0.932) 
Separated  1.028 1.031 0.993 
 (0.892 - 1.185) (0.896 - 1.188) (0.853 - 1.156) 
Household size 0.979 0.979 0.978 
 (0.954 - 1.004) (0.955 - 1.005) (0.950 - 1.007) 
Employed  1.136*** 1.189*** 1.160*** 
 (1.066 - 1.210) (1.091 - 1.296) (1.054 - 1.277) 
Immigrant  0.558*** 0.566*** 0.529*** 
 (0.442 - 0.704) (0.446 - 0.717) (0.405 - 0.690) 
Cigarette price 0.771*** 0.784*** 0.722*** 
 (0.646 - 0.920) (0.655 - 0.938) (0.591 - 0.881) 
Full ban  0.913** 0.916** 
  (0.848 - 0.983) (0.845 - 0.992) 
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Partial ban  0.994 1.029 
  (0.919 - 1.076) (0.944 - 1.123) 
Newfoundland   0.903 0.816 
  (0.662 - 1.232) (0.582 - 1.144) 
Prince Edward   1.213 1.165 
  (0.888 - 1.656) (0.835 - 1.626) 
Nova Scotia    1.170 1.179 
  (0.880 - 1.555) (0.902 - 1.541) 
New Brunswick   1.027 1.112 
  (0.766 - 1.376) (0.836 - 1.480) 
Quebec   1.108 1.108 
  (0.872 - 1.407) (0.873 - 1.407) 
Ontario   1.069 1.002 
  (0.852 - 1.341) (0.813 - 1.234) 
Manitoba   0.899 0.967 
  (0.669 - 1.209) (0.736 - 1.272) 
Saskatchewan   1.205 1.201 
  (0.930 - 1.563) (0.936 - 1.541) 
Alberta   1.266* 1.268** 
  (0.979 - 1.638) (1.008 - 1.594) 
Observations 29118 29118 29118 





Odd ratios (95% confidence intervals) for the quit attempt regression using warning 
scale (exchangeable working correlation) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    
Graphic warnings 1.308*** 1.313*** 1.314*** 
 (1.167 - 1.465) (1.172 - 1.472) (1.161 - 1.488) 
Male  1.002 1.004 0.958 
 (0.859 - 1.169) (0.860 - 1.172) (0.805 - 1.139) 
Age 25-34 0.619*** 0.620*** 0.562*** 
 (0.479 - 0.799) (0.480 - 0.802) (0.426 - 0.743) 
Age 35-44 0.554*** 0.557*** 0.530*** 
 (0.421 - 0.728) (0.423 - 0.734) (0.394 - 0.714) 
Age 45-64 0.494*** 0.494*** 0.487*** 
 (0.369 - 0.660) (0.368 - 0.663) (0.355 - 0.668) 
Age 65+ 0.437*** 0.428*** 0.402*** 
 (0.295 - 0.648) (0.289 - 0.634) (0.260 - 0.621) 
Secondary  1.163 1.166 1.140 
 (0.896 - 1.509) (0.896 - 1.516) (0.859 - 1.512) 
Some post secondary 1.156 1.152 1.158 
 (0.919 - 1.453) (0.915 - 1.449) (0.906 - 1.480) 
Post secondary 1.118 1.113 1.210 
 (0.890 - 1.405) (0.884 - 1.401) (0.947 - 1.547) 
Low middle income 1.022 1.028 1.020 
 (0.830 - 1.257) (0.835 - 1.266) (0.819 - 1.271) 
High middle income 0.997 1.013 0.976 
 (0.806 - 1.235) (0.817 - 1.256) (0.777 - 1.225) 
High income 0.872 0.885 0.812 
 (0.688 - 1.105) (0.695 - 1.127) (0.625 - 1.055) 
Married  0.960 0.938 0.869 
 (0.786 - 1.171) (0.768 - 1.146) (0.700 - 1.080) 
Separated  1.003 0.985 0.901 
 (0.796 - 1.264) (0.781 - 1.243) (0.703 - 1.156) 
Household size 1.012 1.014 1.032 
 (0.957 - 1.071) (0.958 - 1.073) (0.969 - 1.099) 
Employed  0.753*** 0.788** 0.819* 
 (0.650 - 0.874) (0.639 - 0.973) (0.653 - 1.027) 
Immigrant  1.025 1.041 1.009 
 (0.778 - 1.351) (0.787 - 1.376) (0.732 - 1.390) 
Full ban  0.952 0.953 
  (0.780 - 1.160) (0.766 - 1.185) 
Partial ban  0.926 0.903 
  (0.757 - 1.132) (0.725 - 1.125) 




 (0.601 - 0.801) (0.598 - 0.799) (0.618 - 0.854) 
cigarettes smoked per day 
>20 
0.565*** 0.565*** 0.614*** 
 (0.482 - 0.662) (0.481 - 0.663) (0.509 - 0.741) 
Smoke within 31-60 mins 
after waking 
  1.163* 
   (0.986 - 1.372) 
Smoke after 60 mins from 
waking 
  1.038 
   (0.865 - 1.246) 
Newfoundland   1.166 0.972 
  (0.787 - 1.728) (0.623 - 1.517) 
Prince Edward   1.037 0.952 
  (0.701 - 1.534) (0.608 - 1.489) 
Nova Scotia    1.186 1.069 
  (0.819 - 1.718) (0.708 - 1.612) 
New Brunswick   0.881 0.899 
  (0.580 - 1.339) (0.572 - 1.414) 
Quebec   1.009 1.027 
  (0.735 - 1.385) (0.719 - 1.468) 
Ontario   1.030 1.025 
  (0.759 - 1.398) (0.721 - 1.457) 
Manitoba   1.096 0.944 
  (0.742 - 1.619) (0.613 - 1.454) 
Saskatchewan   1.601** 1.430 
  (1.075 - 2.384) (0.910 - 2.248) 
Alberta   1.117 1.009 
  (0.802 - 1.556) (0.686 - 1.485) 
Observations 6269 6269 5204 





Odd ratios (95% confidence intervals) for the quit attempts regression 
(Warnings are defined to be in effect from July, using exchangeable working 
correlation) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    
Graphic warnings 1.308*** 1.313*** 1.308*** 
 (1.167 - 1.466) (1.172 - 1.472) (1.155 - 1.481) 
Male  1.002 1.004 0.958 
 (0.859 - 1.169) (0.859 - 1.172) (0.805 - 1.139) 
Age 25-34 0.618*** 0.620*** 0.563*** 
 (0.479 - 0.798) (0.479 - 0.802) (0.426 - 0.744) 
Age 35-44 0.554*** 0.557*** 0.531*** 
 (0.421 - 0.728) (0.423 - 0.734) (0.395 - 0.716) 
Age 45-64 0.493*** 0.494*** 0.488*** 
 (0.369 - 0.659) (0.368 - 0.663) (0.356 - 0.670) 
Age 65+ 0.437*** 0.429*** 0.404*** 
 (0.295 - 0.648) (0.289 - 0.635) (0.261 - 0.624) 
Secondary  1.163 1.165 1.140 
 (0.896 - 1.509) (0.896 - 1.516) (0.859 - 1.512) 
Some post secondary 1.156 1.151 1.158 
 (0.919 - 1.453) (0.915 - 1.449) (0.906 - 1.479) 
Post secondary 1.117 1.112 1.210 
 (0.889 - 1.404) (0.883 - 1.400) (0.947 - 1.546) 
Low middle income 1.022 1.028 1.021 
 (0.831 - 1.258) (0.835 - 1.267) (0.819 - 1.272) 
High middle income 0.998 1.014 0.977 
 (0.806 - 1.235) (0.818 - 1.257) (0.778 - 1.227) 
High income 0.873 0.886 0.815 
 (0.689 - 1.106) (0.697 - 1.128) (0.627 - 1.058) 
Married  0.960 0.938 0.869 
 (0.786 - 1.171) (0.768 - 1.146) (0.700 - 1.080) 
Separated  1.002 0.984 0.901 
 (0.795 - 1.263) (0.780 - 1.242) (0.703 - 1.155) 
Household size 1.012 1.014 1.032 
 (0.957 - 1.071) (0.958 - 1.073) (0.969 - 1.099) 
Employed  0.754*** 0.788** 0.819* 
 (0.650 - 0.874) (0.639 - 0.972) (0.653 - 1.027) 
Immigrant  1.025 1.040 1.008 
 (0.777 - 1.351) (0.786 - 1.376) (0.731 - 1.390) 
Full ban  0.953 0.954 
  (0.781 - 1.161) (0.767 - 1.186) 
Partial ban  0.926 0.904 




per day 11-19 
0.694*** 0.691*** 0.726*** 
 (0.601 - 0.802) (0.598 - 0.799) (0.617 - 0.854) 
cigarettes smoked 
per day >20 
0.565*** 0.565*** 0.614*** 
 (0.482 - 0.662) (0.482 - 0.663) (0.509 - 0.740) 
Smoke within 31-60 
mins after waking 
  1.162* 
   (0.986 - 1.371) 
Smoke after 60 mins 
from waking 
  1.038 
   (0.865 - 1.246) 
Newfoundland   1.166 0.972 
  (0.787 - 1.728) (0.623 - 1.517) 
Prince Edward   1.037 0.952 
  (0.701 - 1.534) (0.608 - 1.489) 
Nova Scotia    1.185 1.068 
  (0.818 - 1.717) (0.708 - 1.611) 
New Brunswick   0.882 0.900 
  (0.581 - 1.339) (0.572 - 1.415) 
Quebec   1.009 1.027 
  (0.735 - 1.385) (0.719 - 1.468) 
Ontario   1.030 1.024 
  (0.759 - 1.397) (0.721 - 1.456) 
Manitoba   1.095 0.943 
  (0.741 - 1.618) (0.613 - 1.452) 
Saskatchewan   1.601** 1.430 
  (1.075 - 2.384) (0.910 - 2.247) 
Alberta   1.116 1.009 
  (0.802 - 1.555) (0.685 - 1.484) 
Observations 6269 6269 5204 





Odd ratios (95% confidence intervals) for the quit attempts regression 
(Warnings are defined to be in effect from December, using exchangeable working 
correlation) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    
Graphic warnings 1.308*** 1.313*** 1.315*** 
 (1.167 - 1.465) (1.172 - 1.471) (1.161 - 1.489) 
Male  1.002 1.004 0.958 
 (0.859 - 1.169) (0.860 - 1.172) (0.805 - 1.140) 
Age 25-34 0.619*** 0.620*** 0.562*** 
 (0.479 - 0.799) (0.480 - 0.803) (0.426 - 0.743) 
Age 35-44 0.554*** 0.557*** 0.530*** 
 (0.421 - 0.728) (0.423 - 0.734) (0.394 - 0.714) 
Age 45-64 0.494*** 0.494*** 0.487*** 
 (0.369 - 0.660) (0.368 - 0.663) (0.354 - 0.668) 
Age 65+ 0.437*** 0.428*** 0.402*** 
 (0.295 - 0.648) (0.289 - 0.634) (0.260 - 0.621) 
Secondary  1.163 1.166 1.140 
 (0.896 - 1.509) (0.896 - 1.516) (0.859 - 1.512) 
Some post secondary 1.156 1.152 1.158 
 (0.920 - 1.453) (0.915 - 1.450) (0.906 - 1.480) 
Post secondary 1.118 1.113 1.211 
 (0.890 - 1.405) (0.884 - 1.402) (0.947 - 1.547) 
Low middle income 1.022 1.028 1.020 
 (0.830 - 1.257) (0.835 - 1.266) (0.819 - 1.271) 
High middle income 0.997 1.013 0.976 
 (0.806 - 1.235) (0.817 - 1.256) (0.777 - 1.225) 
High income 0.872 0.885 0.812 
 (0.688 - 1.105) (0.695 - 1.127) (0.625 - 1.055) 
Married  0.960 0.938 0.869 
 (0.786 - 1.171) (0.768 - 1.146) (0.700 - 1.080) 
Separated  1.003 0.985 0.902 
 (0.796 - 1.264) (0.781 - 1.243) (0.703 - 1.156) 
Household size 1.012 1.014 1.032 
 (0.957 - 1.071) (0.958 - 1.073) (0.969 - 1.099) 
Employed  0.753*** 0.788** 0.819* 
 (0.650 - 0.874) (0.639 - 0.973) (0.653 - 1.027) 
Immigrant  1.025 1.041 1.009 
 (0.778 - 1.351) (0.787 - 1.376) (0.732 - 1.390) 
Full ban  0.951 0.953 
  (0.780 - 1.160) (0.766 - 1.184) 
Partial ban  0.925 0.903 




per day 11-19 
0.694*** 0.691*** 0.726*** 
 (0.601 - 0.801) (0.598 - 0.799) (0.618 - 0.854) 
cigarettes smoked 
per day >20 
0.565*** 0.565*** 0.614*** 
 (0.482 - 0.662) (0.481 - 0.663) (0.509 - 0.741) 
Smoke within 31-60 
mins after waking 
  1.163* 
   (0.987 - 1.372) 
Smoke after 60 mins 
from waking 
  1.038 
   (0.865 - 1.246) 
Newfoundland   1.166 0.972 
  (0.787 - 1.728) (0.623 - 1.517) 
Prince Edward   1.037 0.952 
  (0.701 - 1.534) (0.608 - 1.489) 
Nova Scotia    1.187 1.069 
  (0.819 - 1.718) (0.709 - 1.612) 
New Brunswick   0.881 0.899 
  (0.580 - 1.339) (0.572 - 1.414) 
Quebec   1.009 1.027 
  (0.735 - 1.385) (0.719 - 1.468) 
Ontario   1.030 1.025 
  (0.759 - 1.398) (0.721 - 1.457) 
Manitoba   1.096 0.944 
  (0.742 - 1.619) (0.613 - 1.454) 
Saskatchewan   1.601** 1.430 
  (1.075 - 2.384) (0.910 - 2.248) 
Alberta   1.117 1.009 
  (0.802 - 1.556) (0.686 - 1.485) 
Observations 6269 6269 5204 





Odd ratios (95% confidence intervals) for the smoking prevalence regression using 
warning scale (Autoregressive Correlation (AR1) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    
Graphic warnings 0.881*** 0.885*** 0.860*** 
 (0.825 - 0.942) (0.827 - 0.948) (0.797 - 0.927) 
Male  1.181*** 1.168** 1.162** 
 (1.046 - 1.333) (1.035 - 1.319) (1.021 - 1.323) 
Age 25-34 0.961 0.964 1.059 
 (0.844 - 1.095) (0.847 - 1.098) (0.912 - 1.230) 
Age 35-44 0.851** 0.858** 0.945 
 (0.732 - 0.990) (0.737 - 0.998) (0.796 - 1.122) 
Age 45-64 0.697*** 0.703*** 0.801** 
 (0.593 - 0.819) (0.598 - 0.828) (0.666 - 0.962) 
Age 65+ 0.475*** 0.477*** 0.488*** 
 (0.394 - 0.573) (0.394 - 0.576) (0.393 - 0.605) 
Secondary  0.952 0.959 0.858 
 (0.787 - 1.151) (0.793 - 1.159) (0.704 - 1.045) 
Some post secondary 0.814** 0.820** 0.759*** 
 (0.693 - 0.956) (0.698 - 0.963) (0.647 - 0.890) 
Post secondary 0.769*** 0.778*** 0.646*** 
 (0.656 - 0.902) (0.663 - 0.912) (0.549 - 0.760) 
Low middle income 0.934 0.934 0.917* 
 (0.856 - 1.018) (0.857 - 1.018) (0.832 - 1.010) 
High middle income 0.875*** 0.877*** 0.857*** 
 (0.797 - 0.961) (0.798 - 0.964) (0.772 - 0.952) 
High income 0.847*** 0.850*** 0.827*** 
 (0.764 - 0.938) (0.766 - 0.942) (0.740 - 0.923) 
Married  0.846*** 0.847*** 0.869** 
 (0.760 - 0.943) (0.760 - 0.944) (0.766 - 0.986) 
Separated  1.111 1.118 1.116 
 (0.966 - 1.277) (0.973 - 1.286) (0.954 - 1.305) 
Household size 0.988 0.988 0.981 
 (0.964 - 1.013) (0.964 - 1.013) (0.953 - 1.009) 
Employed  1.122*** 1.177*** 1.107** 
 (1.051 - 1.198) (1.082 - 1.280) (1.010 - 1.213) 
Immigrant  0.582*** 0.600*** 0.565*** 
 (0.461 - 0.734) (0.473 - 0.761) (0.435 - 0.735) 
Cigarette price 0.833* 0.821** 0.772** 
 (0.690 - 1.005) (0.678 - 0.994) (0.622 - 0.958) 
Full ban  0.909*** 0.935* 
  (0.848 - 0.975) (0.868 - 1.007) 
Partial ban  0.992 1.029 
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  (0.918 - 1.073) (0.948 - 1.118) 
Newfoundland   1.034 0.954 
  (0.782 - 1.368) (0.710 - 1.282) 
Prince Edward   1.157 1.295 
  (0.857 - 1.562) (0.941 - 1.781) 
Nova Scotia    1.121 1.225 
  (0.842 - 1.491) (0.911 - 1.648) 
New Brunswick   1.041 1.244 
  (0.787 - 1.378) (0.933 - 1.660) 
Quebec   1.070 1.187 
  (0.846 - 1.353) (0.929 - 1.517) 
Ontario   1.018 1.110 
  (0.818 - 1.267) (0.896 - 1.375) 
Manitoba   1.032 1.113 
  (0.784 - 1.358) (0.836 - 1.481) 
Saskatchewan   1.193 1.274* 
  (0.920 - 1.547) (0.969 - 1.674) 
Alberta   1.201 1.335** 
  (0.939 - 1.536) (1.058 - 1.683) 
Observations 29118 29118 29118 





Odd ratios (95% confidence intervals) for the smoking prevalence regression 
(Warnings are defined to be in effect from July, using Autoregressive Correlation 
(AR1)) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    
Graphic warnings 0.881*** 0.884*** 0.857*** 
 (0.824 - 0.941) (0.827 - 0.946) (0.794 - 0.924) 
Male  1.181*** 1.168** 1.162** 
 (1.046 - 1.333) (1.035 - 1.319) (1.021 - 1.323) 
Age 25-34 0.962 0.965 1.060 
 (0.845 - 1.095) (0.847 - 1.099) (0.912 - 1.231) 
Age 35-44 0.852** 0.858** 0.946 
 (0.732 - 0.991) (0.738 - 0.998) (0.796 - 1.123) 
Age 45-64 0.697*** 0.704*** 0.801** 
 (0.593 - 0.819) (0.598 - 0.828) (0.666 - 0.962) 
Age 65+ 0.475*** 0.477*** 0.488*** 
 (0.394 - 0.574) (0.394 - 0.576) (0.393 - 0.605) 
Secondary  0.952 0.958 0.857 
 (0.787 - 1.151) (0.793 - 1.159) (0.704 - 1.045) 
Some post secondary 0.814** 0.820** 0.759*** 
 (0.692 - 0.956) (0.698 - 0.963) (0.647 - 0.890) 
Post secondary 0.769*** 0.778*** 0.646*** 
 (0.656 - 0.902) (0.663 - 0.912) (0.549 - 0.760) 
Low middle income 0.934 0.934 0.917* 
 (0.857 - 1.018) (0.857 - 1.018) (0.833 - 1.010) 
High middle income 0.875*** 0.878*** 0.858*** 
 (0.797 - 0.962) (0.799 - 0.964) (0.773 - 0.953) 
High income 0.847*** 0.850*** 0.827*** 
 (0.764 - 0.939) (0.766 - 0.943) (0.740 - 0.924) 
Married  0.846*** 0.847*** 0.869** 
 (0.759 - 0.943) (0.760 - 0.944) (0.767 - 0.986) 
Separated  1.111 1.119 1.117 
 (0.966 - 1.277) (0.973 - 1.286) (0.955 - 1.306) 
Household size 0.989 0.988 0.981 
 (0.964 - 1.013) (0.964 - 1.013) (0.953 - 1.009) 
Employed  1.122*** 1.177*** 1.107** 
 (1.051 - 1.198) (1.082 - 1.280) (1.010 - 1.213) 
Immigrant  0.582*** 0.599*** 0.565*** 
 (0.461 - 0.734) (0.473 - 0.760) (0.435 - 0.734) 
Cigarette price 0.834* 0.823** 0.779** 
 (0.691 - 1.005) (0.680 - 0.995) (0.627 - 0.967) 
Full ban  0.909*** 0.935* 
  (0.848 - 0.975) (0.868 - 1.007) 
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Partial ban  0.992 1.029 
  (0.918 - 1.073) (0.948 - 1.117) 
Newfoundland   1.033 0.953 
  (0.781 - 1.366) (0.709 - 1.282) 
Prince Edward   1.157 1.294 
  (0.857 - 1.561) (0.941 - 1.780) 
Nova Scotia    1.119 1.223 
  (0.841 - 1.489) (0.910 - 1.645) 
New Brunswick   1.040 1.244 
  (0.786 - 1.377) (0.933 - 1.660) 
Quebec   1.069 1.188 
  (0.845 - 1.352) (0.930 - 1.518) 
Ontario   1.018 1.110 
  (0.818 - 1.268) (0.896 - 1.376) 
Manitoba   1.031 1.111 
  (0.783 - 1.357) (0.835 - 1.479) 
Saskatchewan   1.193 1.272* 
  (0.920 - 1.546) (0.968 - 1.672) 
Alberta   1.201 1.335** 
  (0.939 - 1.536) (1.058 - 1.683) 
Observations 29118 29118 29118 





Odd ratios (95% confidence intervals) for the smoking prevalence regression 
(Warnings are defined to be in effect from December, using Autoregressive 
Correlation (AR1)) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    
Graphic warnings 0.882*** 0.886*** 0.860*** 
 (0.825 - 0.943) (0.827 - 0.948) (0.798 - 0.928) 
Male  1.181*** 1.168** 1.162** 
 (1.046 - 1.333) (1.035 - 1.319) (1.021 - 1.323) 
Age 25-34 0.961 0.964 1.059 
 (0.844 - 1.094) (0.847 - 1.098) (0.912 - 1.230) 
Age 35-44 0.851** 0.858** 0.945 
 (0.732 - 0.990) (0.737 - 0.998) (0.796 - 1.122) 
Age 45-64 0.697*** 0.703*** 0.801** 
 (0.593 - 0.819) (0.598 - 0.828) (0.666 - 0.962) 
Age 65+ 0.475*** 0.477*** 0.488*** 
 (0.394 - 0.573) (0.394 - 0.576) (0.393 - 0.605) 
Secondary  0.952 0.959 0.858 
 (0.787 - 1.151) (0.793 - 1.159) (0.704 - 1.045) 
Some post secondary 0.814** 0.820** 0.759*** 
 (0.693 - 0.956) (0.698 - 0.963) (0.647 - 0.890) 
Post secondary 0.769*** 0.778*** 0.646*** 
 (0.656 - 0.902) (0.663 - 0.912) (0.549 - 0.760) 
Low middle income 0.934 0.934 0.917* 
 (0.856 - 1.018) (0.856 - 1.018) (0.832 - 1.010) 
High middle income 0.875*** 0.877*** 0.857*** 
 (0.797 - 0.961) (0.798 - 0.964) (0.772 - 0.952) 
High income 0.847*** 0.850*** 0.827*** 
 (0.764 - 0.938) (0.766 - 0.942) (0.740 - 0.923) 
Married  0.846*** 0.847*** 0.869** 
 (0.760 - 0.943) (0.760 - 0.944) (0.766 - 0.986) 
Separated  1.111 1.118 1.116 
 (0.966 - 1.277) (0.973 - 1.286) (0.954 - 1.305) 
Household size 0.988 0.988 0.981 
 (0.964 - 1.013) (0.964 - 1.013) (0.953 - 1.009) 
Employed  1.122*** 1.177*** 1.107** 
 (1.051 - 1.198) (1.082 - 1.280) (1.010 - 1.213) 
Immigrant  0.582*** 0.600*** 0.565*** 
 (0.461 - 0.734) (0.473 - 0.761) (0.435 - 0.735) 
Cigarette price 0.832* 0.820** 0.771** 
 (0.689 - 1.005) (0.677 - 0.994) (0.621 - 0.957) 
Full ban  0.909*** 0.935* 
  (0.848 - 0.975) (0.868 - 1.007) 
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Partial ban  0.992 1.029 
  (0.918 - 1.073) (0.948 - 1.118) 
Newfoundland   1.034 0.954 
  (0.782 - 1.368) (0.710 - 1.282) 
Prince Edward   1.157 1.295 
  (0.857 - 1.562) (0.941 - 1.781) 
Nova Scotia    1.121 1.225 
  (0.842 - 1.492) (0.911 - 1.648) 
New Brunswick   1.041 1.244 
  (0.787 - 1.378) (0.932 - 1.660) 
Quebec   1.070 1.187 
  (0.846 - 1.353) (0.929 - 1.517) 
Ontario   1.018 1.110 
  (0.818 - 1.267) (0.896 - 1.375) 
Manitoba   1.032 1.113 
  (0.784 - 1.358) (0.836 - 1.481) 
Saskatchewan   1.193 1.274* 
  (0.920 - 1.547) (0.969 - 1.674) 
Alberta   1.201 1.335** 
  (0.939 - 1.536) (1.058 - 1.683) 
Observations 29118 29118 29118 





Odd ratios (95% confidence intervals) for the quit attempt regression using warning 
scale, and Autoregressive Correlation (AR1)  
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    
Graphic warnings 1.323*** 1.333*** 1.398*** 
 (1.155 - 1.515) (1.163 - 1.528) (1.200 - 1.629) 
Male  1.044 1.034 1.057 
 (0.865 - 1.260) (0.855 - 1.249) (0.852 - 1.311) 
Age 25-34 0.497*** 0.499*** 0.505*** 
 (0.363 - 0.680) (0.364 - 0.684) (0.355 - 0.720) 
Age 35-44 0.475*** 0.482*** 0.500*** 
 (0.338 - 0.669) (0.341 - 0.681) (0.344 - 0.729) 
Age 45-64 0.433*** 0.437*** 0.444*** 
 (0.302 - 0.620) (0.304 - 0.627) (0.300 - 0.656) 
Age 65+ 0.333*** 0.329*** 0.356*** 
 (0.200 - 0.554) (0.198 - 0.547) (0.204 - 0.621) 
Secondary  1.287 1.306 1.351* 
 (0.935 - 1.772) (0.944 - 1.807) (0.944 - 1.932) 
Some post secondary 1.242 1.241 1.319* 
 (0.943 - 1.636) (0.941 - 1.636) (0.979 - 1.777) 
Post secondary 1.223 1.222 1.327* 
 (0.928 - 1.611) (0.924 - 1.617) (0.976 - 1.806) 
Low middle income 0.990 1.009 1.079 
 (0.784 - 1.250) (0.799 - 1.275) (0.836 - 1.393) 
High middle income 0.912 0.938 0.926 
 (0.714 - 1.165) (0.732 - 1.201) (0.707 - 1.214) 
High income 0.767* 0.788 0.720** 
 (0.580 - 1.014) (0.594 - 1.047) (0.525 - 0.987) 
Married  1.074 1.035 1.003 
 (0.839 - 1.373) (0.809 - 1.324) (0.762 - 1.319) 
Separated  1.184 1.158 0.979 
 (0.893 - 1.571) (0.874 - 1.535) (0.721 - 1.328) 
Household size 1.014 1.020 1.016 
 (0.949 - 1.083) (0.954 - 1.090) (0.941 - 1.097) 
Employed  0.795*** 0.912 0.859 
 (0.669 – 0.946) (0.721 - 1.155) (0.661 - 1.117) 
Immigrant  1.101 1.110 1.121 
 (0.795 - 1.525) (0.799 - 1.541) (0.778 - 1.615) 
Full ban  0.850 0.964 
  (0.680 - 1.062) (0.752 - 1.235) 
Partial ban  0.826* 0.912 
  (0.659 - 1.034) (0.710 - 1.170) 
cigarettes smoked 0.676*** 0.679*** 0.720*** 
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per day 11-19 
 (0.569 - 0.803) (0.571 - 0.806) (0.587 - 0.882) 
cigarettes smoked 
per day >20 
0.514*** 0.512*** 0.590*** 
 (0.425 - 0.622) (0.423 - 0.621) (0.469 - 0.742) 
Smoke within 31-60 
mins after waking 
  1.179* 
   (0.969 - 1.433) 
Smoke after 60 mins 
from waking 
  1.144 
   (0.901 - 1.453) 
Newfoundland   1.060 0.859 
  (0.639 - 1.757) (0.482 - 1.530) 
Prince Edward   0.817 0.782 
  (0.492 - 1.356) (0.443 - 1.383) 
Nova Scotia    1.200 1.084 
  (0.747 - 1.929) (0.636 - 1.848) 
New Brunswick   0.784 0.794 
  (0.460 - 1.334) (0.443 - 1.423) 
Quebec   0.919 0.999 
  (0.607 - 1.392) (0.632 - 1.578) 
Ontario   0.945 0.976 
  (0.631 - 1.414) (0.626 - 1.521) 
Manitoba   0.961 0.877 
  (0.581 - 1.590) (0.525 - 1.466) 
Saskatchewan   1.328 1.258 
  (0.779 - 2.266) (0.699 - 2.266) 
Alberta   0.957 1.045 
  (0.621 - 1.475) (0.640 - 1.708) 
Observations 4720 4720 3799 





Odd ratios (95% confidence intervals) for the quit attempts regression 
(Warnings are defined to be in effect from July, using Autoregressive Correlation 
(AR1)) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    
Graphic warnings 1.323*** 1.332*** 1.392*** 
 (1.154 - 1.515) (1.162 - 1.527) (1.194 - 1.621) 
Male  1.044 1.033 1.056 
 (0.864 - 1.260) (0.855 - 1.249) (0.851 - 1.311) 
Age 25-34 0.496*** 0.499*** 0.505*** 
 (0.363 - 0.680) (0.364 - 0.684) (0.355 - 0.720) 
Age 35-44 0.475*** 0.482*** 0.501*** 
 (0.338 - 0.669) (0.341 - 0.681) (0.344 - 0.729) 
Age 45-64 0.433*** 0.437*** 0.444*** 
 (0.303 - 0.620) (0.304 - 0.627) (0.300 - 0.657) 
Age 65+ 0.333*** 0.330*** 0.357*** 
 (0.200 - 0.555) (0.199 - 0.548) (0.205 - 0.623) 
Secondary  1.287 1.306 1.351* 
 (0.935 - 1.773) (0.944 - 1.807) (0.944 - 1.932) 
Some post secondary 1.242 1.241 1.318* 
 (0.943 - 1.636) (0.941 - 1.636) (0.978 - 1.776) 
Post secondary 1.222 1.222 1.327* 
 (0.928 - 1.610) (0.923 - 1.616) (0.975 - 1.806) 
Low middle income 0.989 1.008 1.077 
 (0.783 - 1.250) (0.798 - 1.274) (0.834 - 1.392) 
High middle income 0.911 0.937 0.926 
 (0.713 - 1.164) (0.732 - 1.200) (0.706 - 1.213) 
High income 0.767* 0.789 0.720** 
 (0.580 - 1.014) (0.594 - 1.048) (0.525 - 0.988) 
Married  1.072 1.034 1.002 
 (0.838 - 1.372) (0.808 - 1.323) (0.762 - 1.318) 
Separated  1.183 1.157 0.977 
 (0.892 - 1.569) (0.873 - 1.534) (0.720 - 1.326) 
Household size 1.014 1.020 1.016 
 (0.949 - 1.083) (0.954 - 1.090) (0.942 - 1.097) 
Employed  0.796** 0.913 0.860 
 (0.669 - 0.947) (0.721 - 1.155) (0.662 - 1.118) 
Immigrant  1.101 1.110 1.121 
 (0.795 - 1.525) (0.800 - 1.541) (0.778 - 1.615) 
Full ban  0.850 0.964 
  (0.680 - 1.063) (0.753 - 1.235) 
Partial ban  0.826* 0.912 




per day 11-19 
0.676*** 0.679*** 0.720*** 
 (0.569 - 0.803) (0.571 - 0.807) (0.587 - 0.882) 
cigarettes smoked 
per day >20 
0.515*** 0.513*** 0.589*** 
 (0.425 - 0.623) (0.423 - 0.621) (0.468 - 0.741) 
Smoke within 31-60 
mins after waking 
  1.177 
   (0.968 - 1.432) 
Smoke after 60 mins 
from waking 
  1.144 
   (0.901 - 1.453) 
Newfoundland   1.059 0.860 
  (0.639 - 1.756) (0.483 - 1.532) 
Prince Edward   0.817 0.783 
  (0.492 - 1.356) (0.443 - 1.384) 
Nova Scotia    1.200 1.084 
  (0.746 - 1.928) (0.636 - 1.847) 
New Brunswick   0.784 0.795 
  (0.461 - 1.335) (0.444 - 1.424) 
Quebec   0.920 0.999 
  (0.607 - 1.392) (0.632 - 1.579) 
Ontario   0.944 0.975 
  (0.631 - 1.413) (0.626 - 1.520) 
Manitoba   0.960 0.876 
  (0.580 - 1.588) (0.524 - 1.463) 
Saskatchewan   1.328 1.258 
  (0.779 - 2.266) (0.699 - 2.265) 
Alberta   0.956 1.044 
  (0.620 - 1.474) (0.639 - 1.705) 
Observations 4720 4720 3799 





Odd ratios (95% confidence intervals) for the quit attempts regression 
(Warnings are defined to be in effect from December, using Autoregressive 
Correlation (AR1)) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    
Graphic warnings 1.323*** 1.333*** 1.398*** 
 (1.155 - 1.515) (1.163 - 1.528) (1.201 - 1.629) 
Male  1.044 1.034 1.057 
 (0.865 - 1.260) (0.855 - 1.249) (0.852 - 1.311) 
Age 25-34 0.497*** 0.499*** 0.505*** 
 (0.363 - 0.680) (0.364 - 0.684) (0.355 - 0.720) 
Age 35-44 0.475*** 0.482*** 0.500*** 
 (0.338 - 0.669) (0.341 - 0.681) (0.344 - 0.729) 
Age 45-64 0.433*** 0.437*** 0.444*** 
 (0.302 - 0.620) (0.304 - 0.627) (0.300 - 0.656) 
Age 65+ 0.333*** 0.329*** 0.356*** 
 (0.200 - 0.554) (0.198 - 0.547) (0.204 - 0.621) 
Secondary  1.287 1.306 1.351* 
 (0.935 - 1.772) (0.944 - 1.807) (0.944 - 1.932) 
Some post secondary 1.242 1.241 1.319* 
 (0.943 - 1.636) (0.941 - 1.636) (0.979 - 1.777) 
Post secondary 1.223 1.222 1.327* 
 (0.928 - 1.611) (0.924 - 1.617) (0.976 - 1.806) 
Low middle income 0.990 1.009 1.079 
 (0.784 - 1.250) (0.799 - 1.275) (0.836 - 1.393) 
High middle income 0.912 0.938 0.926 
 (0.714 - 1.165) (0.732 - 1.201) (0.707 - 1.214) 
High income 0.767* 0.788 0.720** 
 (0.580 - 1.014) (0.594 - 1.047) (0.525 - 0.987) 
Married  1.074 1.035 1.003 
 (0.839 - 1.373) (0.809 - 1.324) (0.762 - 1.319) 
Separated  1.184 1.158 0.979 
 (0.893 - 1.571) (0.874 - 1.536) (0.721 - 1.328) 
Household size 1.014 1.020 1.016 
 (0.949 - 1.083) (0.954 - 1.090) (0.941 - 1.097) 
Employed  0.795** 0.912 0.859 
 (0.669 - 0.946) (0.721 - 1.155) (0.661 - 1.117) 
Immigrant  1.101 1.110 1.121 
 (0.795 - 1.525) (0.799 - 1.541) (0.778 - 1.615) 
Full ban  0.850 0.964 
  (0.680 - 1.062) (0.752 - 1.235) 
Partial ban  0.826* 0.911 




per day 11-19 
0.676*** 0.679*** 0.720*** 
 (0.569 - 0.803) (0.571 - 0.806) (0.587 - 0.882) 
cigarettes smoked 
per day >20 
0.514*** 0.512*** 0.590*** 
 (0.425 - 0.622) (0.423 - 0.621) (0.469 - 0.742) 
Smoke within 31-60 
mins after waking 
  1.179 
   (0.970 - 1.433) 
Smoke after 60 mins 
from waking 
  1.144 
   (0.901 - 1.453) 
Newfoundland   1.060 0.859 
  (0.639 - 1.757) (0.482 - 1.530) 
Prince Edward   0.817 0.782 
  (0.492 - 1.356) (0.442 - 1.383) 
Nova Scotia    1.200 1.084 
  (0.747 - 1.929) (0.636 - 1.848) 
New Brunswick   0.783 0.794 
  (0.460 - 1.333) (0.443 - 1.422) 
Quebec   0.919 0.999 
  (0.607 - 1.392) (0.632 - 1.578) 
Ontario   0.945 0.976 
  (0.631 - 1.414) (0.626 - 1.521) 
Manitoba   0.961 0.877 
  (0.581 - 1.591) (0.525 - 1.467) 
Saskatchewan   1.328 1.258 
  (0.779 - 2.266) (0.699 - 2.266) 
Alberta   0.957 1.046 
  (0.621 - 1.475) (0.640 - 1.708) 
Observations 4720 4720 3799 






A summary for the odd ratios (95% confidence intervals) for the prevalence 
regression 




Warning scale  0.874*** 0.875*** 0.868*** 
 (0.821 - 0.930) (0.821 - 0.932) (0.809 - 0.931) 
July  0.873*** 0.874*** 0.864*** 
 (0.820 - 0.929) (0.820 - 0.931) (0.805 - 0.927) 
December  0.874*** 0.875*** 0.869*** 




Warning scale  0.869*** 0.867*** 0.852*** 
 (0.815 - 0.927) (0.812 - 0.926) (0.792 - 0.916) 
July  0.868*** 0.866*** 0.850*** 
 (0.814 - 0.926) (0.812 - 0.925) (0.791 - 0.914) 
December  0.869*** 0.867*** 0.852*** 




Warning scale  0.881*** 0.885*** 0.860*** 
 (0.825 - 0.942) (0.827 - 0.948) (0.797 - 0.927) 
July  0.881*** 0.884*** 0.857*** 
 (0.824 - 0.941) (0.827 - 0.946) (0.794 - 0.924) 
December  0.882*** 0.886*** 0.860*** 







A summary for the odd ratios (95% confidence intervals) for the quit attempts 
regression 
  





Warning scale  1.326*** 1.330*** 1.331*** 
 (1.184 - 1.485) (1.187 - 1.490) (1.175 - 1.508) 
July  1.326*** 1.329*** 1.325*** 
 (1.183 - 1.485) (1.186 - 1.490) (1.170 - 1.500) 
December  1.325*** 1.329*** 1.332*** 





Warning scale  1.308*** 1.313*** 1.314*** 
 (1.167 - 1.465) (1.172 - 1.472) (1.161 - 1.488) 
July  1.308*** 1.313*** 1.308*** 
 (1.167 - 1.466) (1.172 - 1.472) (1.155 - 1.481) 
December  1.308*** 1.313*** 1.315*** 





Warning scale  1.323*** 1.333*** 1.398*** 
 (1.155 - 1.515) (1.163 - 1.528) (1.200 - 1.629) 
July  1.323*** 1.332*** 1.392*** 
 (1.154 - 1.515) (1.162 - 1.527) (1.194 - 1.621) 
December  1.323*** 1.333*** 1.398*** 


























Source: Authors’ compilation using data from NPHS 
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Figure 2. Smoking prevalence and quit attempts





Adda, J., Cornaglia, F. (2006). Taxes, Cigarette Consumption and Smoking Intensity. 
American . Economic. Review, 96, 1013-1028. 
 
Alboim, N., Finnie, R., and Meng, R. (2005). The Discounting of Immigrants’ Skills in 
Canada, IRPP choices, 11(2). 
 
Altonji, J.G., and Blank, R.M. (1999). Race and gender in the labor market. Handbook of 
Labor Economics, 3: 3143-3259 . 
 
Baker, M., Benjamin, D. (1994).The performance of immigrants in the Canadian labor 
market. Journal of Labor Economics, 12 (3):369-405. 
 
Barro, R.J., Lee, J.W. (2010). Education Attainment for Population Aged 15 and Over 
1950-2010. Available at [http://www.barrolee.com/data/yrsch.htm]. 
 
Becker G., Murphy K. (1988). A Theory of Rational Addiction. Journal of Political 
Economy, 96(4). 
 
Beggs, J.J., Chapman, B.J. (1988). Immigrant wage adjustment in Australia cross-section 
and time-series estimation. Economic Record, 64 (186):161-167. 
 
Behrman, J.R., Birdsall, N. (1983). The Quality of Schooling: Quantity Alone is 
Misleading. American Economic Review, 73(5), 928-946. 
 
Bernheim, B.D., Rangel, A. (2004). Addiction and Cue-Triggered Decision Processes. 
American Economic Review, 94(5). 
 
Betts, J.R., Lofstrom, M. (2000). The educational attainment of immigrants: trends and 
implications. G.J. Borjas (Ed.), Issues in the Economics of Immigration, University of 
Chicago Press: 51-117. 
 
Betts, J.R. (1995). Does School Quality Matter? Evidence from the National Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 77(2), 231-250. 
 
Borland, R., Wilson, N., Fong, G.T., Hammond, D., McNeill, A., Cummings, K.M., et al. 
(2009). Impact of Graphic and Text Warnings on Cigarette Packs: Findings from Four 
Countries over Five Years. Tobacco Control, 18, 358-364. doi:10.1136/tc.2008.028043. 
 
Bratsberg, B, and Terrell, D. (2002). School Quality and Returns to Education of U.S. 
Immigrants. Economic Inquiry, 40(2):177-198.  
 
Brennan, E., Durkin, S.J, Cotter, T., Harper, T., Wakefield, M.A. (2011). Mass media 
campaigns designed to support new pictorial health warnings on cigarette packets: 
198 
 
evidence of a complementary relationship. Tobacco Control. 20, 412-418. 
doi:10.1136/tc.2010.039321.  
 
Card, D., and Krueger, A. B. (1992). Does School Quality Matter? Returns to Education 
and the Characteristics of Public Schools in the United States. Journal of Political 
Economy, 100(1): 1-40. 
 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2008). Smoking-attributable mortality, years 
of potential life lost, and productivity losses-United States, 2000-2004. Morbidity and 
MortalityWeekly Report, 57, 1226-8. 
 
Chaloupka, F., Warner, K.E. (2000). The Economics of Smoking. In A.J. Cuyler and J.P. 
Newhouse (eds.), Handbook of Health Economics (North Holland): 1539-1627.  
 
Chang, F., Chung, C., Yu, P., Chao, K. (2011). The impact of graphic cigarette warning 
labels and smoke-free law on health awareness and thoughts of quitting in Taiwan. 
Health Education. Research, 26 (2), 179-191. doi: 10.1093/her/cyq073.  
 
Chiswick, B. R. and Miller, P.W. (2010). Chapter 4 The Effects of School Quality in the 
Origin on the Payoff to Schooling for Immigrants, in Gil S. Epstein, Ira N. Gang (ed.) 
Migration and Culture (Frontiers of Economics and Globalization), Volume 8, Emerald 
Group Publishing Limited, 67-103. 
 
Chiswick, B.R., and Miller, P.W. (2008).Why is the payoff to schooling smaller for 
immigrants? Labor Economics, 15(6):1317-1340. 
 
Chiswick, B.R. (1978). The effect of Americanization on the earnings of foreign-born 
men. Journal of Political Economy, 86 (5):897-921. 
 
Chiswick, B.R., and Miller, P.W. (2009). The international transferability of immigrants’ 
human capital. Economics of Education Review, 28(2):162-169. 
 
Cismaru, M., Lavack, A.M. (2007).Tobacco Warning Labels and the Protection 
Motivation Model: Implications for Canadian Tobacco Control Policy. Canadian Public 
Policy, 33(4), 477-486. 
 
Cohen, J.E, Planinac, L.C., Griffin, K., Robinson, D.J., O’Connor, S.C., Lavack, A.et 
al.,(2008). Tobacco promotions at point-of-sale. The last hurrah. Canadian Journal of 
Public Health, 99(3), 166-171. 
 
Duleep, H. O, and Sanders, S. (1993). The Decision to Work by Married Immigrant 
Women. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 46(4): 677-90. 
 
Duleep, H.O., Regets, M.C. (1999). Immigrants and Human-Capital Investment. The 




Duncan,G.J, and Hoffman, S. D. (1981). The incidence and wage effects of 
overeducation. Economics of Education Review, 1(1):75–86. 
 
European Commission (2009). Eurobarometer: Survey on Tobacco (Analytical Report 
Flash EB No 253 – Survey on Tobacco). Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_253_en.pdf (accessed 23 November 2011). 
 
Farrelly, M.C., Nimsch, C.T., Hyland,A., Cummings,M. (2004). The Effects of Higher 
Cigarette Prices on Tar and Nicotine Consumption in a Cohort of Adult Smokers. Health 
Economics, 13(1), 49-58. 
 
Fagan, P., Augustson, E., Backinger, C.L., O'Connell, M.E., Vollinger, R.E., Kaufman A, 
Gibson, J.T.(2007)..Quit attempts and intention to quit cigarette smoking among young 
adults in the United States. American Journal of Public Health, 97(8):1412-20. 
 
Ferrer, A.M., Riddell, W. C. (2008). Education, Credentials, and Immigrant Earnings. 
Canadian Journal of Economics, 41(1): 186-216. 
 
Friedberg,R.M. (2000). You Can't Take It With You? Immigrant Assimilation and the 
Portability of Human Capital. Journal of labor economics, 18(2): 221-251.  
 
Gabler, N., Katz, D. (2010). Contraband Tobacco in Canada: Tax Policies and Black 
Market Incentives; Fraser Institute: Vancouver, BC, Canada. 
 
Galarneau, D., Morissette, R. (2004). Immigrants: Settling for less? Perspectives on 
Labour and Income, 5(6) Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 75-001-XIE, 5-16. 
 
Galarneau, D., Morissette, R. (2008) Immigrants Education and Required Job Skills. 
Perspectives on Labour and Income, Statistics Canada Catalogue no75-001-X . 
 
Givel, M. (2007). A Comparison of the Impact of U.S. and Canadian Cigarette Pack 
Warning Label Requirements on Tobacco Industry Profitability and the Public Health. 
Health Policy, 83(2-3),343-352. 
 
Gospodinov, N., Irvine, I.J(2004).  Global Health Warnings on Tobacco Packaging: 
Evidence from the Canadian Experiment. Topics in Economic Analysis & Policy, 4(1), 
30. 
 
Green, D.A, and Worswick, C. (2004). Immigrant Earnings Profiles in the Presence of 
Human Capital Investment: Measuring Cohort and Macro Effects, The institute for fiscal 
studies ,WP04/13 . 
 
Green, C., Kler, P., and Leeves, G. (2007). Immigrant overeducation: Evidence from 




Groot, W., and Van den Brink, H. M. (2000). Overeducation in the labor market: a meta 
analysis. Economics of Education Review, 19: 149-158. 
 
Gruber, J., Koszegi, B. (2001). Is Addiction “Rational”? Theory and Evidence. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 116(4). 
 
Hammond, D., Fong, G.T., McDonald, P.W., Cameron, R., Brown, K.S. (2003). Impact 
of the graphic Canadian warning labels on adult smoking behaviour. Tobacco Control, 
12, 391-395. 
 
Hammond, D., Fong, G.T, McDonald, P., Brown, S.K., Cameron, R. (2004). Graphic 
Canadian Cigarette Warning Labels and Adverse Outcomes: Evidence from Canadian 
Smokers. American Journal of Public Health, 94(8), 1442-5. 
 
Hammond, D. (2011). Health warning messages on tobacco products: a review. Tobacco 
Control. doi:10.1136/tc.2010.037630. 
 
Hammond, D., Fong, G.T., McNeill, A., Borland, R., Cummings, K.M. (2006). 
Effectiveness of Cigarette Warning Labels in Informing Smokers about the Risks of 
Smoking: Findings from the International Tobacco Control (ITC) Four Country Survey. 
Tobacco Control, 15(3). doi: 10.1136/tc.2005.012294. 
 
Hammond, D., Fong, G.T., Borland, R., Cummings, K.M., McNeill, A., Driezen, P. 
(2007). Text and Graphic Warnings on Cigarette Packages: Findings from the 
International Tobacco Control Four Country Study. American Journal of Preventive 
Medicine, 32 (3), 202-9. 
 
Hanushek, E. A., Kimko, D.D., (2000). Schooling, Labor-Force Quality, and the Growth 
of Nations. American Economic Review, 90(5): 1184- 1208. 
 
Hanushek E.A., Woessmann L. (2009). Do Better Schools Lead to More Growth? 
Cognitive Skills, Economic Outcomes, and Causation. NBER Working Paper 14633. 
 
Hanushek, E. A., Zhang, L. (2009). Quality Consistent Estimates of International 
Schooling and Skill Gradients. Journal of Human Capital, 3(2): 107-143. 
 
Hanushek, E. A., Interpreting recent research on schooling in developing countries. The 
World Bank Research Observer, 10, 227-46. 
 
Hardin J.W., Hilbe J.M. (2003). Generalized Estimating Equations, New York: Chapman 
and Hall. 
 
Hartog, J. (2000). Over-education and Earnings: Where Are We, Where Should We Go? 




Hastings, G., Stead, M., Webb, J. (2004). Fears Appeals in Social Marketing: Strategic 
and Ethical Reasons for Concern. Psychology and Marketing, 21(11), 961-986. 
 
Health Canada (2001). The Health Effects of Tobacco and Health Warning Messages on 
Cigarette, Survey of Adults and Adult Smokers and Youth. Available at: http://www.hc-
sc.gc.ca/hc-ps/tobac-tabac/research-recherche/por-rop/impact_2005-eng.php 
 
Health Canada (2000). Tobacco Products Information Regulations. Available at: 
http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/hc-ps/pubs/tobac-tabac/rc/index-eng.php 
 
Health Canada (2002). The Federal Tobacco Control Strategy: A Framework for Action. 
Health Canada. Available at: http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/hc-ps/alt_formats/hecs-
sesc/pdf/pubs/tobac-tabac/ffa-ca/ffa-ca-eng.pdf. 
 
Health Promotion Board. (2004). Singapore. Graphic Health Warnings on Tobacco 
Packaging Inspire Smokers to Quit the Habit. Available at: 
http://www.hpb.gov.sg/hpb/default.asp?pg_id=2982 
 




Health Canada. (2011). Tobacco Products Labeling Regulations (Cigarettes and Little 
Cigars) (TPLR-CLC). Available at [http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/hc-ps/tobac-
tabac/legislation/label-etiquette/index-eng.php]. 
 
Heckman, J.J., Masterov, D.V. (2007). The Productivity Argument for Investing in 
Young Children. Review of Agricultural Economics, 29(3): 446-493. 
 
Herrick, H (2000).Quit-Smoking Attempts Among Adult Daily Smokers in North 
Carolina: Results from the 1993-1998 NC Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System 
(BRFSS). State Center for Health Statistics, study No. 119.  
 
Hersch, J., (2005). Smoking Restriction as a Self-Control Mechanism. Journal of Risk 
and Uncertainty, 31(1). 
 
Hendricks, L. (2002). How Important Is Human Capital for Development? Evidence from 
Immigrant Earnings. American Economic Review, 92 ( 1). 
 
Heston, A., summers, R., Aten, B. (2011). Penn World Table Version 7.0, Center for 
International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of 
Pennsylvania. 
 
Kahende, J.W., Malarcher, A.M., Teplinskaya, A., Asman, K.J. (2011). Quit Attempt 
Correlates among Smokers by Race/Ethnicity. International Journal of Environmental 




Kiker, B.F., Santos, M.C., and De Oliveira, M .M. (1997). Overeducation and 
undereducation: evidence for Portugal, Economics of Education Review, 16(2): 111-125 . 
 
Kler, P. (2007). A panel data investigation into over-education among tertiary educated 
Australian immigrants. Journal of Economic Studies, 34(3): 179 – 193. 
 
Ladd, H., Loeb, S. (Forthcoming). The challenges of measuring school quality: 
Implications for educational equity. In D. Allen, & R. Reich (Eds), Education, Justice, 
and Democracy (pp.22-55). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.  
 
Lee, J.W., Barro, R.J. (1997). Schooling Quality in a cross section of countries. NBER 
working paper No. 6198. 
 
Lee, J.W., Barro, R.J. (2001). Schooling quality in a Cross-Section of Countries. 
Economica, 68: 465-488.  
 
Levy, D.T, Benjakul, S., Ross, H., Ritthiphakdee, B (2008). The role of tobacco control 
policies in reducing smoking and deaths in a middle income nation: results from the 
Thailand SimSmoke simulation model. Tobacco Control, 17:53-59 
doi:10.1136/tc.2007.022319  
 
Liang, K. Y., & Zeger, S. L. (1986). Longitudinal data analysis using generalized linear 
models. Biometrika, 73, 13–22. 
 
Li, C., Gervais, G., and Duval, A. (2006). The Dynamics of over qualification: Canada’s 
Underemployed University Graduates. Statistics Canada analytical paper, Catalogue no. 
11-621-MIE -No. 039.  
 
Li, J., Grigg, M. (2009). New Zealand: New Graphic Warnings Encourage Registrations 
with the Quitline. Tobacco Control, 18, 72. doi:10.1136/tc.2008.027649.  
 
Lindley, J.K., Lenton, P. (2006).The Over-Education of UK Immigrants: Evidence from 




Mattoo, A., Neagu, I.C. and Özden, C. (2008). Brain waste? Educated immigrants in the 
US labor market. Journal of Development Economics, 87: 255-269. 
 
Miller, C.L., Hill, D.J., Quester, P.G., Hiller, J.E. (2009). Impact on the Australian 
Quitline of New Graphic Cigarette Pack Warnings Including the Quitline Number. 
Tobacco Control, 18, 235-237. doi:10.1136/tc.2008.028290. 
 
Nagelhout, G.E., Levy, D.T., Blackman, K., Currie, L., Clancy, L., Willemsen, M.C 
(2011). The effect of tobacco control policies on smoking prevalence and smoking-
203 
 
attributable deaths. Findings from the Netherlands SimSmoke Tobacco Control Policy 
Simulation Model. Addiction, 107(2):407-16. doi: 10.1111/j.1360-0443.2011.03642.x.  
 
Nascimento, B.E., Oliveira, L., Vieira, A.S., Joffily, M., Gleiser, S., Pereira, M.G., 
Cavalcante,T., Volchan, E. (2008). Avoidance of Smoking: The Impact of Warning 
Labels in Brazil. Tobbaco Control, 17(6), 405-9. 
 
Nielsen, C.P. (2011). Immigrant over-education: evidence from Denmark. Journal of 
Population Economics, 24:499-520. 
 
Nonnemaker, J.M., Homsi, G (2007). Measurement properties of the Fagerstrom Test for 
Nicotine Dependence adapted for use in an adolescent sample. Addictive Behaviors, 
32:181-186.  
 
Non Smokers’ Right Association. Health warnings on tobacco products in Canada 
available at [http://www.nsra-adnf.ca/cms/index.cfm?group_id=1281] 
 
Non Smokers’ Right Association (2006). A map comparing cigarette prices in Canada. 
available at [http://www.nsra-adnf.ca/cms/index.cfm?group_id=1420]. 
 
Nordin, M. (2011). Immigrants’ Returns to Schooling in Sweden. International 
Migration, 49 (4). doi:10.1111/j.1468-2435.2009.00570.x. 
 
O’Donoghue, Rabin M. (1999). Doing it Now or Later. American Economic Review, 
89(1). 
 
O’Donoghue, Rabin M. (2002). Addiction and Present-Biased Preferences. Economics 
Working Paper E02-312, University of California at Berkley. 
 
Oreopoulos, P. (2009). Why Do Skilled Immigrants Struggle in the Labor Market? A 
Field Experiment with Six Thousand Résumés. NBER Working Paper No. 15036. 
 
Physicians for a Smoke-Free Canada (2010). Estimating the volume of Contraband Sales 




Picot, G., and Hou, F.(2003). The Rise in Low-Income Rates among Immigrants in 
Canada. Analytical Studies Branch Research Paper Series. Catalogue 
no.11F0019MIE2003198, Statistics Canada. 
 
Psacharopoulos, G., Woodhall, M. (1985). Education for Development: An Analysis of 




Reitz, J.G. (2001). Immigrant skill utilization in the Canadian labour market: 
Implications of human capital research. Journal of International Migration and 
Integration.2(3): 347-378, DOI: 10.1007/s12134-001-1004-1. 
 
Richardson, C.G., Ratner, P.A (2005). A confirmatory factor analysis of the Fagerstrom 
Test for Nicotine Dependence. Addictive Behaviors, 30:697-709. 
 
Ruiter, A.C., Kok, G. (2005). Saying is not (always) Doing: Cigarette Warning Labels are 
Useless. European Journal of Public Health, 15 (3): 329. doi: 10.1093/eurpub/cki095.  
 
Schoellman, T. (2011). Education Quality and Development Accounting. Review of 
Economic Studies. xx, 1–30. doi: 10.1093/restud/rdr025. 
 
Shields, M. A., Price, S. W. (1998). The earnings of male immigrants in England: 
evidence from the quarterly LFS. Applied Economics, 30, 1157-1168. 
 
Shields, M. (2007). Smoking bans: Influence on smoking prevalence. Health Reports, 
18(3). 
 
Sicherman, N. (1991). Overeducation in the Labor Market. Journal of Labor Economics. 
9(2): 101-22. 
 
Statistics Canada (2009). National Population Health Survey Household Component. 
Available at: http://www.statcan.gc.ca/imdb-bmdi/document/3225_D10_T9_V3-eng.pdf. 
 




Sweetman, A. (2004). Immigrant Source Country Educational Quality and Canadian 
Labor Market Outcomes. Statistics Canada, Analytical Studies Branch Research Paper 
No. 234. 
 
The Conference Board of Canada, (2004). Performance and Potential 2004- 2005: Key 
Findings. How Can Canada Prosper in Tomorrow’s World? Available at 
[www.conferenceboard.ca]. 
 
The Ontario Tobacco Research Unit. (2010). RETAIL DISPLAY OF TOBACCO 
PRODUCTS: MONITORING UPDATE. Available at: 
http://www.otru.org/pdf/15mr/15mr_no1_4.pdf. 
 
Tobacco free center. (2011). pictorial warning labels by countries and jurisdictions. 
Available at: http://tobaccofreecenter.org/files/pdfs/en/WL_examples_en.pdf 
 
Tsang, M. (1987). The impact of underutilization of education on productivity: a case 




Tsang, M. and Levin, H. (1985). The economics of overeducation. Economics of 
Education Review, 4, 93–104. 
 
Tsang, M., Rumberger, R. and Levin, H. (1991). The impact of surplus schooling on 
worker productivity. Industrial Relations, 30, 209–28. 
 
Vardavas, C.I., Connolly, G., Karamanolis, K., Kafatos A. (2009). Adolescents Perceived 
Effectiveness of the Proposed European Graphic Tobacco Warning labels. European 
Journal of Public Health, 19(2), 212-7. 
 
Verdugo, R.R., and Verdugo, N.T. (1989). The Impact of Surplus Schooling on Earnings: 
Some additional findings. Journal of Human Resources, 24(4): 629-643. 
 
Wald, S. and Fang, T. (2008). Overeducated Immigrants in the Canadian labour market: 
Evidence from the Workplace and Employee Survey. Canadian Public Policy, 34(4). 
 
Webster, B., Wakefield, M. (2008). Do Graphic Health Warning Labels have an Impact 
on Adolescents' Smoking Related Beliefs and Behaviours? Addiction, 103(9), 1562-71. 
 
Wooldridge JM. Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. The MIT Press, 
Cambridge, MA, 2002. 
 
World Health Organization. (2011). WHO report on the global tobacco epidemic, 2011, 
warning about the dangers of tobacco. WHO Press Geneva, Switzerland. Available at : 
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2011/9789240687813_eng.pdf 
 
World Health Organization. (2008). MPOWER: a policy package to reverse the tobacco 
epidemic. WHO Press Geneva, Switzerland. Available at : 
http://www.who.int/tobacco/mpower/mpower_english.pdf. 
 
Zeger, S.L., Liang, K.Y., Albert, P.S. (1988). Models for longitudinal data: a generalized 
estimating equation approach. Biometrics, 44(4):1049-60. 
 
 
